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HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION

Preventing Authoritarian Reversals or Promoting Consolidation?

By PAUL POAST and JOHANNES URPELAINEN*

INTRODUCTION

DEMOCRATIZATION in the developing world is, according to Samuel Huntington, “an important—perhaps the most important—global political development of the late twentieth century.”¹ While scholars of comparative politics have explored the domestic political economy of democratic transitions,² they, along with scholars of international relations,³ also recognize that international actors, particularly international organizations (IOs), are crucial for successful political transformation.⁴

But how do IOs promote democratic transitions? While previous work suggests that “democratization from above” via IOs can support democratic transitions,⁵ scholars know relatively little about how the process actually works. Given that few IOs are capable of using force to protect democratic transitions against coups and civil war, the causal mechanisms through which IOs can be effective are not at all clear.

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¹ Huntington 1991, xiii.

² Huntington 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Svolik 2008.

³ Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008. At the international level, linkages to liberal democracies (Levitsky and Way 2006) and financial openness (Freeman and Quinn 2012) also influence democratization.

⁴ Ekiert, Kubik, and Vachudova 2007; Vachudova 2005.

⁵ Pevehouse 2005.

In particular, the existing scholarship fails to distinguish between the effect of international organizations on the temporary survival of transitional democracy and their effect on lasting democratic consolidation, whereby democratic governance becomes the only game in town and nondemocratic forms of political competition, such as coups, are no longer relevant.⁶ As Milan Svolik⁷ points out, distinguishing between “transitional” and “consolidated” democracies is critical, as each faces different odds of reverting to dictatorship. In transitional democracies, the threat of authoritarian reversal is ever present. In consolidated democracies, authoritarian reversals are exceedingly rare.⁸ In other words, consolidation refers not to mere survival, but to a qualitative change that essentially eliminates the possibility of reverting to dictatorship.

While this distinction is critical, Svolik⁹ notes that democratic consolidation is unobservable. Transitional, nonconsolidated democracies may resist authoritarian reversals for long periods of time in favorable circumstances, yet they remain at risk of authoritarian reversal. Factors that enable democratic consolidation and prevent authoritarian reversals include economic performance,¹⁰ wealth,¹¹ previous military rule,¹² and a combination of economic performance and previous military rule.¹³

The distinction between “consolidated” and “transitional” is essential to understanding how international organizations can help recently democratized states weather the difficult metamorphosis to full consolidation. Do international organizations help transition democracies survive in difficult times, or do they promote democratic consolidation? For instance, by not addressing this distinction, Jon Pevehouse seems to suggest that international organizations can promote consolidation *and* prevent or stop reversals, writing that “[j]oining regional organizations can raise the costs of anti-democratic behavior by those outside or inside the regime . . . these costs serve both as a deterrent to potential anti-regime forces and provide a device for new democrats to foster credible commitments to political reform.”¹⁴

⁶ Throughout this article, the terms “transitional” and “nonconsolidated” are used interchangeably.

⁷ Svolik 2008.

⁸ Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Przeworski 2005; Svolik 2008.

⁹ Svolik 2008.

¹⁰ Przeworski et al. 2000.

¹¹ Przeworski 2005.

¹² Cheibub 2007.

¹³ Haggard and Kaufman 1995.

¹⁴ Pevehouse 2005, 3. A related question is whether international organizations could cause democratization in the first place. Our study omits the question, but see Pevehouse 2005, chap. 4, for evidence that IO memberships can, in addition to supporting exogenously initiated democratic transitions, induce democratization.

We argue that while IOs can promote democratic consolidation, they are unable to prevent authoritarian reversals in transitional democracies. This inability is largely because IOs are not designed to use force. IOs can build capacity and coordinate expectations¹⁵ and thereby increase the likelihood of consolidating a transitional democracy. However, since IOs cannot enforce policy or directly intervene in conflict,¹⁶ they cannot protect transitional democracies from coups and revolutions. Moreover, states are reluctant to relinquish any portion of their monopoly on the use of force within their territory to enable the IO to prevent reversals.

Given the importance of domestic political context when studying democratization, we follow Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman¹⁷ and José Antonio Cheibub¹⁸ and expect military dictatorship to complicate democratic consolidation. However, it is unclear whether a history of military rule increases or decreases the influence of IOs. IOs could promote democratic consolidation where they are most needed—in the difficult circumstances caused by previous military dictatorship. Alternatively, they could promote democratic consolidation where circumstances are more conducive—the fertile ground of a previous civilian authoritarian regime. Both hypotheses sound plausible, yet they are mutually exclusive.

Empirically, we first analyze authoritarian reversals and democratic consolidation in the heyday of IOs, 1965–2001. Following Svoblik,¹⁹ we estimate a split-population model that distinguishes between (observable) authoritarian reversals and (unobservable) democratic consolidation. The split-population model assumes that some democracies are consolidated while others are not and, while the consolidation status of any given democracy is unobservable, the statistical model uses available data to estimate the likelihood that a given democracy has become consolidated. To account for the endogenous nature of state decisions to seek IO membership, we add a prior selection equation to the conventional split-population model. Since IO membership is not exogenous, it is important to use a selection model that accounts for variation in how readily different democracies seek membership. This allows us to evaluate the effect of IO membership on democratic consolidation.

¹⁵ Chayes and Chayes 1995; Abbott and Snidal 2010.

¹⁶ Downs, Rocke, and Barsom 1996.

¹⁷ Haggard and Kaufman 1995.

¹⁸ Cheibub 2007.

¹⁹ Svoblik 2008.

We find that IOs enhance the probability of democratic consolidation. The effect of IOs on democratic consolidation is maximized against the backdrop of previous military rule, suggesting that IOs promote democratic consolidation where they are needed most. However, we also find that IOs do nothing to prevent authoritarian reversals in unconsolidated democracies. We argue and show that the result is consistent across different types of IOs, thereby suggesting that high levels of IO independence or enforcement capacity are not required for IOs to perform functions like capacity building and coordination.

Admittedly, membership in or the prospects of accession to some IOs, such as the European Union (EU), might prove highly effective in promoting democratic governance.²⁰ Nevertheless, we maintain that distinguishing between transitional democracies and democratic consolidation is important both for understanding the general functioning of IOs and for calibrating the expectations policymakers place on such organizations. We demonstrate that, in general, IOs play an important role in democratic consolidation, but their effects are contingent. In contrast to Pevehouse's argument,²¹ IOs do not prevent or stop authoritarian reversals, but they do promote democratic consolidation. They are also much more important in the difficult case of previous military rule. This finding testifies to the importance of analyzing the interaction between domestic and international parties when studying democratization. In addition, while Svobik²² highlights authoritarian reversal and democratic consolidation as distinct processes, he is largely silent about the precise political mechanisms that foster consolidation. By emphasizing institutional capacity, we offer a concrete mechanism for the occurrence of consolidation.

CONSOLIDATED VERSUS TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACY

Democratic consolidation cannot be captured in a single empirical measure. On a theoretical level, it refers to the lack of nondemocratic political competition for power. In a consolidated democracy, elections are the only credible means to power. However, measuring democratic consolidation is difficult. It requires both deep formal institutionalization and the public legitimacy of democratic political competition. While democratic consolidation virtually guarantees a lack of authoritarian reversals, even a nonconsolidated democracy may be able to avoid such reversals for some period of time. Similar to Svobik,²³ we do

²⁰ Mattli and Plümpert 2004; Vassiliou 2007; Poast and Urpelainen 2013.

²¹ Pevehouse 2005.

²² Svobik 2008.

²³ Svobik 2008.

not attempt to develop an empirical measure of democratic consolidation, but instead use a statistical technique that estimates the probability of democratic consolidation.

The key to understanding how IOs influence democratization is to recognize that democratizing states face two challenges: the need to consolidate democracy and the need to prevent authoritarian reversal. While related, these are distinct processes. As briefly discussed in the introduction, Svobik²⁴ highlights how transitional and consolidated democracies each face different odds of reverting to dictatorship. Barry Weingast makes a similar distinction between the initiation and consolidation of democracy.²⁵

Democratic initiation places a government in a precarious state, as it marks a transition from a known authoritarian regime to “something else.”²⁶ As Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter observe,

[t]hat ‘something’ can be the instauration of a political democracy or the installation of a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule. The something can also be confusion, that is, a rotation in power of successive governments that fails to provide any enduring or predictable solution to the problem of institutionalizing political power. Transitions can also develop into widespread, violent confrontations that eventually give way to revolutionary regimes that promote changes far beyond the political realm.²⁷

It is thus unclear what regime type will emerge when democracies are in a state of transition. Since the enduring presence of democracy is far from certain, actors in a transitional democracy have incentives to undermine the nascent regime. To state it another way, citizens in transitional regimes, who hold widely different social and economic positions, have not agreed on the limits to impose on the state. They all may prefer democracy, but this preference is balanced by a preference for outcomes on a host of other policies, such as economic reform.²⁸

Moreover, leaders in transitional regimes, particularly in democratizing states, face acute time-inconsistency problems—the incentive to quickly renege on commitments—with respect to policies. As Edward Mansfield and Pevehouse²⁹ write, “[T]he possibility of policy reversals is hardly unique to transitional regimes, but such regimes are often marked by political instability and considerable government turnover,

²⁴ Svobik 2008.

