


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From Benedict, K., 2015. Global Governance. In: James D. Wright (editor-in-chief), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences*, 2nd edition, Vol 10. Oxford: Elsevier. pp. 155–161.

ISBN: 9780080970868

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Global Governance

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Abstract

Global governance is the purposeful order that emerges from institutions, processes, norms, formal agreements, and informal mechanisms that regulate action for the common good. Global governance encompasses activities that transcend national boundaries at the international, transnational, and regional levels and is based on rights and rules that are enforced through a combination of economic and moral incentives. Mechanisms of global governance are composed of elements and methods from both the public and private sectors. These elements include agreed upon standards, evolving norms based on shared values, and directives issued by private authorities and ultimately enforced by states. Methods of global governance include harmonization of laws among states, international regimes, global policy issue networks, and hybrid institutions that combine functions of state agencies and private sector organizations.

The exercise of global governance raises three sets of issues. The first has to do with the legitimate exercise of authority, the second with democratic values, and the third with effectiveness. In contrast to governance at local and national levels, a social contract between citizens and institutions of global governance has not developed to constitute a sufficient basis for legitimate action in all domains. In its current formulations, global governance implies democratic governance by emphasizing openness, accountability, and fairness. However, the reliance on scientific and professional bodies to set standards, on bureaucratic agencies of the state to implement policies, and on voluntary organizations to monitor compliance, none of which are based on democratic principles of representation or equal participation, raises questions about the compatibility of democratic values with the practice of global governance. The effectiveness of global governance is challenged by the worldwide scope of problems, such as climate change, and by the large number of public institutions, private firms, and civil society groups that require coordination to address global problems.

Definition

Global governance is the combination of intentional and patterned human interactions that regulate action worldwide for the common good. It is a purposeful order that emerges from institutions, processes, norms, formal agreements, and informal mechanisms that provide a field of action for human activities. Governance is based on shared expectations, as well as on intentionally designed institutions and mechanisms (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992; Biersteker, 2009).

In nation-states, the authority of public institutions lies ultimately in the government's capacity to provide societal order and socialize individuals to a common identity, as well as its monopoly of the legitimate use of force (March and Olsen, 1998). In the global context, no world governmental body is responsible for order and stability, nationalism stirs rivalries, and no one institution enjoys a monopoly of the legitimate use of force; no single global authority exists. Yet commerce among countries and firms expands, information is communicated

across national boundaries in an orderly fashion, and expectations about rule implementation are shared through transnational networks of private and public agents. Cooperative action is based on rights and rules that are enforced through a combination of financial, material, and moral incentives as well as through the use or threat of force. How this happens is the domain of global governance.

Global governance is distinguished from international relations, which refers to relations among states and to the formal institutions in which states participate, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or the Association of South East Asian Nations. Global governance includes these formal organizations, but also encompasses activity at the international, transnational, and regional levels that is both within and outside the purview of states. For some analysts, the term includes recognition of the effects of local activity on the global, such as emissions of carbon dioxide on the atmosphere, and global effects on the local, such as transnational capital flows on the health of subnational economies. For most analysts, global refers to those activities in the public and private sectors that transcend nation-state boundaries.

Governance in the Context of Rapid Globalization

Heightened attention to global governance at the turn of the twenty-first century is the result of an increasing understanding of the interconnectedness of human activity on the planet and growing recognition that problems arising from global trade and finance, and from changes in the climate due to human activity, for example, need more cooperation than is possible through states acting together in existing international organizations, such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund. The growing interdependence of societies brought about by increased trade and capital flowing across national boundaries, a recognition of the effects of human activity on the biosphere, extensive population migration, and increasing communication between people in far-flung locations contribute to the globalization of human society. Regulating these transborder activities to prevent harm to economic livelihoods, to human health and dignity, and to the Earth's

atmosphere prompt increased attention to the need for improved global governance.

Informal Networks, Formal Institutions, and Incentives

Ordered and patterned interactions on a global scale then are the result of international agreements, of harmonization of laws among countries, of common interpretations of international law, of transnational cooperation among functional agencies, of self-enforcing contracts between private firms, and of standard operating procedures of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Taken altogether, this array of formal legal arrangements, informal codes of conduct, incentives, and habitual practices based on shared expectations about legitimate action constitutes global governance.

