The Sins of the fathers

Intergenerational effects of state-led repression in Chile

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The Sins of the Fathers
Intergenerational Effects of State-led Repression in Chile

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Abstract

In this paper I study the intergenerational consequences of state-led repression. The main contribution of this research piece is to understand how state-led repression during the military dictatorship in Chile (1973-1990) had a long-run effect through the intergenerational transmission of political preferences and behaviors. In Bautista (2013a) I find that subjects who were repressed do not seem to change their political preferences but the costs attached to repression persists and therefore they change their political behavior. In this paper I look at how the repression affects the generation of the children of the repressed and I look at two possible hypotheses: 1) that basic average effects on political participation which I found in Bautista (2013a) are transmitted to the children, 2) Given the presence and persistence of the traumatic event, the impact of having a repressed parent would shift the political preferences of the children to the right. I use a difference in differences model where I compare the parents' outcome in 1973 with that of their children in 2012. I find several robust results that are consistent with the hypotheses I presented. Children of the repressed replicate the behavior of the parents since they are less likely to talk about politics with friends, participate in political demonstrations, belong to a political party and more likely to belong to human rights organizations. Regarding the second hypothesis, I find that children of the repressed, not only express to be less interested in politics but they are more right-wing than their parents and the children of the non-repressed.

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1 Introduction

There is a great deal of evidence that many aspects of people's preferences, characteristics and values are intergenerationally transmitted within the family. For example, the persistence of political preferences across generations has been much studied, particularly in the seminal work of Kent Jennings and his collaborators (see Jennings, 2007, Jennings and Niemi, 1981, Jennings, Van Deth et al, 1989, Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009, Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002). There is also a large literature in economics on intergenerational mobility that studies how parents' endowments will determine children's levels of education, income and occupational status (some examples of this literature are: Atkinson, Maynard and Trinder, 1983, Ermisch, Jantti and Smeeding, 2012, Holmlund, Lindahl, and Plug, 2011), a recent literature review on this topic is done by Black and Devereux (2010)). More recently, economists have begun to examine the intergenerational transmission of preferences and values. For instance, Bisin and Verdier (2000) investigate how ethnic and religious characteristics persist in different communities in the U.S. through the transmission of culture and socialization mechanisms. Dohmen, Falk, Huffman and Sunde (2011) find that children's risk and trust attitudes are shaped by that of their parents through the socialization process within the family and subsequently these attitudes affect different economic outcomes. Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002) show how values towards corruption can be transmitted from parents to children as a consequence of a deliberate government policy.

People's preferences can be affected by many other events. Erickson and Stoker (2011) for example show how the shock of being low on the Vietnam war draft lottery left an indelible effect on peoples political preferences, tending to make then much more left-wing or antiwar than those higher up the lottery list. Similarly, Madestam and Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) find that people who experience a rainless 4th of July celebration (a large cultural and social event in the US) during childhood are more inclined to vote for and support the Republican party in their adult life. There is also evidence that negative economic shocks can change people's financial risk attitudes Malmendier and Stefan (2011) and that having experienced

an economic recession during youth can affect economic preferences turning individuals into more reliant in government redistribution and politically more likely to support left-wing parties (Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2013). Bautista (2013a) and (2013b) also shows that the experience of state repression can have long lasting consequences in political behavior.

The main objective of this paper is to In this paper examine the intergenerational transmission of the consequences of state repression. Theoretically, it is natural to hypothesize that indeed consequences of repression are transmitted intergenerationally. The approach I take is the same as developed at length in the book of Green, Palmquist and Schickler (2002) who argue that a great deal of political evidence can be interpreted through the lens of identity theory. In their argument people adopt a basic social identity early in life via a process of socialization and they identify with a political party which fits best with this identity. Once adopted, attachments to party rarely change even when a person votes for a different party. For example, one can self-identify as a democrat but vote for Ronald Reagan because one decides that he is the candidate best able to do what needs to be done. Critically simply the fact of voting for a Republican does not entail switching ones self-identification as a Democrat. This book emphasizes that there is a great deal of inter-generational persistence of identities. In this paper I emphasize how the experience of repression can significantly alter the type of identity that a parent wishes to transmit to their children.

This framework allows, for example, for situations where, while one's identity does not change, the way that one expresses this identity can change, for instance as a consequence of the costs and benefits of different actions, here repression. This model, as emphasized by Akerlof and Kranton (2010) and Benabou and Tirole (2011) also allows for people to respond in different ways when their identity is challenged. Indeed, I showed in the Bautista (2013b) that the heterogeneous effects regression evidence is consistent with the idea that radicals and students took actions to reconfirm their identities, exactly as hypothesized in this literature.