²⁵ Weingast 1997.

²⁶ O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 3.

²⁷ O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 3.

²⁸ Weingast 1997, 246.

²⁹ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008, 271.

which increases the odds of policy change.”³⁰ The time-inconsistency problem is present in democratizing states largely due to an absence of constraints against indiscriminate policy control. Time inconsistency is less of a problem in societies where a “web of legal rights” constrains the calculations of the ruler’s interests.³¹ But in democratizing states, leaders and members of society are unsure if formal characteristics and institutions will be enforced or endure.³² This is especially a problem for democratizing countries in the developing world, where Huntington long ago observed that democratic institutions consistently fail to take root.³³ When institutions appear ephemeral to actors within a society (including the leader), actors perceive themselves and others as unconstrained. This undermines the ability of actors to develop stable expectations of behavior, which, by shortening time horizons, can undermine institutional and policy quality.³⁴ As Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo state, “In such a context . . . [leaders] may select strategies that are prescribed by the rules, but they may also choose among various extra-institutional options.”³⁵ Such options include breaking down the established rules themselves.

Ethan Kapstein and Nathan Converse find one of the most important inhibitors of authoritarian reversal is having sufficient constraints on executive power. Countries with weak executive constraints experience authoritarian reversal 70 percent of the time.³⁶ In contrast, only 40 percent of countries with strong executive constraints experience reversals. This leads Kapstein and Converse to state, “[I]nstitutions providing checks and balances [on the executive] do appear to play a crucial role in whether young democracies consolidate or collapse.”³⁷ Most importantly, these scholars observe that “[Democratization] is a function of whether societies . . . are able to craft governance arrangements that are characterized by effective checks and balances.”³⁸ Constraints on executive power enable sustained democratization because democratic leaders with few constraints on executive power will seek to weaken their opponent’s base of support and, using both rhetorical and

³⁰ See also Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Calvo and Frenkel 1991.

³¹ Quinn 2000, 11.

³² Levitsky and Murillo 2009.

³³ Huntington 1968.

³⁴ O’Donnell 1994; North 1990; Stein et al. 2006.

³⁵ Levitsky and Murillo 2009, 124.

³⁶ For Kapstein and Converse 2008, a country has “weak” executive constraints if the 1–7 executive constraint variable in the Polity IV data set has a score of 5 or lower (Jagers and Gurr 1995).

³⁷ Kapstein and Converse 2008, 61.

³⁸ Kapstein and Converse 2008, 117.

legal attacks, divide veto players.³⁹ These attacks can be perpetuated against business federations, labor unions, and political or civil society organizations.

In contrast to the highly volatile political environment of transitional democracies, consolidated democracies are marked by an acceptance of democracy's permanence. In other words, consolidation refers not to mere survival, but to a qualitative change that essentially eliminates the possibility that a democracy will revert to a dictatorship. According to Svoboda, this is when the probability of reversal to dictatorship becomes essentially zero.⁴⁰

Weingast, quoting Michael Burton, John Higley, and Richard Gunther,⁴¹ further elaborates: "[Consolidated democracies require that] politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game . . . [D]emocratic consolidation is a 'process through which democratic forms come to be valued in themselves, even against adverse substantive outcomes.'"⁴²

Hence, while transitional democracies face an ever-present threat of authoritarian reversal, authoritarian reversals are virtually nonexistent in consolidated democracies.⁴³ Within consolidated democracies, citizens have resolved the coordination dilemma and will punish political officials who undermine democratic principles, regardless of the policy gains the citizens would have enjoyed by such deviations.⁴⁴ How citizens reach this stage is largely a function of time. With each year that passes, the conditional probability that a democratic regime reverses to autocracy decreases.⁴⁵

When does a country, in practice, reach this stage? This is a fundamental question. Weingast acknowledges how "the literature characterizes many central differences between consolidated and unconsolidated democracies, but this characterization does not explain the difference."⁴⁶ The ambiguity about when a democracy graduates from transitional to consolidated takes us to the core of Svoboda's claim, which, as we describe below, informs our empirical strategy: a democracy achieving consolidation is unobservable.⁴⁷ Rather than imposing

³⁹ Weyland 2002.

⁴⁰ Svoboda 2008, 153.

⁴¹ Burton, Higley, and Gunther 1992.

⁴² Weingast 1997, 260.

⁴³ Huntington 1991; Przeworski 1991; Przeworski 2005; Svoboda 2008.

⁴⁴ Weingast 1997, 260.

⁴⁵ Przeworski et al. 2000, 101.

⁴⁶ Weingast 1997, 260.

⁴⁷ Svoboda 2008, 154.

an arbitrary cutoff for how old a democracy must be in order to be classified as consolidated, we can, at best, accept that a many-decades-old democracy might plausibly be consolidated.

Democratizing states progress down two tracks. One is the long track of becoming a consolidated democracy. This track entails developing and ingraining the procedures for citizens to choose their rulers in free and fair elections, express themselves in the political process, uphold civil and minority rights with institutions that constrain an executive (once chosen by the citizens), and ensure that all societal actors are treated as equal before the law.⁴⁸ The other track occurs simultaneously; the democratizing state's leadership faces daily the possibility that some shock may induce a segment of the regime and/or society that is dissatisfied to perpetuate an authoritarian reversal. While the risk for such a reversal diminishes with time as the state becomes consolidated, the leadership cannot know when it finally dissipates. For instance, while improvements in a transitional democracy's level of development will assist in consolidating that democracy, the risk that a sudden recession will induce the return of the autocracy will only disappear once the democracy consolidates. In the section below, we use the distinction between consolidated and transitional democracies to develop a theory for how IOs can and cannot facilitate democratization.

HOW MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTS DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

We argue that while IOs can promote democratic consolidation, they are unable to prevent authoritarian reversals in transitional democracies. IOs can provide capacity building and technical expertise, coordination between private and public actors, and enhanced transparency.⁴⁹ These functions can facilitate cooperation among actors and coordinate expectations, thereby increasing the likelihood of consolidating a transitional democracy. However, since IOs cannot enforce policy or directly intervene in conflict, they cannot protect transitional democracies from coups and revolutions. Moreover, states are reluctant to relinquish a

⁴⁸ These are the components of a truly accountable political system (liberal democracy) as identified by Guillermo O'Donnell and affirmed by Dahl 2004, 52.

⁴⁹ Chayes and Chayes 1995; Grigorescu 2003; Abbott and Snidal 2010. As we discuss IO functions, we do not emphasize their role in "socializing" (Pevehouse 2005) governments into democratic governance. If we did, socialization would probably contribute more to gradual democratic consolidation than to thwarting often violent authoritarian reversals.

portion of their monopoly on the use of force within their territory to enable IOs to prevent reversals. In short, while the vast majority of IOs can effectively help democratizing countries improve their governance capacity and slowly strengthen their resilience, IOs have a limited ability to stop an authoritarian reversal, such as a military coup or a revolution.

In making this argument, we assume that IO membership is exogenous to democratization. Following other studies of democratization and IO membership,⁵⁰ we assume that the democratizing state sought membership for reputational reasons and to implement reforms that allow it to govern more effectively. Hence, our theory focuses on the impact an IO has on democratization once the state joins the IO. Because previous research suggests that democratization leads to IO membership,⁵¹ our empirical tests must account for such selection effects.

We next present our theory. We begin by detailing the reasons IO membership cannot prevent authoritarian reversal and then explain how it can promote democratic consolidation.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP CANNOT PREVENT AUTHORITARIAN REVERSALS

Given that IOs, by and large, cannot enforce state behavior, we expect them to have minimal ability to prevent authoritarian reversals. As defined above, authoritarian reversals occur when political groups successfully subvert the state through revolution or coup.⁵² Most authoritarian reversals are violent, resulting in deaths and political violence against the democratizing state's leaders and their supporters.⁵³ Even if an authoritarian reversal is implemented by a democratically elected government, it often features violent suppression of political opposition.

Reversals succeed because the democratizing state cannot thwart the threat. Given that most IOs lack the ability to enforce policy even in times of peace, their ability to suppress political violence is questionable. When a political group begins the violent overthrow of a democratic government, its primary concern is to break the state's monopoly on the use of force. An IO with expertise in coordination and capacity building, for example, is hardly an important obstacle to this goal. When a political group begins to subvert democratic institutions, IOs cannot directly intervene to prevent an authoritarian reversal.

⁵⁰ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

⁵¹ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

⁵² Haggard and Kaufman 1995.

⁵³ Svoblik 2012b, 23.