So, for example, the United Nations is a formal international arrangement based on legal agreements among states and is considered to be part of global governance. It is one of many formal institutions, however. Others include the World Trade Organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, as well as other regionally based treaty organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Organization of African States, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

In addition, transnational cooperative actions among national law enforcement agencies, for example, also are part of global governance. Interpol combats illegal criminal activity, like drug and human trafficking, through police agencies that volunteer to cooperate and share information. In civil law, courts set precedents and decide cases based on case law from other national judicial systems. And in commercial law, private mediation is used by business firms, rather than government authorities, to settle disputes (Slaughter, 1997). Finally, over the past two decades, newly created international courts with compulsory jurisdiction are independently applying the rule of law as newly empowered nonstate litigants seek remedies, and courts call upon legal and political networks to pressure states to uphold court interpretations (Alter, 2014).

These informal arrangements are supported by networks of individuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and state agencies. Cross-government professional relationships provide opportunities to learn from the experience of judges, central bank governors (the Basle Committee), securities regulators (International Organization of Securities Commissioners), and regulators of insurance industries (International Association of Insurance Supervisors) from other countries. These organizations use Memoranda of Understanding to improve the harmonization of regulation on the international level as financial transactions have become increasingly global. Providing for orderly global financial transactions through transnational networks of domestic officials and industry representatives can be quicker and more flexible than negotiating through formal international institutions; new rules can be incorporated directly into domestic law, rather than requiring treaty action.

The development of networks has accelerated with the introduction of high-speed electronic communications technology. Even before these advances, however, travel and

telephone communication contributed to a worldwide human rights movement, a global environmental movement, an international women's movement, transnational corporations, and international professional societies. Such networks have established common standards in a number of fields. In the case of human rights, for example, the diffusion of norms about the rights of prisoners and citizens came about through the use of international media to publicize cases of abuse. Similar tactics have exposed poor labor conditions of major transnational corporations such as Nike and Apple. Such public 'shaming' of governments and businesses is based on shared norms about the need to protect individual rights. Some of these values have been codified in formal national and international laws, while others are observed because they enhance the public reputations of businesses and legitimacy of governments.

At its core, the concept of global governance builds on behavioral understandings of law and society, where law is a dynamic and changing reflection of shared standards and values. This suggests that norms of appropriate behavior emerge from daily interactions to solve transborder problems and from a developing consensus about what is fair. These norms may subsequently be codified in law. Compliance is undertaken voluntarily rather than through the use of physical force, although the threat of sanctions, whether criminal or civil, is recognized as an underlying motivator of compliant action. The evolution of GATT into the World Trade Organization exemplifies the formal codification of rules, about international trade in this case, emerging from a process of informal negotiation and standard setting (Abbott and Snidal, 2000).

Both the threat of sanctions and an interest in avoiding harm to themselves are at work. In the private adjudication of transnational business disputes, for example, firms wish to preserve flexibility and avoid undue government interference, which they may view as harmful, so they comply with the judgment of a private mediator rather than taking the issue to a public institution for settlement. Transnational corporations, such as Nike and Apple, will implement higher labor standards if they believe their product sales will suffer if poor worker conditions are brought to light.

Elements of Global Governance

Several fundamental elements constitute the building blocks of contemporary global governance. The most prominent of these are standards, norms, states, and international organizations.

Standards

Agreeing upon and setting standards is one means of coordinating private actions. For example, the standardization of time through the use of Greenwich Mean Time permits coordination of communications, airline schedules, television broadcasting, business deals, and a myriad of daily transactions that we now take for granted. Rules of international navigation and airline procedures ensure the safety of air travel across national borders. A standard railroad gauge eases transborder crossings. Product standardization rationalizes the multinational

manufacturing of automobiles, televisions, refrigerators, and other appliances through ISO 9000. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) ensures that financial wire transactions between banks in different countries are protected from corrupt or criminal practices.