This model of thinking of political ideology or preferences as being part of one's identity

becomes even more powerful when considering whether or not the children of repressed people have different political preferences or patterns of behavior than the children of those who were not repressed. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) present a general framework which can be used to endogenize the political preferences of children. In an inter-generational set-up these form as a result of socialization both from parents (vertical socialization) and from peers (horizontal socialization). This model is extended by Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier and Zenou (2011) to allow children to react to this process so that after socialization they still have some scope for choosing their own identity. In this model, parents evaluate the utility of their children through their own preferences. This implies that, other things equal, they like children to be like themselves and they allocate socialization efforts in this direction. This force would tend, for example, to suggest that left-wing parents are more likely to have left-wing children than right-wing parents. This effect, however, can be mitigated by several forces. For one thing, even if parents like children who are like them, parents are also concerned about the implications for the children of being of a certain type. To return to the left-wing example, to the extent that left-wing parents anticipate that left-wing people in the future are more likely to be repressed by the military, an event which severely reduces the welfare of children, they will be less likely to allocate effort to making their children more left-wing. From this analysis one could derive the hypothesis that left-wing parents who have been repressed are less likely to have left-wing children than left-wing people who have not been repressed. Similarly, to the extent that repression leads parents to participate less politically one would anticipate that this would be transmitted to the children of these people so that the children of repressed people would participate less than the children of people who were not repressed.

Socialization is not simply vertical however. Indeed some scholars, such as Boyd and Richerson (2006) or Henrich and Henrich (2007) present evidence in the context of cultural transmission between generations that horizontal socialization is even more important. In my context it is possible that the impact of repression has important consequences for horizontal

socialization. In the model of Bisin and Verdier (2000 and 2001), horizontal socialization is simply a process whereby the preferences of children are influenced not by the preferences of their parents but exogenously by the preferences of peers they may interact with socially (and in their model randomly). One could imagine however that the extent of this interaction is chosen somewhat by parents. This could have varying effects in my context. For instance, imagine that being repressed led to social ostracism. This comes up in my survey where I asked questions about the extent to which people trust other people. Repressed people trust their neighbors significantly less than those who were not repressed. This likely reflects the fact that neighbors may have given information to the police or informed on them. If children are horizontally socialized by neighbors, or children in school who perhaps think similarly, then in the left-wing example, this would tend to make children more right-wing than their repressed left-wing parents. However if parents can control who their children interact with then one would imagine that the process of horizontal socialization could end up being quite similar to that of vertical socialization.

Finally, introducing the element of 'identity choice' by children, even conditional on processes of socialization they have some freedom to choose their identity or at least adjust it. A simple model of this would involve children being able to accept or reject the identity that their parents have tried to create in them. One could imagine many different potential types of decisions here. It could be that the children of left-wing parents who were repressed and who try to socialize their children into having left-wing preferences, reject this. Repression could have had all sorts of traumatic consequences for individual families, leading to economic hardship, social ostracism and divorce. For example, Juan Plaza who in 1973 was a militant in the communist party and a union leader, was detained in December of 1973 and after spending months in different detention centers he describes that:

> "After I completed the sentence and regained my freedom the worse was to come: the lack of a job. This sentence that had to be paid by my wife, my children and my relatives" (Kuntsman and Torres eds. 2008, pp. 414).

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This can lead children to blame their parents for the hardships that the family endured and reject a left-wing identity. Alternatively, they may empathize with the terrible fate that overcame their parents thinking of their behavior as legitimate and the repression as being illegal and outrageous. In this case the children could embrace the left-wing identity.

This discussion illustrates that there are quite a large number of mechanisms which can map the political preferences and behavior of parents into those of their children and there are quite a few ways in which repression may impact childrens preferences.

Nevertheless, there are a few simple hypotheses that I can extract from these theories which are likely to be first-order. To do this it is important to first recognize that since the fear that parents feel about the possibility of being repressed again was very much alive at the time I collected the data, it is very likely that parents socialized their children under the shadow of this fear.[1] This implies that parents would indeed be concerned that if their children had political preferences and behavior which were similar to their own, they too could risk being repressed.

Hence in Hypothesis 1 I expect that:

The basic average effects on political participation for the parents (which I found in Bautista (2013a)) to be transmitted to the children

For example, just as repression made parents less likely to be members of a political party, I would expect that having a repressed parent would make a child less likely to be a member of a political party when compared to a child of those in my control group who were not repressed. My second hypothesis also follows from the above discussion.

Hypothesis 2:

Given the presence and persistence of the traumatic event, I hypothesize that the impact of having a parent repressed would be to shift the political preferences of children to the right.

Even though the basic socialization model predicts that repression would not change the

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[1]In fact, one of the main difficulties I encountered in the data collection was that the children would be the ones that reject the interview on the grounds of "not being interested in this topic", or not wanting to know about the repressive experience of their parents.

political preferences of parents, a pattern I found in the data in Bautista (2013a), this is not true for the children. The preferences of the children are endogenous to repression and the fear that parents felt would likely lead them to socialize children to being less left-wing than they were.