Even relatively independent IOs, such as the European Union, rarely shape the outcome of violent encounters between a government and its opposition. As Yoram Haftel and Alexander Thompson⁵⁴ show, states who are members of such organizations ultimately make their own policy; moreover, an IO's independence rarely involves the ability to interfere with a state's internal affairs. Even when IOs promote international peace, they do so by disseminating information among states and promoting common norms, not by stopping violence by deploying troops.⁵⁵

This is not to say that the use of force is the only way IOs can intervene to stop a coup or revolution. An IO could, for example, sound the alarm and draw the international community's attention to an illegitimate seizure of power, or offer to mediate. We argue, however, that IOs with weak capabilities cannot be expected to be effective entities in this arena. Nongovernmental organizations also act against authoritarian reversal by alerting the international community to a situation (perhaps more effectively than IOs), and mediation does not require an IO.

Consequently, groups responsible for authoritarian reversals have no reason to consider the possibility that IOs will prevent them from doing so. When weighing the costs and benefits of a coup or revolution, their primary concerns are the response of the state, popular mobilization, and the reaction of foreign powers.⁵⁶ These factors are much more important than condemning statements by IOs, which leads to our first hypothesis:

—H1. Consider a transitional democracy that has not consolidated. The probability of authoritarian reversal does not depend on membership in international organizations.

To understand this hypothesis, consider Pevehouse's⁵⁷ case study of the Organization of American States (OAS). According to his analysis, the OAS played a useful role in promoting democratization in Latin America. Specifically, he considers the suspension of Guatemala's constitution and legislature by Jorge Serrano Elías in May 1993. While Pevehouse⁵⁸ identifies the military as playing a key domestic role in

⁵⁴ Haftel and Thompson 2006.

⁵⁵ Haftel 2007. Oneal and Russett 2005 note that IOs can also generate international audience costs, but they never argue that these apply to domestic groups. Moreover, Chapman and Wolford 2010 show formally that even if IOs can increase the costs of war, they have an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of conflict.

⁵⁶ Przeworski 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Levitsky and Way 2006.

⁵⁷ Pevehouse 2005.

⁵⁸ Pevehouse 2005, 190.

Serrano's ouster in June 1993 and the eventual reestablishment of democracy in the country, he also claims that the OAS had a deterrent effect. He claims that the OAS secretary-general's trip to Guatemala to warn Serrano's supporters about the possibility of international isolation was a key reason the military there supported the continuation of democracy, writing that "a fear of international isolation was clearly present among a large group of junior officers."⁵⁹ To support this claim, Pevehouse states that simultaneous to the OAS mission, "the US cut aid to Guatemala and threatened to eliminate trade preferences."⁶⁰ This observation is problematic for his argument, however, because to understand the relationship between IOs and democratization, the influence of the OAS should not be conflated with the influence of the United States. Moreover, Pevehouse⁶¹ does not analyze whether the OAS worked to prevent authoritarian reversals or to promote democratic consolidation.

According to our hypothesis, the OAS should be more effective in promoting democratic consolidation through capacity building than by directly deterring subversive groups from attempting coups and revolutions. Various OAS country projects in Latin America illustrate this claim. Based on our coding of these projects using the organization's Annual Report of the Secretary General, we find that less than 5 percent (thirty-one out of 654) of the organization's projects between the years 1992 and 2010 focused on preventing domestic political crises and, almost without exception, these projects were implemented in Colombia and Haiti. The remaining 95 percent had more mundane goals, such as electoral capacity building or training civil servants. Additionally, projects labeled as domestic political crisis prevention were, in actuality, responses to crises that already passed. In short, while the OAS provides some limited crisis response, it does not appear to prevent political crises, including authoritarian reversals.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP PROMOTES DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

IO membership may help in the long and difficult process of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation occurs when political competition allows different interests to gain office while the expected probability of a coup or revolution is minimal. This state of being requires

⁵⁹ Pevehouse 2005, 191.

⁶⁰ Pevehouse 2005, 191.

⁶¹ Pevehouse 2005.

that democratic institutions provide various political groups plausible nonviolent means of political competition and that such competition becomes self-enforcing.⁶² If a sufficient number of the people believe in democracy, then coups and, in particular, revolutions are no longer lucrative political strategies for groups that covet political office.

IO membership can increase the probability that a transitional democracy successfully undergoes democratic consolidation, and thus, in the long run, becomes invulnerable to authoritarian reversals. Since democratic consolidation requires functioning institutions for political competition and policy implementation, an IO can promote democratic consolidation through capacity building, policy implementation, information provision, and improved coordination. We next detail each of these roles.

First, IOs can build capacity for standard functions of electoral competition. In the right circumstances, IOs can help democratizing states implement fair and organized elections.⁶³ They can help in election monitoring, provide assistance for legislation concerning political organizations, and allow inexperienced political groups to learn from the experiences of their other members. Thus, even if IOs cannot directly enforce free and fair elections, they can improve the legitimacy of elections by enhancing their implementation and, at least on the margin, reduce politicians' incentives to cheat.

As an illustration, consider an OAS project initiated in 2008 in Panama.⁶⁴ This project was "to implement a quality management and certification system for the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, based on the standards of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9001:2000." The certification system emphasized:

preparation of manuals and regulation of all procedures; diagnostic studies to identify the procedures, products and services to which the quality management system can be applied; an evaluation of the current status of the operation; and analysis of what is lacking in the current practices and where they are inadequate, given the requirements of the ISO 9001:2000; a certification viability study; strategic plans for each office, and analysis of the Tribunal's organizational structure.

It would be difficult to argue that this purely technical project does anything to prevent authoritarian reversals in the short run. However, in the long run it improves Panama's ability to implement fair elec-

⁶² Fearon 2011; Przeworski 2005.

⁶³ Donno 2010; Hyde 2011.

⁶⁴ Organization of America States 2008.

tions, and thus enhances the legitimacy of the country's democratic political institutions.

Second, IOs can improve policy implementation so that democratic governance becomes more rewarding for different societal interests.⁶⁵ When the democratic government is capable of implementing policies that political groups covet, the ability to jeopardize democratic political institutions through subversive action is limited and fewer political groups view nondemocratic means to power as useful alternatives to the electoral route.

To illustrate, consider the World Bank's emphasis on anticorruption measures. In March 2007, the World Bank adopted a new anticorruption strategy, and in October of that year, the executive board approved an implementation plan for the strategy.⁶⁶ A key element of the strategy was to support countries' domestic anticorruption efforts—a prime example of the capacity building that our theory emphasizes. These anticorruption measures produce benefits only in the long run, and it is hard to argue that they effectively deter subversive groups from attempting to gain power by nondemocratic means. However, reduced corruption can improve the effectiveness of democratic governance, and thus, over time, builds popular support for democratic political institutions.

Third, IOs can provide citizens and legislators with information concerning solutions to standard governance problems. International organizations offer a means for legislators, citizens, and interest groups to access international sources of expertise and information.⁶⁷ They can also teach inexperienced governments and officials in recently democratized countries the international norms and best practices of policy formation.⁶⁸ Increased availability of such information allows governments of democratizing states to increase the probability of democratic consolidation through more effective governance procedures.

A good example of this particular mechanism is the Africa Caribbean Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) Parliamentary Assembly. By bringing together parliamentarians of the ACP and EU countries that signed the 2000 Cotonou trade agreement, the assembly's three committees (political affairs; economic development, finance, and trade;

⁶⁵ Jacoby 2001; Joachim, Reinalda, and Verbeek 2008.

⁶⁶ See *Strengthening Governance: Tackling Corruption*, March 6, 2012, update, 1–81, at <http://go.worldbank.org/32PINXVIJ0>, accessed March 21, 2012.

⁶⁷ Grigorescu 2003.

⁶⁸ Finnemore 1993.

and social affairs and the environment) aim “to promote democratic processes through dialogue and consultation” in order to promote development within ACP countries.⁶⁹ The organization cannot enforce policy, but it allows parliamentarians to exchange information and learn the ins and outs of democratic governance from counterparts in other countries.

Finally, IOs can coordinate expectations inside their member states. Common rules and practices can be thought of as scripts that democratizing states adopt to coordinate expectations and reduce uncertainty surrounding future policies and developments.⁷⁰ IOs disseminate such scripts among their member states⁷¹ and these create focal points that cause a convergence of expectations in democratizing states.

Overall, this discussion leads to our second hypothesis:

—H2. Consider a transitional democracy that has not consolidated. The probability of democratic consolidation increases with each additional membership in an international organization.

This hypothesis is consistent with the general thrust of the literature on democracy assistance. As Thomas Carothers⁷² argues, liberal democracies rarely promote democracy through carrots or sticks. Instead,

[t]he most common and often most significant tool for promoting democracy is democracy aid: aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening . . . democracy assistance is neither a carrot nor a stick. It is not awarded for particular political behavior, nor is it meted out for democratic slippage.