In general, standards are accepted because they are voluntary and are arrived at through the exercise of professional expertise, in which peers or equal actors reach decisions through rational deliberations that are open to interested parties. In practice, the process of standard setting by bodies such as ISO 9000, for example, is completed by those with expertise in fields like accounting and engineering or the Internet, representing users and pledged to serve the public interest. The legitimacy of standards rests upon efficiency and on the desirable consequences of the rule, which allows no exceptions or variations. To the extent that efficiency is a value in itself, and to the extent that professions embody and transmit a set of values, standard setting is not entirely value-neutral. In comparison with hierarchy, markets, or norm-based communities, standardization is a minimal form of governance.

Norms

Norms are internalized rules based on commonly held values. In the international security area, nonuse of nuclear weapons is cited as such a norm. The norm is based in part on a shared revulsion at the devastation to human life and society that is inflicted indiscriminately in nuclear explosions. In the human rights domain, human rights abuses violate widely shared understandings of the inherent value of human life and the appropriate treatment of individuals by their governments.

Shared norms are developed and transmitted through informal networks of professionals and representatives from international institutions, national governments, nongovernmental voluntary associations, and private business (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). For example, the International Red Cross advocated for the humane treatment of wartime combatants that resulted in the Geneva Convention by convincing military leaders that protecting the wounded was compatible with their war aims. These commonly held values in many domains, in turn, contribute to the regulation of international conflict, the management of nuclear weapons, environmental pollution, human rights abuses, and humanitarian relief, among others. Some analysts view these networks as an essential component of global governance, providing a way of governing without government (Reinicke, 1998).

States

The organization of nation-states in the twentieth century has depended upon the development of bureaucracy, or hierarchy, as a means of governing. The growth of the modern state has included regulation of markets, of educational institutions, of environmental conditions, of criminal activity – in fact of nearly every aspect of daily life – as a means of coordinating action for the common good. While some of this regulation has come through standard setting and norms development, the characteristic mode of hierarchical government is through directives. These directives are enforced through the use

and threat of punitive sanctions, including imprisonment and fines.

The enforcement power of the state is based on its monopoly over the legitimate use of force. This monopoly, in turn, is based on a social contract, whereby citizens voluntarily cede some of their sovereign rights to the government, in return for protection from hostile forces and for a social order maintained by the state. The central problem for theorists and practitioners of global governance is that there is no global social contract and no world government, and yet, transborder activities generate needs for coordination, as well as problems of collective action to deal with externalities, such as climate-changing carbon dioxide emissions.

Some observers locate global governance in a global public domain beyond the sphere of states (Ruggie, 2004), where supranational and private actors dominate in emerging structures that are undemocratic and unequal (Deudney, 2007). Others emphasize the continuing role of states in global governance and document how national laws anchor and promote transnational private financial transactions for economic gain at the same time that national laws are shaped by the actions and needs of private transnational firms (Sassen, 2002). Whether the state is part of or is marginal to global governance continues to be debated. Whatever the outcome of the debate, however, it is clear that events like the global financial crisis of 2007, violent attacks by global terrorist movements, and the lack of concerted action to reduce climate-changing gases challenge state sovereignty and the capacity to protect citizens from harmful transborder flows and activities.

International Organizations

International organizations, ranging from the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to the International Court of Justice, have played more active roles since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. Their influence is sometimes difficult to evaluate, and their failings are often the subject of negative comment, as when the UN Security Council failed to intervene in genocides in Rwanda and Darfur. Yet the positive contributions to more efficient collective state action, as in state pooling of financial resources for economic development in poor countries through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, are often taken for granted (Abbott and Snidal, 1998).

In a particularly telling contrast, UN conferences that have sought to commit member states to reductions in their carbon dioxide emissions that disrupt the Earth's climate have failed over the past 40 years. Yet the UN-supported Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which collects data from scientists worldwide and reports the findings in consensus documents, has been very successful. Indeed, it has presented the public and policy leaders with remarkably clear analyses of large bodies of data and provided a clear scientific basis for government action.

However, industrial countries belong to a plethora of international, regional, and issue-specific organizations that overlap in ways to actually cause conflict and complicate national decision making. The decade-long international dispute over bananas between the European Union and the

United States illustrates the complexities and costs of overlapping jurisdictions, in this case, the nesting of the banana regime within the EU, the Lome Convention, and the World Trade Organization (Alter and Meunier, 2006).