There is another reason why parents would want to create more right-wing children if they feared they would be repressed. As I noted in Bautista (2013a), one can think of the behavior of parents following repression as a form of preference falsification (Kuran, 1995) in the sense that parents are forced to behave in ways which are not consistent with their underlying preferences. As psychologists have pointed out, however, this creates a form of cognitive dissonance (see Akerlof and Dickens, 1982, for an introduction to the application of these ideas in social science) which creates disutility for people. If parents anticipate that their children will experience cognitive dissonance by behaving in ways which are not consistent with their underlying preferences then this will naturally lead parents to try to make their children more right wing to reduce such dissonance.

Another important mechanism is that in reality it is not possible for parents to independently socialize many dimensions of their childrens preferences and behavior. Indeed, behavior typically follows from preferences. In this case the only way in which parents can really reduce the risk that their children will face the repression that they experienced is to make their children more right wing so then they will naturally tend to behave in less risky ways.

How will children react to these socialization attempts? In principle one can think of complicated reactions as I discussed above, however, if the fear that parents experienced as a consequence of repression is transmitted to children the natural hypothesis is that they would accept this identity given that it mitigates the risks of experiencing the same trauma their parents experienced. This fear can also be potentiated by the fact that some of this children were traumatized themselves from what happened to their parents. This implies that the two above hypotheses are what I would expect to find in the data. An example of

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this transmission and the traumatic experience is the one of Carlos Bravo who was a worker in a mining company and on September 15th of 1973 the Carabineros came to his house after some neighbors who were not sympathetic with the Unidad Popular government denounced him. He describes how during the arrest:

> *"They would gunpoint my son Hector, who was 8, they would ask him where were the guns hidden and he would answer several times that he did not know anything. Until now, Hector has consequences from this traumatic experience, when he faced the dilemma of betraying or lying. This is what he has told me in his own words."* (Kuntsman and Torres eds. 2008, pp. 119)

These hypotheses about the average effects of having a parent repressed of course leave open the possibilities that, as I analyzed in Bautista (2013b), there are heterogeneous effects of repression. By this I mean that children whose repressed parents were radicals or students at the time of repression may behave differently from the children of non-radical and non-student repressed parents. I intend to analyze these possibilities in future work. Other types of heterogeneous effects are also of interest, in particular the age of the child at the time when their parents were repressed. It seems plausible that if children were at an age of intense socialization at the time their parents were repressed then this would magnify any of the effects I identify here. I also collected in my survey in an open ended question which was asked of both children and parents whether or not repression had impacted the family and if so in which ways. The answers give a very rich sense of the different impacts that people suffered and in future work I plan to code these questions to see if this creates further heterogeneous effects. For example, one would imagine that the effects of repression would be greater on children if this had very adverse effects on family life as many of the answers suggest.

To investigate these hypotheses I estimate simple panel data models at the level of the family. This model is very similar to that estimated in Bautista (2013a) except that at the second date I replace the outcome variable of the parent today with the outcome variable of

the child today. I now use family fixed effects to control for unobservables which are common to the family. In the context of the intergenerational transmissions of not only culture but also economic status and education, which are highly persistent across generations, the presence of such fixed effects makes a great deal of sense. The estimated coefficient on the $RepressedParent_i \cdot Post_t$ variable then gives me an estimate of the impact of having a parent repressed on the outcome variable (for example political preferences) of a child.

The results I find are very consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. I find robust evidence that having a parent repressed reduces the interest in politics of children and reduces their propensity to join political parties. The children of repressed are also less likely to participate in political protests and less likely to talk about politics with friends. Interestingly however, like their parents, they are more likely to participate in human rights organizations. The basic pattern here is that the negative effects I found in Bautista (2013a) are indeed transmitted to the children of the repressed. This is very consistent with Hypothesis 1. In addition the data also supports Hypothesis 2. I find that children of the repressed tend to be systematically more right-wing.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I give a description of the construction of the dataset I use in this article and present some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the econometric models estimated and my main results including discussion of some alternative hypotheses that could explain the patterns I find. The fourth section concludes.

2   Data

2.1   Survey

In Bautista (2013a) and (2013b) I describe in detail the data collection that I conducted to examine the impact of repression on political behavior for those subjects who were repressed and those who were not. Since the main objective of this paper is to have a better understanding of how repression has an impact on the political preferences and behavior of

the children, I will focus the description of the data for this subset of the sample of parents and their children. As I mentioned in Bautista (2013a and 2013b), I collected information and constructed a dataset of 152 individuals who experience repression during the dictatorship and 193 who others did not with the information about their respective children. This dataset is the result of a survey that I conducted in the Metropolitan Region of Santiago in 2012.[2]

As the information for the repressed and non-repressed parents was gathered, I also administered a survey to a child of each subject. Because of the sensitivity of the topic, it is difficult to randomly choose a child and expect that he or she will respond to the survey. For this reasons, I asked the parent to talk to their children and request the participation of one of them. Once the child agreed to participate, I would interview him or her. In some instances, the children were not interested in participating or the adults did not have children. For this reason, there are surveys of repressed adults without the respective survey of the child.