The relationship between IO membership and democratization is similarly one of giving assistance to democratic governance without conditionality based on rewards and punishments.⁷³

DOES DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT MATTER?

We next examine the role of domestic factors in the relationship between IOs and democratic consolidation. Consideration of the domestic

⁶⁹ See Article 17 of the Cotonou Agreement, revised June 22, 2010, at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/20_01/default_en.htm, accessed March 21, 2012.

⁷⁰ Bush 2011.

⁷¹ Bearce and Bondanella 2007; Cao 2009; Meyer et al. 1997.

⁷² Carothers 1999, 6.

⁷³ This does not preclude the possibility that the effect of additional IO memberships shows decreasing returns to scale.

context is critical, as illustrated by the comments of European Union Special Representative Bernardino León on Egypt's nascent transition to democracy, "Democracy must be achieved within, from the Egyptian society. We [the EU] can only accompany and I insist we will give our utmost respect to the choices and verdicts of the Egyptian people."⁷⁴

Perhaps the most important domestic factor influencing democratic consolidation is military rule during dictatorship. In general, democratization in military dictatorships results in democratic consolidation much less frequently than democratization in civilian authoritarian regimes.⁷⁵ According to the literature, this is because a history of military rule increases the probability of a military coup. Since the military previously ruled the country, the military is organized and capable of thwarting threats to its political influence. This, of course, presents a major problem for democratic consolidation—democracy being the only game in town is in direct contradiction to a privileged position for the military based on its monopoly on the use of force. Therefore, military dictatorship is a central factor in determining the baseline probability of democratic consolidation. In short, military dictatorships are relatively tough cases for democratic transition.

The two hypotheses we present below capture diametrically opposed possibilities: IO effects either *complement* or *substitute for* domestic covariates of democratic consolidation. On the one hand, it could be that IO effects are minimized in the overly difficult circumstances that characterize previous military dictatorships, so that IO membership is most effective in the fertile ground of nonmilitary authoritarianism. On the other hand, it could be that IO effects are maximized where they are needed most, so that IO membership is most relevant against the backdrop of the difficulties created by a history of military dictatorship. Both hypotheses are plausible, and we see no reason to favor one over the other from a strictly deductive perspective.

COMPLEMENTARITY

By complementarity, we mean that two causal factors reinforce one another. In the case of democratic consolidation, IO membership could strengthen the prospect of consolidation in countries that are already heading in that direction. According to previous research, a history

⁷⁴ *Daily News Egypt* 2011.

⁷⁵ Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Cheibub 2007; Svobik 2008. Moreover, Svobik 2012a, chap. 5, notes that military dictatorships relying on repression for political survival are vulnerable to military intervention.

of military rule is a central impediment to democratic consolidation⁷⁶ and, therefore, the military must be incapacitated as a political actor for democratic consolidation to take place. As long as the weapons backing the state's monopoly on the use of force can be used to overthrow the civilian democratic government, democratic consolidation is impossible.

If democratic consolidation is exceptionally difficult under a history of military rule, then capacity building and information provision through IO membership may be irrelevant. For example, previous research suggests that the military remains a powerful and potentially dangerous political actor in democratizing states that were previously ruled by the armed forces.⁷⁷ If the negative effect of the military on democratic consolidation overwhelms other issues, it also overwhelms an IO's contribution to democratic consolidation. Thus, only without the burden of previous military rule can IO membership assist democratic consolidation.

When the deposed military remains a serious threat to democratic consolidation, the impediments to consolidation are such that an IO specializing in capacity building or coordination is simply of no use. Complementarity assumes that democratizing countries with a history of military dictatorship have no realistic chance of avoiding authoritarian reversals, thereby rendering IO membership useless.

—H3a. Consider a transitional democracy. The positive effect of membership in an international organization on the probability of democratic consolidation is higher given previous civilian dictatorship than given previous military dictatorship.

The essence of this argument is simple. If a democratizing country has a history of military dictatorship, it is in acute danger of authoritarian reversal. In such a circumstance, the probability of democratic consolidation is low simply because the transitional democracy is highly likely to slide back to authoritarian rule at any given moment. Consequently, a lack of military dictatorship is an essential precondition for IOs to positively affect democratic consolidation.

SUBSTITUTABILITY

By substitutability, we mean that the importance of one causal factor decreases if another causal factor is introduced. According to this argument, since previous military rule reduces the probability of democratic

⁷⁶ Svoblik 2008.

⁷⁷ Haggard and Kaufman 1995.

consolidation, IO membership can counteract the negative effect of previous military rule. All else constant, military rule reduces the probability of democratic consolidation. However, IO membership would greatly increase the probability of democratic consolidation in democratizing countries that were previously military dictatorships.

The substitutability argument requires that democratizing states without previous military rule already possess the ingredients for successful democratic consolidation. Even without IO membership, democratizing states with a history of civilian authoritarian rule will ultimately create domestic political institutions that effectively dispose of nondemocratic forms of political competition. Therefore, IO membership is needed in the difficult circumstances caused by previous military rule. If IO membership increases governance capacity and creates an institutional setting that endows different political groups—including the military—with incentives to engage in legitimate democratic political competition, then even a democratizing state with a history of military rule may be able to overcome the risks associated with transitional democracy. Therefore, we would expect IO membership to facilitate democratic consolidation in democratizing states that suffer from the extra handicap of previous military rule.

—H3b. Consider a transitional democracy. The positive effect of membership in an international organization on the probability of democratic consolidation is higher given previous military dictatorship than given previous civilian dictatorship.

While the complementarity hypothesis is based on the idea that some democratizing countries are doomed to fail, the substitutability hypothesis contradicts this notion. IO membership might help democratizing countries overcome the handicap of previous military dictatorship. Rather than dooming the democratizing country to failure, a history of military rule, according to the substitutability hypothesis, is an impediment that can be successfully averted through IO membership.

Although surprising at first blush, the substitutability hypothesis is based on a logical argument. If transitional democracies without a history of military rule have a high probability of consolidation, they may be expected to consolidate democratic rule without any external assistance. In democratizing states with a history of military rule, however, improvements in governance capacity and the legitimacy of the state are necessary to achieve democratic consolidation. While IOs cannot prevent authoritarian reversals, the probability of democratic consolidation *conditional* on the lack of such reversals increases because of the

factors discussed in the section above. If the transitional democracy avoids authoritarian reversals for a sustained period of time for reasons unrelated to IOs, the importance of non-IO forms of support is high. While IOs cannot prevent the military from overthrowing the democratic government, they can contribute to democratic consolidation if the military remains at bay.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1965–2001: RESEARCH DESIGN

Identifying how IOs affect democratic consolidation and authoritarian reversal (H1 and H2) and whether the effect is conditioned by prior domestic institutions (H3a and H3b) requires operationalizing democratic consolidation, authoritarian reversal, IO membership, and prior domestic institutions. After discussing our unit of analysis, we describe how to empirically capture these concepts.

UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND POPULATION

Our population of cases, unit of analysis, and identification of authoritarian reversals come from Svoblik.⁷⁸ The population comprises all non-established democracies from 1965 to 2001; the time frame is determined by availability of data for IO membership and other covariates.⁷⁹ This gives us seventy-nine countries with thirty-four unique episodes of authoritarian reversals. Our unit of analysis is a modified country-year, called a *democratizing spell-year*. A democratizing spell begins when a country enters the data set by democratizing. It ends with an authoritarian reversal or in the year 2001, the last year of the data set.

More precisely, a country is no longer in a democratizing spell when it no longer meets any of the three necessary conditions for democracy identified by Carles Boix, Michael Miller, and Sebastian Rosato.⁸⁰ These conditions are: (1) the executive is directly or indirectly elected in popular elections and is responsible either directly to voters or to a legislature, (2) the legislature (or executive if elected directly) is chosen in free and fair elections, and (3) a majority of adult men has the right to vote.

Boix, Miller, and Rosato⁸¹ provide the example of Guinea-Bissau to

⁷⁸ Svoblik 2008.

⁷⁹ For our purposes, a “nonestablished democracy” is a state that was not already coded as democratic in 1950.

⁸⁰ Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013. Their criteria are relevant because Svoblik 2008 uses an older version of the Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013 data.

⁸¹ Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

illustrate the coding rules. João Vieira won a free and fair multiparty election to become president in 1994. The military, in a rebellion, took over the capital in 1998 and removed him from power in 1999. When a new president was elected in 2000, the new president dissolved the legislature and ruled by decree. Another military coup occurred in 2003 and an election in 2005 brought Vieira back to the presidency. Unfortunately, the military continued to engage in attempted coups and political violence resulting in Vieira's assassination in 2009. Because the military repeatedly inhibited the rule of elected officials, Boix and his colleagues⁸² code Guinea-Bissau as democratic only for the years 1994 through 1997.