Newly established international courts are emerging as autonomous interpreters of the rule of law as well as arbiters of disputes between states. The rise of compulsory jurisdiction that allows international commissions, prosecutors, and private parties to initiate litigation enables international courts to interpret the meaning of international law independently from state interests. In effect, changes over the past 20 years have removed the monopoly power of national governments and domestic judges to define what international law requires even within their own jurisdictions. Much as states have tasked international financial institutions with aiding poor countries and regulating trade disputes, states have tasked international courts with helping to enforce international law (Alter, 2014). In cases ranging from prosecuting war criminals, to enforcing international conventions against human trafficking, to establishing labor rights, courts have interpreted and enforced new international law. And, whereas states have traditionally enforced laws through coercion and punishment, international courts enforce laws with the aid of transnational organizations, international public media, and legal actors to pressure governments to comply. As domestic courts often effect changes in legal interpretation by expressing a public consensus about the expansion of rights even at the expense of dominant interests, international courts are acting independently from powerful state interests to make findings from the perspective of rule of law.

Methods of Global Governance

Elements of governance – standards, norms, state capacities, and international organizations – are used in combination to coordinate action, solve transnational problems, and manage conflict, and together constitute global governance in practice. Among the most effective methods are harmonization of laws, international regimes, global issue networks, and hybrid public–private institutions.

Harmonization of Laws

The implementation of formal international agreements is accomplished through the adoption of national laws to bring local and national practices into compliance with international rules. For example, carrying out the provisions of the Montreal Protocol to protect the atmospheric ozone layer is accomplished through legislative action in each country to bring manufacturing practices into conformity with the Protocol's agreed directives to reduce production and release of chlorofluorocarbons.

Legislative action is one path to harmonization of laws. Another is through the courts and judicial systems of countries. A body of transnational law is developing informally in which judges in one country are basing their decisions on precedents and case law from other countries (Busch and Jorgens, 2005; Slaughter, 1997). This is taking place in areas of civil and commercial law, through observation and borrowing, where

standard rules help to smooth business and legal transactions in what is conceived as global public administrative law (Kingsbury et al., 2005). In the area of human rights law, courts are citing cases in other national jurisdictions, in addition to the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as precedent and to lend credibility to decisions about the protection of civil and political rights in their own countries.

International Regimes

International regimes are defined as a “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge” (Krasner, 1983). The effectiveness of a regime rests on the operations of institutions, organizations, governments, and international bodies that share a set of principles, rules, and norms in a particular area of international action. Although regimes include formal treaties and national law, they also rely on informal norms and networks to develop and enforce standard behavior in an area of global policy.

For example, regimes to control the development and spread of nuclear weapons had been relatively successful in the context of the Cold War. They were critical to controlling the US–Soviet arms race, to preventing nuclear war, and to limiting the spread of nuclear weapons technology and weapons. These regimes had their basis in a number of formal treaties and international agreements, such as the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, as well as selected enforcement powers through the United Nation's International Atomic Energy Agency. They were shaped as well by the informal meetings, discussions, networks, and personal relationships of scientists and other experts working across national boundaries to formulate these agreements (Evangelista, 2002). To ensure compliance, regimes relied on formal and informal surveillance techniques and the trust that emerged from shared norms about the dangers of nuclear weapons, their development, production, and proliferation (de Nevers, 1999).

The World Trade Organization (WTO), along with the OECD's system for accepting data on product testing, multi-lateral agreements on investment, and other regulations, constitute a regime that provides order in trading between and among countries. The regime provides for standards, regulates tariffs, and adjudicates disputes among countries to prevent trade wars. Although still regarded as an institution that favors developed countries, WTO inclusion of environmental standards and labor provisions has enhanced its legitimacy as a global organization that can effectively resolve disputes, especially between emerging economies and established industrial countries.

Global Policy Issue Networks

Development of global policy and implementation of common laws also depends on informal networks of organizations and individuals. These networks are composed of individuals who share an interest in providing a public good that may not be provided by any single nation-state. Through communication networks, sometimes built around professional associations and scientific bodies, these transnational

action networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) or epistemic communities (Haas et al., 1993) provide information, documentation, and alternative policy solutions to global policy problems.

