The Perils of Top-down State-Building
Can weak states build social order from the top down?
Social Structure and Conflict
Why are conflicts in some areas especially frequent and severe?
Reducing Crime and Violence: Experimental Evidence from Cognitive Behavioral Therapy in Liberia
Can therapy influence criminals to stop violent careers?
Predicting Local Violence in Liberia
Is it possible to predict where violence will occur?
Reconciling After Civil Conflict Increases Social Capital but Decreases Individual Well-Being
Does reconciliation heal the wounds of war?
Are states led by women less prone to conflict than states led by men?
Labor Market Opportunities and Violent Crime among Muslim Youth: Experimental Evidence from Northern Nigeria
Can providing labor market opportunities improve economic well-being and decrease violent criminal activity?
State-Building Lessons from the British Empire
After the frustration of recent state-building missions, we should ask why such interventions seemed less difficult in the era of colonial expansion. Before 1939, foreign statebuilding interventions were regularly managed by a decentralized team of plenipotentiary agents who specialized in fostering local political development. Since 1945, however, international assistance has generally worked with and through an officially recognized national government, implicitly supporting a centralization of power. This paper considers the corps of British colonial District Officers as a potential model for an international state-building agency, which could help to repair failed states that export violence and suffering.
Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective
In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries’ decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: What determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?