Much of the empirical literature on democratic transitions assumes, after controlling for covariates, that all democracies face the same risk of authoritarian reversal.⁸³ According to Svoblik,⁸⁴ this fails to account for heterogeneity among democracies; some are consolidated and, hence, not vulnerable to authoritarian reversals, while others are transitional and avoid reversals only through favorable circumstances captured by a separate mechanism. The difficulty is that one cannot observe whether an existing democracy is consolidated or transitional. This is problematic because the two groups face different odds of reverting to dictatorship. Since our theory predicts that IO membership promotes consolidation but does *not* prevent authoritarian reversal in unconsolidated democracies, failure to distinguish between consolidated and transitional democracies prevents meaningful hypothesis testing. We now present an estimation approach that overcomes this barrier.

ESTIMATION APPROACH AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

A subject in our data is a democratizing spell. Each spell is right-censored, meaning each observation is either a consolidated democracy or transitional democracy at the final year of the time period analyzed (2001), but we cannot observe which state of democracy is the case. Svoblik,⁸⁵ building from previous statistical work,⁸⁶ uses an approach that treats each country as falling into one of two populations: transitional democracies or consolidated democracies. Using Svoblik's approach, we can simultaneously identify the impact of covariates on both the probability of a democratizing spell experiencing authoritarian reversal and the probability of a democratizing spell achieving democratic consoli-

⁸² Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

⁸³ Przeworski et al. 2000; Pevehouse 2005; Cheibub 2007.

⁸⁴ Svoblik 2008.

⁸⁵ Svoblik 2008.

⁸⁶ Anscombe 1961; Maltz and McCleary 1977; Schmidt and White 1989.

dation. If the probability of both reversal and democratic consolidation is low, a country can remain transitional for a very long period of time. Thus, rather than identifying the country's population, the model estimates the probability that a given country will enter a particular population. Because this estimates the probability of a state entering one of two unobservable populations, it is referred to as a *split-population* model.

Empirical results from a split-population model are acquired through a series of steps. In the first step, we specify two equations, each with the same vector of covariates.

$$\Pr(\textit{Consolidation}) = f(X_{i,t}) \quad (1)$$

and

$$\Pr(\textit{Reversal}) = f(X_{i,t}), \quad (2)$$

where $X_{i,t}$ is the vector of covariates capturing features of country i in year t . The first equation examines the probability that country i in year t is a consolidated democracy, while the second equation examines the probability that country i in year t experiences authoritarian reversal as an unconsolidated democracy.

If we could observe democratic consolidation, we would directly predict the effect of IO memberships on the likelihood that a transitional democracy becomes consolidated. Since such an observation is not possible, we can only estimate a probability that the country is consolidated given that, up to time t , the country has not yet reversed. Therefore, following Svulik,⁸⁷ the dependent variable in the first equation is the length, measured in years, of the democratizing spell. In the second equation, the dependent variable indicates whether a spell ends in authoritarian reversal. This, of course, is observable. Specifically, every spell-year for a democratizing spell ending in authoritarian reversal is coded 1 while every spell-year for a democratizing spell not ending in authoritarian reversal is coded 0.

We next estimate the effect of covariates $X_{i,t}$ on the probability of country i being a consolidated democracy at time t by leveraging that we know the number of years that country i has been a democracy and can observe when a country experiences authoritarian reversal. This entails simultaneously estimating the two equations,⁸⁸ which is done

⁸⁷ Svulik 2008.

⁸⁸ If the analyst could observe consolidation, then the analyst could estimate the equations separately or sequentially.

by deriving a likelihood function that simultaneously accounts for the probability that a transitional democracy will revert to autocracy in a given year, given that it eventually does revert, and for the probability that a country is a consolidated democracy, given that it is not observed to have reverted to autocracy.⁸⁹ Having derived the likelihood, we then apply numerical maximization to acquire coefficient estimates for both equations.⁹⁰ These coefficient estimates reveal the impact of a given covariate on the probability of a democratizing spell ending in either reversal or democratic consolidation.

As to the direction of causality, one may wonder if older democracies might acquire more IO memberships than new democracies, leading to a spurious correlation between IO memberships and avoiding authoritarian reversals. Below, we show that this concern is unwarranted. Similar to Mansfield and Pevehouse,⁹¹ our analysis (Table 2) shows that democracies join the most organizations in the early years of their spell as a democracy. If a democracy's age predicted new IO memberships, this would bias the results against our hypotheses. In other words, the findings below may understate the predictive power of our theory.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Our hypotheses address the expected effects of two explanatory variables, namely military dictatorship and IO membership and their interaction. We discuss each in turn.

The military dictatorship variable is a binary indicator for whether a democratizing spell was preceded by military dictatorship. It equals 1 given previous military rule, meaning it was an authoritarian country officially headed by a professional military officer, and 0 given previous civilian rule, meaning it was an authoritarian country officially headed by a civilian. As in Svoblik,⁹² the data are drawn from earlier versions of Boix, Miller, and Rosato.⁹³ In general, we expect a history of military dictatorship to reduce the probability of democratic consolidation.

With respect to the IO membership variable, we presume that joining more IOs creates, all things being equal, additional opportunities for IOs to influence the democratization process. There are two poten-

⁸⁹ Refer to Svoblik 2008, 156, for a more formal description of the likelihood function.

⁹⁰ When maximizing the likelihood of this simultaneous equation model, Svoblik assumes a distribution for the probability that a country continues as a democracy if it is right censored. He uses a Weibull distribution and log-logistic distributions. In the results presented here, we use a Weibull distribution, as it should be familiar to readers who have conducted survival analysis and because convergence could not be achieved assuming the log-logistic distribution.

⁹¹ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

⁹² Svoblik 2008.

⁹³ Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013.

tial approaches for operationalizing this variable, each with conceptual and methodological pitfalls. First, one could consider a state's overall number of IO memberships. This measure would include IOs that the state joined while a nondemocracy. One should reasonably expect that autocratic leaders would not choose to join IOs that promote democracy. Indeed, such IOs may not even allow autocratic states to become members.⁹⁴ This conceptual problem notwithstanding, we did try to estimate the model described above for preexisting IOs, but it failed to converge.

The second approach is to only consider the IOs the state joined since beginning the process of democratization. This measure is also problematic in that it is well documented that democratizing states seek membership in IOs.⁹⁵ However, we view this problem as preferable, since we can deploy a statistical method for addressing the selection bias. Although there is a risk of bias *ex ante*, we can rely on a transparent statistical method to correct for it.

Therefore, the IO membership variable captures the number of *new* IO memberships that a democratizing country possesses in a given year. This variable scores 0 in the beginning of a democratizing spell. It increases by 1 every time the democratizing country joins an IO and decreases by 1 every time it leaves one. Each authoritarian reversal results in resetting the number of new IO memberships for that country.⁹⁶

Importantly, our coding omits IO memberships inherited from authoritarian rule. This distinction is meaningful because authoritarian rulers may seek IO memberships for reasons unrelated to democratization. In fact, authoritarian governments may join an IO to avoid democratization.⁹⁷ Therefore, previous IO memberships should not have effects similar to those of new IO memberships initiated during a democratizing spell. The data for this variable are from Pevehouse, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke.⁹⁸ We expect IO membership to have a positive effect on democratic consolidation. Equally important, we expect it to have no effect at all on the probability of authoritarian reversal.

⁹⁴ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006. At the same time, we recognize that existing IOs can change their nature and begin promoting democratic consolidation, provided a sufficient number of members support democratic rule.

⁹⁵ Pevehouse 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008.

⁹⁶ A potential drawback of this approach is that a country with multiple democratization spells may not be able to join as many organizations as other states do. This is not a major issue for two reasons. First, the number of IOs continues to increase rapidly throughout the period under investigation. Second, many new IOs are created by democratizing states.

⁹⁷ An example is the Warsaw Pact, which enabled cooperation among communist dictatorships in the Soviet bloc.

⁹⁸ Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004.

Figure 1 illustrates the construction of this variable by showing the democratizing spells of four countries: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Ghana, and the Philippines. The Dominican Republic has not experienced any authoritarian reversals since democratizing in 1966, and it has steadily increased its number of IO memberships. Because the Philippines eventually reverted to autocracy, it has two democratizing spells. The analysis of the Philippines begins with a substantial number of new IOs (twenty-five) because it was in the middle of a democratizing spell that began in 1948 in the first year of our data set, 1965. Conversely, though Argentina was also in the middle of a democratizing spell in the first year of our data set, it had actually left two IOs since the first of its democratizing spells began in 1958. Over the time period of our analysis, Argentina and Ghana both experienced three democratizing spells. Ghana began its first democratizing spell in 1970 with -1 new IO memberships because it left an IO that same year. It began its third democratizing spell in 1993 with just three IOs because it joined three IOs the same year it began democratization.