Some of the most visible networks have formed since the mid-1970s on human rights, environmental protection, communications technology, and women's issues. In each of these areas, lawyers, scientists, and political and cultural leaders have found counterparts in other countries to form worldwide movements that have publicized the harm brought about by current national policies and practices. In the case of women's issues, the actions of nongovernmental organizations at United Nations conferences on women and on population were essential to changing norms and practice. At the 1995 population conference in Cairo, the recognition of women's empowerment as a key path to fertility reduction, rather than an emphasis on birth control, demonstrated the influence and effectiveness of women's issue networks in shaping global policy. The adoption by the United Nations of the concept of the 'responsibility to protect' emerged from policy networks, high-level commissions funded by private foundations and governments, and in response to the shameful genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s that violated shared norms about the protection of civilians in conflicts.

Hybrid Institutions

As transnational activity has increased, as nongovernmental actors have become more prominent, and as national governments have devolved authority to private sector bodies, new institutional arrangements have developed to manage global relations. These arrangements are referred to as hybrid institutions or public-private partnerships because they mix private sector organizations and a variety of incentive systems with governmental agencies to achieve public goods. They combine standard rules, private market arrangements, nongovernmental norm-based organizations, and government agencies – both national and international.

Some of the most inventive have emerged in the area of environmental protection. The certification of sustainably harvested coffee or forest products is an example of hybrid global governance institutions. Presented as an alternative to governmental regulation of the timber industry, environmental nongovernmental organizations have convinced major private firms in the forest products industry that consumers will pay premium prices for furniture and other lumber products that are sustainably harvested. To ensure compliance, private firms participate in a council of producers, scientists, and other independent interests that inspects production operations and certifies that manufactured products are derived from sustainably harvested lumber. The manufacturer uses that certification to appeal to consumers who are willing to pay higher prices to protect natural resources. The process takes place without government intervention, includes market incentives, and relies on professional expertise and standardization to enforce rules. Similar certification institutes have been established for textile manufacturing and diamond mining.

The prosecution of transnational criminal activity involves another kind of hybrid institution. Organized crime has become relatively border free, especially as liberalization of

economic relations has taken place, yet law enforcement jurisdiction remains within fixed territorial legal frameworks. To deal with this challenge, law enforcement agencies have developed cooperative relationships with their counterparts in other countries, as well as with banking institutions, to share information and to apprehend criminals. Interpol, a voluntary association of police departments from around the world, has made 31 000 arrests in the past decade to bring malefactors in the illegal transnational drug trade, the arms trade, human trafficking, and other criminal activity, to justice (Barnett and Duvall, 2005).

Issues in Global Governance

While new modes of coordinating transborder activity are emerging that hold the promise of effective global governance, theoretical and normative challenges have been raised. Three are addressed here: effectiveness, the legitimacy of global governance bodies, and the democratic nature of these global governance processes.

Effectiveness

The problems that global governance is intended to address are beyond the scope of any one national government to solve. Yet, without the usual tools of government, including legitimate use of force to induce compliance, governance at the global level often fails. Enforcement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is compromised by lack of automatic sanctions for countries such as North Korea, Libya, and Iran, when they withdraw from the treaty or engage in bomb-making activity, or for European suppliers that provide equipment to the illicit nuclear weapon network of Pakistan's nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.

When the interests of a coalition of states can be met through international organizations, as in the case of removing chemical weapons from Syria in 2014 by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, global agencies can provide expertise and coordination of state parties to international conventions. But more often, global governance is frustrated by lack of agreement about how goals should be met, as in the failure to agree on goals and quotas for reducing carbon emissions that are warming the Earth's atmosphere, or in devising common rules for regulating securities and financial transactions worldwide with the result that the global economy suffers in 2014 from volatility that dampens recovery from the world recession of 2008. In another example, prompt coordination to prevent the spread of deadly pandemics is hampered by lack of state cooperation in reporting outbreaks. Officials may fear a halt in international tourism and loss of trade if they do report emerging epidemics, but they also may suffer from a lack of faith in the effectiveness of global institutions like the World Health Organization. This lack of information sharing, in turn, further reduces the effectiveness of global governance.