The total number of surveys I conducted was 741 and they are distributed in the following way: 203 repressed adults and 193 non-repressed adults, for a total of 396 adults. For the reasons explained above, 51 of the children of the repressed adults declined to participate in the study and for this reason I only have 152 children of the repressed who replied to the survey and there are 193 children of the non-repressed, for a total of 345 children of the repressed and non-repressed. For the purposes of this paper I am only using the information of the 345 repressed and non-repressed adults with children.

The survey questionnaire for the adults or parents contained questions that addressed their political engagement, interest and preferences and their social involvement in different organizations during the government of President Salvador Allende or the UP government, during the Military dictatorship and for the years of Post-Dictatorship (1990 to present). There was also a section that asked about various socio-economic variables for these 3 dif-

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[2]For the details on how I constructed the sample of the repressed parents and the control group please refer to Bautista (2013a) and (2013b)

ferent periods. I also included questions about all of their children in order to capture some aspects of social mobility, for example, I asked about the age, occupation and level of education of all of their children. In a separate questionnaire designed for those children who accepted to be interviewed, I asked about their educational level and occupational status at the moment of the survey and about their political preferences and behavior as I did for their parents. For example, I asked about their interest in politics, their ideological position, the political actions they have taken or their membership to different organizations such as political parties, unions and other type of organizations. For the case of the children of the repressed, I asked about when they first learned about their parent's traumatic experience, what they considered were the main consequences of this event. I also asked them whether themselves have been repressed and the survey asked questions about the details of the repressive events which they experienced so that I could also measure the intensity of repression. For example, I asked about the age when they were first detained, the organisms that conducted the detentions, the places and length of detentions and the consequences of the repression such as whether they went into exile or into hiding.

The next section will look in detail at how repression has an effect on the political preferences and behavior of the children of the repressed subjects.

2.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the socio-economic variables of the parents in 1973. As in Bautista (2013a) and (2013b), these variables are used to control for those characteristics that could determine their probability of being repressed and also the likelihood of participating in different political activities that at the same time can influence whether they are repressed or not. Overall, repressed and non-repressed parents were very similar in 1973 in terms of their age, household income, occupation skill and the sector of the economy where they used to work. For example, the third variable reports the means of an income scale variable where the subjects are asked to place their households on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 represents the poorest

households and 10 the richest ones in 1973 in Chile. The mean reported by the repressed is 4.151 while for the non-repressed is 4.275 and the p-value associated with the t-test is 0.533 and I can reject the null hypothesis that there is a statistical significant difference between these two means. This result is can be found for most of these variables except for the case of the mean of number of years of education that the repressed and non-repressed subject had in 1973 since there is a statistical significant difference where the repressed seemed to have about one more year of education than the non-repressed. The other variable that is different between these two groups is the percentage of subjects whose occupation was low skilled. This mean is larger for the group of the non-repressed with a value of 0.114 while the percentage of the repressed is 0.026.

Now I turn to the main variables of interest in this paper which are the ones that capture the political preferences and behaviors of the parents in 1973 and of the children in 2012. The descriptive statistics of this variables can be found in Table 2. Panel A shows the means of those variables for the case of the parents in 1973. As it was presented in Bautista (2013a) and (2013b), repressed subjects have different means from those who were not repressed. For example, the variable parent's interest in politics in 1973 which is coded from 1 to 4 (1=no interest, 2 = little interest, 3=some interest and 4 = very interested). Column (1) displays the mean for this variable for the repressed parents is 3.328 and the mean for the non-repressed is displayed in Column (2) and is 2.410. Column (3) displays the p-value associated with the test of difference in the means (t-test) and this value is 0, therefore I can reject the hypothesis that the means of the repressed and non-repressed parents are the same. I obtain the same results for the other variables in this Panel A, meaning that all of the outcome variables for the repressed parents are systematically different form the non-repressed parents. Not only they were more interested in politics but they were also more left-wing, more likely to talk about politics with friends and being a member of a political party and a human rights organization in 1973 or to donated money for political activities, participated in strikes and political demonstrations.

Now, Panel B of Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the political preferences and behaviors of the children of the repressed and non-repressed subjects. These results show once more that the children of subjects who were repressed have different political preferences and behaviors since for all of the variables the difference in the means is statistically significant. For example, the first variable is a dummy that captures their interest in politics, which is coded in the same way as it was for the parents' in 1973. The mean of this variable for the children of the repressed is 2.914 and 2.409 for the children of the non-repressed. The p-value associated with the t-test indicates that the difference of these means is statistically significant. This is also the case for the variable Ideological Position, since the value for the children of the repressed is 3.372 and 4.196 for the children of the non-repressed. In the same way that the repressed parents are more engaged in politics by being more active, the children also display this behavior since the percentage of subjects who talk about politics with their friends, were or are members of political parties or human rights organizations, donate money for a political activity, participated in strikes, or political demonstrations is larger for the case of the children of the repressed than the no repressed and the p-values associated with the t-test are always statistically significant.