We also include an interaction term between the military dictatorship variable and the number of new IO memberships. According to the substitutability hypothesis (H3b), the interaction term should have a positive coefficient in the democratic consolidation equation: new IO memberships are the most useful in the difficult circumstances induced by previous military rule. In contrast, according to the complementarity hypothesis (H3a), the interaction term should have a negative coefficient in the democratic consolidation equation: new IO memberships are the least useful in the difficult circumstances induced by previous military rule.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Previous studies of democratization have identified a core set of factors that influence democratic consolidation and authoritarian reversals. We control for these factors in our empirical analysis. Importantly, we aim for a parsimonious specification. Statistically, split-population models are difficult to estimate. Inclusion of irrelevant variables could not only cause incorrect inferences,⁹⁹ but also an inability of the model to converge on an estimate. Therefore, we include only critical control variables in the model.


The literature emphasizes the importance of economic wealth on democratic consolidation, with most studies arguing that higher wealth

⁹⁹ Achen 2005.




Dominican Republic

(a)




Argentina

(c)



Ghana

(b)



Philippines

(d)

FIGURE 1
NEW IO MEMBERSHIP FOR FOUR COUNTRIES

levels are conducive to democratic consolidation because wealth reduces political groups' willingness to rely on risky revolutions or coups.¹⁰⁰ Following Haggard and Kaufman¹⁰¹ and Svobik,¹⁰² we also include economic growth because poor economic conditions may impede democratic consolidation and induce authoritarian reversals. These data are from Angus Maddison.¹⁰³

The effect of presidential institutions on democratic consolidation

¹⁰⁰ Przeworski et al. 2000; Przeworski 2005.

¹⁰¹ Haggard and Kaufman 1995.

¹⁰² Svobik 2008.

¹⁰³ Maddison 2003.

and authoritarian reversals remains controversial,¹⁰⁴ but Svolik¹⁰⁵ finds that they have a strong negative effect on democratic consolidation even controlling for previous military rule. Therefore, we include an indicator for a presidential system based on data from Svolik.¹⁰⁶

Finally, to account for selection effects, we include a Mill's ratio variable, described in greater detail below. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis, including the selection equation below. The values of these variables are shown for the overall data set and the subsets of data with previous military regimes and no previous military regimes.

SELECTION

As we detailed above, democratizing countries seek IO memberships. Therefore, to identify the effect of IO membership on democratic consolidation, we must model the selection process. We model it in two steps.¹⁰⁷ A two-stage procedure allows us the flexibility to use the split-population model at the outcome stage. Using a probit to estimate a selection-stage model, we obtain predicted probabilities, transform these into an inverse Mill's ratio, and then include this ratio as a control variable in the second stage split-population model. As William Reed¹⁰⁸ points out, a weakness of a two-stage procedure is that the outcome model is heteroskedastic and, thus, inefficient. Therefore, we employ robust standard errors in the outcome model.¹⁰⁹

In the first stage, we include a set of variables that predict a democratizing country's probability of joining a new IO while not being influenced by extant IO memberships. To do this, we include dummies for five regions (North America, South America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East), with Oceania and Africa being the omitted categories.¹¹⁰ We then interact each region by a time trend, so as to allow for regional trends. These variables are exogenous to IO membership by definition, yet they influence new IO membership, given the large number of regional organizations¹¹¹ and the increasing number of organizations in existence.¹¹² Finally, because previous research suggests that recent democratization is conducive to IO membership,¹¹³ we include an indi-

¹⁰⁴ Cheibub 2007; Linz 1994.

¹⁰⁵ Svolik 2008.

¹⁰⁶ Svolik 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Heckman 1979; Huth 1996.

¹⁰⁸ Reed 2000.

¹⁰⁹ Bushway, Johnson, and Slocum 2007.

¹¹⁰ Africa is the base category, but Oceania was dropped from the regression due to collinearity.

¹¹¹ Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004.

¹¹² Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan 1996.

¹¹³ Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006.

TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS: MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS, ALL OTHERS REMOVED^a

<i>Variable</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>Overall</i>					
Years Democratizing	1289	23.41	28.28	1	118
Join IO	1289	0.74	0.43	0	1
North America	1289	0.03	0.18	0	1
South America	1289	0.26	0.44	0	1
Asia	1289	0.15	0.35	0	1
Oceania	1289	0	0	0	0
Europe	1289	0.37	0.48	0	1
Middle East	1289	0.042	0.20	0	1
Year	1289	1988	10.66	1965	2001
New IO Memberships	1220	22.97	23.70	-4	93
First 5 Years of Democratization	1289	0.27	0.44	0	1
Previous Military Regime	1289	0.44	0.49	0	1
New IO Memberships× Previous Military Regime	1220	4.49	8.02	-4	43
GDP	1289	8.40	1.00	5.92	10.10
GDP Growth	1289	1.41	5.39	-42.32	84.97
Previous Presidential Regime	1289	0.39	0.48	0	1
<i>Previous Military Regimes</i>					
Years Democratizing	572	11.09	9.50	1	44
Join IO	572	0.75	0.43	0	1
North America	572	0.01	0.11	0	1
South America	572	0.54	0.49	0	1
Asia	572	0.11	0.31	0	1
Oceania	572	0	0	0	0
Europe	572	0.09	0.29	0	1
Middle East	572	0.06	0.25	0	1
Year	572	1989	9.67	1965	2001
New IO Memberships	542	10.10	9.38	-4	43
First 5 Years of Democratization	572	0.34	0.47	0	1
GDP	572	8.12	0.87	5.92	9.59
GDP Growth	572	1.18	4.16	-26.80	11.67
Previous Presidential Regime	572	0.63	0.48	0	1
<i>No Previous Military Regimes</i>					
Years Democratizing	717	33.23	33.90	1	118
Join IO	717	0.74	0.43	0	1
North America	717	0.05	0.22	0	1
South America	717	0.04	0.19	0	1
Asia	717	0.18	0.38	0	1
Oceania	717	0	0	0	0
Europe	717	0.60	0.48	0	1
Middle East	717	0.02	0.14	0	1
Year	717	1987	11.34	1965	2001
New IO Memberships	678	33.26	26.50	-1	93
First 5 Years of Democratization	717	0.22	0.41	0	1
GDP	717	8.62	1.04	6.25	10.10
GDP Growth	717	1.59	6.19	-42.32	84.97
Previous Presidential Regime	717	0.19	0.39	0	1

^a Established democracies removed.

cator for the first five years of democratization. This indicator is also exogenous to new IO memberships because all countries in our data set are democracies.

The results from the selection model are reported in Table 2. Importantly, recent democratization induces countries to join IOs. This is not only consistent with our theory, but also suggests that controlling for selection effects is important. As to regional effects, the Asian region is perhaps most notable. In early years, democratizing countries in Asia seem to have joined IOs at a much faster rate than other democratizing countries. This effect, however, declines over time.

TABLE 2
SELECTION MODEL^a

<i>Dependent Variable</i>	<i>Become an IO Member</i>
Democratize in the First 5 Years	0.32*** (0.09)
North America	7.01 (41.65)
South America	-13.02 (25.82)
Asia	51.12* (28.96)
Europe	0.50 (24.55)
Middle East	-40.31 (38.51)
Year	-0.00 (0.01)
North America×Year	-0.00 (0.02)
South America×Year	0.01 (0.01)
Asia×Year	-0.03* (0.01)
Europe×Year	-0.00 (0.01)
Middle East×Year	0.02 (0.02)
Constant	5.85 (21.68)
Observations	1,289

Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01

^aAfrica and Oceania are omitted categories.

DEMOCRATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
1965–2001: FINDINGS

The results from the split-population model are reported in Table 3. The first set of coefficients predicts democratic consolidation. The second set predicts authoritarian reversal for a nonconsolidated democracy. As for consolidation, the results support H1 and H3b: IOs promote consolidation and the effect is maximized in the difficult circumstance of previous military rule. The coefficient for IO membership is positive and statistically significant at the $p=0.01$ level. The interaction term is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the effect of new IO memberships is larger when a country had a previous military dictatorship. In sum, IO memberships promote democratic consolidation regardless of a history of military rule, but the effect is larger given a history of military rule.

Conversely, the effect of IO membership on authoritarian reversal seems weak. For a democratizing country without the shadow of military rule, the coefficient for new IO membership is slightly negative while the standard error is large. The interaction term's coefficient is larger than the coefficient for new IO membership, but the standard error is again large. The data provide little evidence for the existence of a relationship between IO membership and authoritarian reversal.

The control variables offer several useful insights. First, the Mills ratio has a strong negative relationship with democratic consolidation. This suggests that democratizing countries join IOs to increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation in difficult circumstances. This is consistent with our expectations, as democratizing countries appear to join IOs if democratic consolidation seems difficult. Second, both gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and growth are positively related to democratic consolidation, which is consistent with previous findings.¹¹⁴ Third, in the authoritarian reversal models, not one of the control variables has a statistically significant coefficient. This suggests that in the years 1965–2001, accounting for authoritarian reversals is much more difficult than accounting for democratic consolidation. Based on the robustness analyses below, however, it does seem as though a high GDP per capita could be a powerful antidote to authoritarian reversals; moreover economic and social globalization, as well as path dependence in the form of previous authoritarian reversals, seem to increase the risk of a reversal. Notably, these effects differ significantly from those reported

¹¹⁴ Svolik 2008.