One way to increase the effectiveness of global governance is to instill heightened belief in the legitimate action and authority of global institutions. This is the next challenge to be addressed.

Legitimacy and Authority

Successful governance requires the consent and compliance of those whose activity is being governed. In other words, to be effective, practices and institutions that constrain actions must be accepted as legitimate. This aspect of contemporary global governance remains problematic. In theories of the state, social contracts between citizen and government have depended on citizens relinquishing some rights in exchange for physical protection. But no such social contract exists at the global level (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). At the most, legitimacy claims have been based on what works well, what is efficient, or what is reasonable in the eyes of those seeking solutions to transborder coordination and public goods problems (Deudney, 2007).

Issues of legitimacy become even more vexed with the increased participation of nongovernmental organizations in issue networks and hybrid institutions. While the authority of governments and the legitimacy of private firms are based, in some measure, on implicit contracts with citizens or consumers, respectively, the authority and legitimacy of nongovernmental organizations is based on their claims of acting in the public good – as they define it. Whether protecting individuals by calling attention to the human rights abuses of their own governments, or conserving biodiversity in the face of extractive private industry, or saving women from customary rituals that cause physical harm, nongovernmental actors believe they are upholding standards that are in the interests of all humanity.

These organizations, however, are not assembled through an election process or any other democratic procedure. They are self-appointed and claim to be acting on the basis of values that serve a global public interest. Without an authoritative institution that provides a process for establishing common values and agreement on what constitutes the public good, issues of authority and legitimacy in global governance will most likely remain unresolved.

Democratic Values and Fairness

While some definitions of global governance emphasize the neutral management of human affairs, there is a strong normative component to the term that leaves underlying assumptions about who governs and with whose standards largely unexamined (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). The strongest challenges to current practices of global governance come from developing country analysts who observe that emerging global standards and norms are based on industrial countries' interests and values (Hurrell, 2007). They suggest that the dominance of power politics in international institutions, the disparity of wealth between North and South, the intolerance for differences in values, the resort to force to resolve international conflicts, and the neglect of environmental degradation are major deficiencies of global governance.

To reform current practices, critics encourage equal participation by developing countries in international institutions and suggest treating dominant powers like the United States as normal countries that must abide by international law. Chinese analysts, in particular, would strive for a harmonious world of justice and common prosperity. They observe that

globalization has disproportionately benefited developed countries and contributed to inequality everywhere which is undemocratic and which undermines peace and stability. And global governance mechanisms to manage globalization have grown out of and are imposed by Western ideology and values on the rest of the world. To rectify these disparities, global governance should encourage technology transfer, provide more aid to poorer countries, and in general, promote shared development and common prosperity. Furthermore, recognizing the diversity of civilizations and tolerance for alternative methods of problem solving would provide a richer set of ideas for managing transnational issues and would enhance the legitimacy of global governing mechanisms (Wang and Rosenau, 2009).

While the challenges to current conceptions of global governance may be growing, practices continue to evolve along with calls for transparency, accountability, and protection of individual rights (Ruggie, 2004). The informality and pluralism of global governance both recognizes and requires the contributions of private firms, nongovernmental actors, and informal networks in policymaking. Yet the reliance on unrepresentative scientific and professional bodies to set standards, on bureaucratic national and international agencies to implement policies, and on unelected voluntary organizations to monitor compliance raises questions about the compatibility of democratic values and the practice of global governance.

The increasingly acute challenges to human welfare from rising inequality within and between countries, and from the stresses on societies from climate change will propel transborder activity, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, may induce fear and a retreat to state-centered isolation. The web of networks, institutions, rules, and norms that constitute global governance has thickened dramatically over the past 30 years to meet some of the challenges of economic globalization, promote the spread of universal human rights, and conserve biodiversity of species in the world, among others. Whether the effectiveness, legitimacy, and the authority required to resolve the global crises of the environmental commons, of growing inequality, and of increasing instability and violence will emerge quickly enough to prevent cataclysmic suffering remains to be seen.

See also: Globalization: Legal Aspects; Law and Society; Nongovernmental Organizations: Anthropological and Historical Aspects.

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