An interesting fact that these descriptive statistics show is that the averages for non-repressed parents in 1973 and their children in 2012 are very similar but this is not the case for the group of the repressed. For example, about 22% of the children of the non-repressed expressed to have participated in strikes by 2012 while 23% of the parents said that they have had in 1973. In the case of the children of the repressed, 34% expressed to have participated in strikes by 2012 while their parents' participation in 1973 was of 49%. This is true for most of these variables and from this pattern it is possible to say that the non-repressed children and parents of have a similar set of political preferences and behaviors. However, this is not the case for the repressed parents since their children seem to be less interested in politics, or in general, participate less in political activities and organizations.

3 Intergenerational Consequences of Repression

As in Bautista (2013a) and (2013b), the descriptive statistics show that the repressed parents and their children are systematically different from the non-repressed parents and their children. I am able to go beyond the cross-sectional comparison since I collected retrospective data of the parents in 1973. To deal with the problem that the repressed differ systematically from the non-repressed ex-ante, I use a difference in differences model, where I compare the average value of the dependent variables between the repressed and non-repressed parents in 1973 and those of the children if the repressed and non-repressed today. This strategy will estimate the casual effect of belonging to a family where a parent was repressed if there is an unobservable governing selection into the repressed group which is common to the group. The equation I estimate is the following:

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot RepressedParent_i + \beta_2 \cdot Post_t + \beta_3 \cdot RepressedParent_i \cdot Post_t + \boldsymbol{X'_i} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

where $y_{i,t}$ is the value of a political outcome for individual $i{=}p,c$ at time $t{=}1973$ and $t{=}2012$, $RepressedParent_i$ is an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if the individual was repressed during the dictatorship, $Post_t$ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 for the period after the dictatorship and captures the trend effect for the people in this survey; $RepressedParent_i \cdot Post_t$ is an interaction term that takes the value of 1 in the period after the dictatorship if the parent$_i$ was repressed during the dictatorship. The coefficient associated with this interaction, β_3 is the parameter of interest since this is the term that captures the effect of repression and is the parameter that shows the difference in differences. Even though I do have time varying controls such as education and income for the children in 2012, I do not include them since these are outcomes variables that can be affected by the fact that their parents were repressed and this could lead to the "over-controlling" problem (see Angrist and Pischke (2009) p. 64 Section 3.2.3). For this reason I estimate this model using $\boldsymbol{X_i}$ which is a vector of covariates, which includes age, gender, household income scale,

years of education, labor force participation status, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the parent worked in 1973. $\varepsilon_{i,t}$ is the error term representing all omitted factors.

To address omitted factors that can influence the outcome at the family level I include family fixed effects. In this specification I am comparing the children and their parents over time and even if there are unobservable family specific characteristics, they will be controlled for by the fixed effects and this will enable me to estimate the causal effect of being repressed. I also estimated this fixed effects specification including the interaction of the controls in 1973 with the $Post_t$ dummy. Again, even though I do have time varying controls such as education and income, I do not include them since the post dictatorship values are outcomes and this could lead to the "over-controlling" problem (see Angrist and Pischke (2009) p. 64 Section 3.2.3). One way to ameliorate this problem is to interact the pre-repression covariates with a time dummy. So, the equation I estimated is (Result tables show this estimation with and without the interaction of the controls in 1973 with the $Post_t$ dummy) :

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_2 Post_t + \beta_3 RepressedParent_i \cdot Post_t + \boldsymbol{X'_i} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} \cdot Post_t + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (2)$$

Where the variables are as defined before after equation (1) and where η_i is the family fixed effect. The presence of family fixed effects implies that I cannot estimate the effect of time invariant individual characteristics captured in the vector $\boldsymbol{X_i}$.

As a robustness check, I also estimated these regressions by assigning a different weight to the data based on the estimated propensity score of the parent being repressed. So, I estimated the propensity score of the parent being repressed given the socio-economic characteristics in 1973. For the parents who were not repressed I assigned a weight of

$$w = \hat{\lambda}/(1 - \hat{\lambda}) \qquad (3)$$

where $\hat{\lambda}$ is the estimated propensity score, and I assigned

$$w = 1 \tag{4}$$

for the repressed. It is important to remember that the propensity score matching method assumes that the outcome of being repressed depends exclusively on the observable characteristics of the subjects. However, since I have information for the same subject available for two periods, combining the propensity score matching method with the difference in differences strategy allows to take into account potential non-observables.