TABLE 3
 SPLIT-POPULATION MODEL WITH SELECTION
 CORRECTION AND ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS

Model: Democratic Consolidation

New IO Memberships	0.04*** (0.00)
Previous Military Regime	-0.90*** (0.12)
New IO Memberships× Previous Military Regime	0.06*** (0.01)
GDP per capita	0.42*** (0.05)
GDP Growth	0.03*** (0.01)
Previous Presidential Regime	0.05 (0.09)
Mills Ratio	-0.15*** (0.03)
Constant	-0.12 (0.37)

Model: Authoritarian Reversal

New IO Memberships	-0.03 (0.15)
Previous Military Regime	18.45 (27.42)
New IO Memberships× Previous Military Regime	-1.53 (2.38)
GDP per capita	14.49 (26.76)
GDP Growth	-0.77 (1.73)
Previous Presidential Regime	51.26 (83.09)
Mills Ratio	-35.07 (61.39)
Constant	-82.14 (145.17)
Alpha	-0.79*** (0.05)
Number of Observations	1,220

Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<.10, ** p<.05,
 *** p<.01

in Svolic,¹¹⁵ who applied a much longer time frame, suggesting that some of his arguments may not hold for recent years.

SUBSTANTIVE EFFECTS

To interpret the effect of IOs on democratic consolidation, we compute the substantive effect over the range of the modifying variable, which is when a country does and does not have a history of military rule.¹¹⁶ The nonlinear structure of our split-population model means one cannot discern the marginal effect by simply adding together the coefficients on *New IO Memberships* and the interaction term. Instead, we compute the percentage change in the probability of consolidation (reversal) associated with a 10 percent increase in *New IO Memberships*. Specifically, since the split-population model uses a Weibull distribution, we compute the hazard rate associated with consolidation (reversal) when *New IO Memberships* is at its mean value (twenty-five IO memberships) and when *New IO Memberships* is 10 percent above its mean value. It should be noted that 333 country-years in our sample witnessed a change in *New IO Memberships* that is of this magnitude or greater.

We calculate the effect for country i as a percentage change in the hazard rate,

$$\% \Delta h(t) = \left(\frac{e^{\beta(x_i=X_2)} - e^{\beta(x_i=X_1)}}{e^{\beta(x_i=X_1)}} \right) \times 100, \quad (3)$$

where X_1 and X_2 are, respectively, the values of *New IO Memberships* before and after the change in the value of *New IO Memberships*. The results are reported in Table 4. Increasing the number of new IO memberships for a democratizing state raises the probability of consolidation, whether the country had a previous military regime (28 percent increase) or not (10 percent increase). This is consistent with our interpretation from observing Table 4.

ROBUSTNESS AND FURTHER ANALYSIS

We next conduct a series of robustness tests. First, the IO membership variable might simply capture the effect of global interconnectedness on a democratizing country's political trajectory. To address such concerns, we conduct two additional tests (reported in Table 5). To measure a country's level of globalization, we rely on two measures from the KOF Index of Globalization.¹¹⁷ The first measure, economic glob-

¹¹⁵ Svolic 2008.

¹¹⁶ Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006.

¹¹⁷ Dreher 2006.

TABLE 4
MARGINAL EFFECT OF NEW IO MEMBERSHIPS
ON PROBABILITY OF CONSOLIDATION^a

<i>Category</i>	<i>Percent Change</i>	<i>0.95 Upper Bound</i>	<i>0.95 Lower Bound</i>
No Previous Military Regime	10	12	8
Previous Military Regime	28	34	22

^a Change in *Number of IO Memberships* from 25 to 27.

alization, is characterized as long-distance flows of goods, capital, and services, as well as information and perceptions that accompany market exchanges.¹¹⁸ The second measure, social globalization, characterizes the spread of ideas, information, images, and people.¹¹⁹ The first two columns of Table 5 show the results from these models.

Second, a past authoritarian reversal may affect the probability of experiencing another authoritarian reversal¹²⁰ and, hence, whether the state seeks IO memberships. Therefore, we include the variable *Previous Authoritarian Reversals*, created by Svulik,¹²¹ which is simply a count of the number of previous authoritarian reversals experienced by country *i*. The third column of Table 5 shows the result from this model.

Across the three columns of Table 5, results on the effect of *New IO Memberships* and *Democratic Consolidation* remain largely unchanged. With respect to authoritarian reversal, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients for *New IO Memberships* and the interaction between *New IO Memberships* and *Previous Military Regime* fluctuate dramatically from model to model. For example, consider the estimated impact on the probability of authoritarian reversal of a state joining IOs when it did not have a previous military regime. One model suggests that there is no relationship (model 1), a second suggests that there is a negative relationship (model 2), and a third suggests that there is a positive relationship (model 3). This points to the sensitivity of the split-population model and implies that one should be cautious about drawing firm conclusions regarding the relationship between IO membership and authoritarian reversal.

Third, one might argue that not all IOs are equally likely to affect democratization. Some IOs have more capabilities than others, and the

¹¹⁸ Dreher 2006.

¹¹⁹ Dreher 2006.

¹²⁰ Lehoucq and Pérez-Liñán 2009.

¹²¹ Svulik 2008.

TABLE 5
SPLIT-POPULATION MODEL: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
<i>Model: Democratic Consolidation</i>			
New IO Memberships	0.03** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.00)
Previous Military Regime	-1.45*** (0.32)	-1.29*** (0.18)	-0.93*** (0.10)
New IO Memberships× Previous Military Regime	0.07*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)
GDP per capita	0.65*** (0.09)	0.28*** (0.09)	0.73*** (0.06)
GDP Growth	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)
Previous Presidential Regime	-0.17 (0.16)	-0.05 (0.10)	0.26*** (0.06)
Mills Ratio	-0.37*** (0.06)	-0.35*** (0.04)	-0.10*** (0.03)
Economic Globalization	-0.02*** (0.01)		
Social Globalization		0.02 (0.01)	
Previous Autocratic Reversals			-0.34*** (0.04)
Constant	-0.23 (0.94)	1.50*** (0.47)	-2.43*** (0.44)
<i>Model: Authoritarian Reversal</i>			
New IO Memberships	0.09 (0.06)	-1.20*** (0.35)	3.42*** (0.86)
Previous Military Regime	5.32*** (1.70)	-2.14 (1.61)	85.70*** (19.84)
New IO Memberships× Previous Military Regime	-0.49*** (0.11)	0.75*** (0.25)	-1.25*** (0.35)
GDP per capita	-2.28* (1.26)	-1.09 (0.96)	-100.26*** (24.54)
GDP Growth	0.31*** (0.08)	0.11 (0.10)	5.49*** (1.36)
Previous Presidential Regime	4.88* (2.80)	2.43** (1.14)	63.32*** (16.10)
Mills Ratio	-0.41 (0.50)	-0.21 (0.36)	-43.62*** (10.70)
Economic Globalization	0.34*** (0.05)		
Social Globalization		0.61*** (0.13)	

TABLE 5 *cont.*

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>
Previous Authoritarian Reversals			62.05*** (15.56)
Constant	-0.46 (8.76)	-5.96 (6.76)	631.22*** (154.81)
Alpha	-0.91*** (0.07)	-0.84*** (0.06)	-0.87*** (0.05)
Number of Observations	1,063	1,083	1,220

Standard errors in parentheses; * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .0$

ability of an IO to influence democratization also depends on the domain. For example, it might be easier for some IOs to promote election monitoring than to establish judicial independence. We account for IO heterogeneity by using new data on IO functionality. We develop a coding scheme of organizational function for the Correlates of War International Organization data set compiled by Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke.¹²² For current purposes, it is sufficient to note that the coding scheme produces eight categories of IO functionality: general-political, security-political, legal-political, general-economic, commodity-economic, resource-economic, technical, and unclassified. Overall, political IOs promote and facilitate cooperation between states on topics not covered by the economic IOs and that are of broader scope than those covered by the technical organizations. We also classify two important subsets of political IOs: security—primarily formal alliances that established an organization (such as NATO)—and legal—primarily organizations focused on the promotion of human rights or adherence to a particular aspect of international law (such as the Hague Conference on International Law or the International Refugee Organization). Given the large number of economic IOs, we dedicate three main categories to economic organizations. In addition to standard economic organizations focusing on trade and investment, many economic organizations focus specifically on the management of natural resources or production and trade in commodities.

Unfortunately, when using a particular category, the small number of nonzero values on the *New IO Memberships* variable causes the split-population model to be unidentified. As an alternative test, we simply create a series of cross-tabulations for each category of IO function.