3.1 Results

Tables 3 to 8 contain the results for the different dependent variables. The results for the first specification are in columns 1 and 2. Column (1) starts with the simplest model which does not include any covariates, column (2) includes all the socio-economic covariates of the parent in 1973 such age, gender and labor force participation in 1973, how skilled was the job undertaken in 1973 and dummies for the economic sector in which the parent was working in 1973; column (3) contain the result of the second specification with family fixed effects. Column (4) reports the estimation including family fixed effects plus the interaction of the covariates with the $Post_t$ dummy. Finally, column (5) contains the estimation that weights the sample using the propensity score of being repressed. Tables 3 to 8 have identical structure.

Table 3 contains the results where the dependent variable is interest in politics, the question on the survey asked the parents the following for the Unidad Popular period: "During the time of the UP Government (1970/1973), How interested were you in politics?" and for the present the children were asked: "Nowadays, how interested are you in politics?" The answers ranged in the following way: Not at all (1), Very little (2), Somewhat (3) and Very Interested (4). The first finding of interest is the statistically significant coefficient on the

$RepressedParent_i$ indicator variable. In column (1) β_1 equals 0.918 with a standard error of 0.139, so that it is highly significant. Looking at the next column (2) this finding is highly robust to the addition of all the covariates and there is little change in either the estimated coefficient or the standard error. In column (3) when I include family fixed effects I cannot independently estimate the effect of time invariant family characteristics. This finding illustrates as Table 2 suggested that the repressed parents and their children are significantly more interested in politics that the non-repressed parents and their children. In Bautista (2013a), where I looked at the average effect of being repressed for the case of the parents, I find that being repressed does not systematically change the parent's interest in politics, but according to the results shown in this table, I find that there is differential impact of repression on interest in politics when it comes to their children. For example, in column (1), β_3 is equal to -0.413 with a standard error of 0.186 and therefore statistically significant at the 5% level. This results shows that the children of the repressed are less interested in politics than the children of the non-repressed.

In Table 4 the dependent variable is the ideological position of the individual. Parents in 1973 and children nowadays were asked to classify themselves on a spectrum from 1 to 10 where 1 is the most left-wing position and 10 the most right-wing position. The coefficient for the $RepressedParent_i$ indicator variable shows how parents who were repressed are more left-wing than the non-repressed parents in columns (1) and (2). The sign of β_1 is negative and statistically significant even when I include the full set of covariates in column (2), then β_1 takes a value of -1.750 with a standard error of 0.286. The main interesting result of this table is the coefficient of the $Post_t$ and $RepressedParent_i$ interaction since it is positive and statistically significant across all the specifications. This result supports the second hypothesis I introduced in the Introduction, where I argue that the presence and persistence of fear given that the parent were repressed will lead the children to shift their political ideology towards the right. So, while parent's ideological preferences might not have changed, those of their children did change due to repressive event and became more

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right-wing than those children of the non-repressed.

Table 5 presents the results for the dependent variable 'Talked about Politics with Friends'. In the survey parents and children were asked respectively: "During the period of the Unidad Popular did you talk about politics with friends / Nowadays: How often do you talk about politics with friends"? and the options they were given were: 1-Never, 2-Sometimes, 3-Always. In the first row, we can see how the repressed parents talked more about politics than the non-repressed since β_1 is positive and statistically significant in column (1) and (2). However, the interesting result that this table shows is the one given by the coefficient on the interaction term of the $Post_t$ and $RepressedParent_i$ since it is negative and statistically significant. For example, in column (4) which is the most demanding specification, $\beta_3 = -0.248$ (s.e. $= 0.119$) and statistically significant at the 5% level. Although this result does not provide conclusive evidence that could support the horizontal vs. the vertical socialization, it does show that the children of the repressed behave differently from their parents when it comes to the interaction with their peers since for the case of the parents, repression does not seem have an impact in this particular political attitude.

The results of this table illustrate the ideas presented in the introduction regarding horizontal socialization and how being repressed can lead to social ostracism. In fact, Schirmer (1986) went through the archives of the Foundation of Protection for Childhood Damaged by States of Emergency (PIDEE - acronym in Spanish) which was in charge of helping the children who experienced repression directly of that of their parents. In this article, written in 1986, she argues that the children that this foundation helped:

> "feel alone and isolated in a society that has adapted to longterm military rule and the need for secrecy. Neighbors employers and teachers tend to shun these families for fear of reprisal. Classmates may see the PIDEE children as orphaned misfits, and through jokes and jibes, there is a rejection by most friends which is exacerbated by the child's own irritability, constant crying and aggressiveness...Not knowing whom to trust in school, these children usually say nothing,

becoming more introverted, and internalizing the self-censorship practiced by adults in repressive societies." and she quotes: "Nine-year-old Alfonso says, *I don't get together with the other kids (in school). I don't speak. I keep quiet in school and everywhere. I speak alone. I think alone.*" Schirmer (1986)

Table 6 displays the results for the dependent variable 'Participated in Political Demonstrations'. This variable takes the value of 1 when: the parents reported to have participated in this type of political activities by the time of the Unidad Popular government, before the military coup, and the children reported to have participated at some point in their lives and 0 otherwise. Since it is a dummy variable the estimation can be interpreted as a Linear Probability Model. Once more we observe that the repressed parents and their children are more likely to have engaged in this political activity since β_1 is positive and statistically significant in columns (1) and (2). The coefficient of interest is again β_3, for the interaction $Post_t$ and $RepressedParent_i$. This coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level along all the specifications. If we look at column (5) where I estimate the difference in differences model but weighting the sample using the propensity score of the parent being repressed, β_3 is -0.212 and the standard error is 0.074. This results shows once more how the presence and persistence of fear among these families that were subject to repression determines the way the children behave politically and repression decreases the participation of children to participate in political demonstrations.