¹²² Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004. Full details of our coding scheme can be found in Kaoutzanis, Poast, and Urpelainen 2014.

The results are summarized in Table 6. We find that having an above-median number of new IO memberships reduces the reversal rate with the following IOs: security-political, legal-political, general-economic, commodity-economic, resource-economic, and technical, regardless of the presence or absence of previous military regimes. This suggests that our findings will hold across a variety of categories of IO functionality. However, one must keep in mind that these results fail to account for the unobserved process of consolidation, do not control for confounders, and do not correct for selection bias.

Next, we consider two other dimensions on which we can differentiate IOs: their level of democratic density and independence. The results are summarized here, with the full results available in the supplementary material.¹²³ We first consider the democratic density of the IOs that a democratizing state joins, as it might be the case that IOs only promote democratization if the organization's membership is comprised primarily of democratic states. Following Pevehouse and Bruce Russett,¹²⁴ we code whether the average polity score for the members of an IO is at or above 7. An IO with an average polity score at or above 7 is considered a democratic IO. Next, for each democratizing state, we count the number of IOs it has joined since beginning the process of democratization. This serves as the coding for the *New IO Memberships* variable. As with the functionality tests, the small number of nonzero values on the *New IO Memberships* variable causes the split-population model to be unidentified. As an alternative test, we simply create a series of cross-tabulations. For countries that do not have a history of military rule, those with an above-median level of memberships in democratic IOs have a slightly lower rate of reversal (0.34 compared to 0.36) relative to countries with a below-median level of memberships. However, this difference is not statistically distinguishable from zero. In contrast, when countries have a military history, those with an above-median level of memberships in democratic IOs have a rate of reversal that is lower (0.05 compared to 0.15) than the rate for countries with a below-median level of memberships. However, one must again keep in mind that these results fail to account for the unobserved process of consolidation, do not control for confounders, and do not correct for selection bias.

We then consider the independence of the IOs that a state joins, that is, the level of autonomy the IO's bureaucracy has to enact policies free of pressure from member states. Using data from Haftel and Thomp-

¹²³ Poast and Urpelainen 2014.

¹²⁴ Pevehouse and Russett 2006.

son,¹²⁵ we code the level of IO independence for twenty-eight of the organizations in our data set. With so few organizations coded, we must again consider simple cross-tabulations. Thus, we consider the number of independent IOs a democratizing state has joined since beginning the process of democratization. The rates of reversal for countries with a military past are substantively and statistically the same (a rate of 0.32 for each group) whether the country joined above or below the median number of independent IOs. When countries do not have a military past, those countries that joined more than the median number of independent IOs had a slightly lower rate (0 to 0.03) of authoritarian reversal, but the difference in the rates is statistically indistinguishable from zero. By and large, the limited number of IOs with independence data constrains our ability to make inferences on this variable. However, our preliminary test does not suggest that IO independence is key to promoting democratization.

We conduct three final tests.¹²⁶ To begin, given the explosion of newly democratic states following the end of the Cold War, we test whether the impact of IOs on democratic consolidation and authoritarian reversals is different in the post-Cold War period. Running our analysis only on the post-Cold War sample produces results consistent with Table 4. We also consider that it might be the case that the density of ties to the United States influences democratic consolidation or the onset of autocratic reversals since the US government, as the global hegemon for the time period under consideration, may take measures to support democracy promotion.¹²⁷ To address these concerns, we conduct two tests. In one, we control for the UN voting-score based affinity between the democratizing state and the United States.¹²⁸ In the other, we control for the alliance portfolio based s-score between the democratizing state and the United States.¹²⁹ Both tests produce results consistent with Table 4.

CONCLUSION

Given the importance of democratization for contemporary politics, a large and growing body of literature on the domestic and international causes and consequences of democratization has emerged.¹³⁰

¹²⁵ Haftel and Thompson 2006.

¹²⁶ Poast and Urpelainen 2014.

¹²⁷ Monten 2005.

¹²⁸ Strezhnev and Voeten 2013.

¹²⁹ Signorino and Ritter 1999.

¹³⁰ Huntington 1991; Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Svobik 2008; Whitehead 1996; Pevehouse 2005.

TABLE 6
 AUTHORITARIAN REVERSAL RATE UNDER DIFFERENT CONDITIONS
 AND IO FUNCTIONS

<i>Previous Military</i>	<i>Above Median Number of IOs</i>	<i>Below Median Number of IOs</i>	<i>p-Value of Difference</i>
<i>General Political</i>			
Previous Military	0.35	0.35	0.99
No Previous Military	0.08	0.20	0.01
<i>Security Political</i>			
Previous Military	0.47	0.20	0.00
No Previous Military	0.12	0.09	0.55
<i>Legal Political</i>			
Previous Military	0.45	0.23	0.00
No Previous Military	0.14	0.00	0.02
<i>Main Economic</i>			
Previous Military	0.47	0.28	0.01
No Previous Military	0.12	0.09	0.58
<i>Commodity Economic</i>			
Previous Military	0.42	0.31	0.13
No Previous Military	0.13	0.08	0.33
<i>Resource Economic</i>			
Previous Military	0.46	0.23	0.00
No Previous Military	0.15	0.04	0.01
<i>Technical</i>			
Previous Military	0.53	0.20	0.00
No Previous Military	0.15	0.00	0.00

Our contribution is to draw out the mechanisms of when and how IO membership can promote democratization. We show that while IO membership can promote democratic consolidation through external support for institutional development, it cannot directly prevent authoritarian reversals in transitional democracies. Moreover, IO membership is particularly important for countries that democratize in the shadow of past military rule. In such countries, the threat of a military coup presents long odds for democratizers. Since democratic consolidation is generally elusive, IO membership has the potential to produce large benefits. In other words, IO membership can enable democratic consolidation in unlikely places.

Our argument and findings have several implications. One distinct feature of our study is the central role of contingent domestic/

international linkages. While the benefits of IO membership for democratization are highly contingent, because external assistance can support democratic consolidation but not prevent authoritarian reversals, the effect of IO membership on democratic consolidation also depends on the domestic context. This finding shows that further research on the domestic/international interface in transitional democracies holds considerable promise. Though scholars of comparative politics and international relations have, to their credit, relied on each other's contributions, we believe the potential for cross-fertilization has not yet been exhausted.

The findings are also relevant to some of the most important political transformations evolving as we wrote this article. In the Middle East and North Africa, the Arab Spring has created newly democratic polities that face tremendous difficulties in consolidating the basic elements of democratic governance, such as free and competitive elections. Our results suggests that external actors interested in promoting democratization, such as the United States and many European states, could make a difference by opening the doors of important regional organizations to transitional democracies. By facilitating IO membership, external actors could allow new democracies in the Middle East and North Africa to enhance their democratic capabilities at a relatively low cost. Of the three countries in this region where the people toppled an autocrat, Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, Egypt counts as a military dictatorship.¹³¹ In and of itself, this is bad news for Egypt. However, our findings also suggest that IOs could play a useful role in promoting democratic consolidation there. Institutionalizing democratic rule is particularly difficult in the shadow of past military rule, so external assistance could make a big difference in Egypt.

There is less hope that IOs can reduce the risk of authoritarian reversal in young democracies. Building on previous research, we argue and show that IO membership will not deter coups, revolutions, and other forms of authoritarian reversals. Few IOs have the capabilities needed to deter subversive domestic groups from seizing the opportunity to gain power. External actors must complement the work of IOs, as the US did in Guatemala in 1993, since they can take measures to prevent or counter autocratic reversals.

While this study does not differentiate between IOs, our findings suggest that scholars studying particular IOs must carefully consider exactly how the organizations promote democracy. Consider the EU, for example. Is the main benefit of EU membership (or the enticement of

¹³¹ Libya is coded as a personalistic dictatorship; Tunisia is a hybrid regime.

EU membership) the prevention of autocratic reversal or the promotion of democratic consolidation? Events transpiring in the Ukraine (a potential future EU candidate) and Hungary (an EU member) at the time this article was written suggest that the EU can only take a country so far on either dimension of democratization.¹³² As a report commissioned by the European Parliament noted in late 2013, “Democracy in Europe can no longer be taken for granted.”¹³³ But pessimism regarding democratic backsliding in Europe and the inability of IOs to prevent coups should be tempered. Even the simple, mundane approaches offered by IOs—such as capacity building and information provision—can work. Democratic consolidation depends on the institutionalization of democratic rule, and supporting this process is the causal mechanism that allows IOs to be effective.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

Supplementary material for this article can be found at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000343>.

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¹³² The backsliding of democratic reforms in several East European EU members was the focus of “An Awkward Anniversary: A Colloquium on Ten Years of Central and Eastern Europe in the EU,” a conference sponsored by the Program in Contemporary European Politics and Society at Princeton University, April 18–19, 2014.

¹³³ Birdwell et al. 2013, i.

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