In Table 7 the dependent variable is a dummy for whether or not the subject membership to a political party. This model can be interpreted as a Linear Probability Model since the outcome variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the parent in 1973 or children nowadays reported to having belonged to a political party and 0 otherwise. The results presented in Bautista (2013a) show that repression leads to subjects to disengage from these organizations. In this case, where I compare the repressed parents and their children with the non-repressed, I find a similar result. First, we see here again, that repressed parents are systematically more engaged in political parties than non-repressed parents. In column

(2) when I include the covariates, β_1 is equal to 0.412 with a standard error of 0.046 and highly significant. The main finding of this table however, is the significant coefficient on the interaction term of the $Post_t$ and $RepressedParent_i$ dummy variables. For example, in column (1) β_3= -0.259 (s.e. = 0.059) and statistically significant at the 1% level. So, as their parents, children of the repressed are less likely to participate in political parties.

Finally, Table 8 shows the results for the dependent variable membership to a human rights organization. In Bautista (2013a) I looked at the effect or repression on the same dependent variable for the case of the repressed and non-repressed parents and my findings show that repressed subjects increase their participation in these organizations, which led me to argue that this is a possible way in which these subjects substitute their political activism from political parties to other types of organizations. The results in this table suggest that this particular behavior is transmitted to their children since I also observe that the children of the repressed are more likely to belong to human rights organizations. In column (1) β_3= 0.059 (s.e.=0.032) and significant at the 10% level. Although the significance of this coefficient is not very high, the result holds across all of the specifications. This shows that while the repressed parents may have been more likely to be members of human rights organizations during the UP government, the experience of repression led their children to participate even more in such organizations, compared to the non-repressed.

4   Conclusion

In this paper I study the intergenerational consequences of state-led repression based on an original dataset I collected in Chile 2012. This dataset contains information about subjects who were repressed during the military dictatorship in Chile (1973-1990) and their children and a control group of adults and their children who were not repressed. In Bautista (2013a), I found that the average effect of repression on several aspects of people's political activity, for example membership of political parties or unions is negative. I hypothesized that this

was because repression induced a widespread and persistent sense of fear which led people to withdraw from active political activity. In this paper I hypothesize that this fear persisted and is transmitted to the children of those who were repressed for the different mechanisms I explain in the introductory section. I find evidence that support this hypothesis since children of the repressed talk less about politics with their friends, they are less likely to participate in political demonstrations and join political parties but they are more likely to join human rights organizations like their parents. The second hypothesis I test is whether children deviate from their parent's political preferences given repression and the fear that the parents felt would likely lead them to socialize children to being less left-wing than they were. I also find support for this hypothesis since the children of the repressed are not only less interested in politics compared to those children of the non-repressed but they are also more right-wing.

In a future project I aim to investigate whether as in the case of the parents, there are heterogeneous effects of repression on the children. This is a possible scenario since for the case of the parents in Bautista (2013b), I find that particular types of repressed people might react to repression differentially. In particular since repression can be interpreted as a challenge to people's identity it could lead certain types of people to respond by taking actions to re-confirm their identity - in this context participate more and they can transmit this behavior to their children. The first group of interest was political radicals and I argue that the take-power of the military after 1973 presented the biggest challenge to their identity and I find evidence that this is the case. The radicals more likely to join political parties, to work in and donate money to a political activity compared to those radicals who were not repressed. In this context it is natural to hypothesize that as with radicals, an act of repression might precipitate acts to confirm ones activated identity and that they will transmit this activism and their identity to their children differently from those parents who were not radicals. The second group of children I am planning to look in detail are those who 'came of age' at the moment when their parents were repressed. This is an interesting

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question since it will look at how preferences and identity can be formed or reinforced during those years of intense political socialization.

My research agenda makes important contributions to different areas of political science. That of political behavior since I am able to investigate at the micro-level the consequences of repression in the transformation of political preferences and behavior, but it also offers a contribution for a better understanding of the path dependent legacies of authoritarian regimes. The results I present in this paper, in conjunction with those in Bautista (2013a) and (2013b), suggest that the enduring consequences of repression during dictatorships are subtle and first-order and an important part of the story of how authoritarian legacies are left. This is particularly the case after the evidence I present in this paper which suggests that the effect of repression is transmitted from one generation to the other.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Parents in 1973

Variables	Mean Repressed	Mean Non-Repressed	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	25.296	26.544	0.271
Female	0.243	0.295	0.284
Household Income (1 poorest - 10 richest)	4.151	4.275	0.533
Years of education	11.539	10.762	0.052
High skilled occupation	0.132	0.093	0.260
High-Mid skilled occupation	0.046	0.026	0.312
Mid skilled occupation	0.441	0.435	0.918
Low skilled occupation	0.026	0.114	0.002
Primary Sector	0.053	0.067	0.571
Secondary Sector	0.118	0.119	0.983
Tertiary Sector	0.625	0.575	0.350

These statistics were built based in retrospective questions in the survey and they show the averages for 1973. Column (1) reports the mean values for the repressed subjects and column (2) contains the mean values of the non-repressed subjects. Column (3) contains the p-value associated with the test in the difference in the means of the repressed and non-repressed. The variable Age corresponds to the age the subjects reported in 1973. The variable Female is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the subject is a female and 0 otherwise. Household Income is a scale that goes from 1 to 10. The subject is asked to place her household on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 are the poorest households and 10 the richest ones in 1973 in Chile. The number of years of education was estimated depending on the highest level of education the subjects achieved at the moment of the interview. The variables of the levels of occupation: high, high-mid, mid and low skilled are the result of recoding a variable that contains 11 categories that follow the classification of occupations of the International Labour Organization. The variables Primary, Secondary and Tertiary are recoded based on the International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities - ISIC. Initially the firms were coded in a more disaggregated way following ISIC.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Children and Parents' Political Outcomes

	Panel A - Parent's Political Preferences and Behavior in 1973		
Variables	Repressed	Non-Repressed	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interest in Politics (1-4)	3.328	2.410	0.000
Ideology (L-R)	2.877	4.683	0.000
Talked Politics with Friends	2.592	1.994	0.000
Participation in Demonstrations (1/0)	0.831	0.288	0.000
Membership to Political Party	0.553	0.124	0.000
Membership to Human Right Organization	0.046	0.010	0.039
Donating Money for Politics (1/0)	0.432	0.073	0.000
Participation in Strikes (1/0)	0.496	0.232	0.000
	Panel B - Children's Political Preferences and Behavior Today		
	Children of the Repressed	Children of the Non-Repressed	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Interest in Politics (1-4)	2.914	2.409	0.000
Ideological Position (1- 10)	3.372	4.196	0.000
Talked About Politics with Friends (1-4)	2.263	1.969	0.001
Participates in Political Demonstrations (1/0)	0.684	0.366	0.000
Membership to Political Party	0.211	0.041	0.000
Membership to Human Right Organization	0.105	0.01	0.000
Donated Money for Political Activity (1/0)	0.283	0.057	0.000
Participated in a Strike (1/0)	0.342	0.223	0.014

Panel A contains the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables for the repressed and non-repressed parents in 1973. Column (1) contains the means of the different political outcomes for the children of the repressed. Column (2) contains the means of the children who were not repressed. Column (3) contains the p-values associated with the test in the difference in the means of the children of the repressed and non-repressed. The variable Interest in politics takes values from 1 to 4 where 1 is Not at all interested, 2 A bit interested, 3 Somewhat interested and 4 is Very interested. The variable Ideological position takes values from 1 to 10, for this variable the subjects were asked to place themselves in a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 represents a left-wing position and 10 a right-wing position. The variables Talked about Politics with friends varies from 1 to 3, where 1 represents that the subject never talked about politics, 2 sometimes and 3 always. Belonged to a Political Party is a dummy that take the value of 1 when the subjects report to have belonged to any of these organizations and 0 otherwise. The variables donated money for a political activity, participated in a strike and political demonstrations are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the subject was engaged in any of these activities and 0 otherwise. Panel B contains the descriptive statistics of the outcome variables for the children of the repressed and non-repressed parents. These outcome variables report values for the children until the date of the survey. The order of the columns is the same as in Panel A.

Table 3: Interest in Politics

DV: Interest in Politics (1=Not at all, 2=A Bit, 3= Somewhat, 4= Very)

	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	0.918***	0.817***			
	(0.139)	(0.131)			
Post	-0.001	-0.025	0.000	0.864	0.812
	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.119)	(0.535)	(0.594)
Post*Repressed Parent	-0.413**	-0.400**	-0.392**	-0.306*	-0.318*
	(0.186)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(0.178)	(0.182)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	631	631	631	631	631
R-squared	0.090	0.175	0.706	0.727	0.714

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) is the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Interest in politics, takes values from 1 to 4 where 1 is not at all interested, 2 A bit interested, 3 Somewhat interested and 4 is Very interested. The socio economic covariates are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 4: Ideological Position

	DV: Ideological Position (1=Left - 10=Right)				
	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	-1.806***	-1.750***			
	(0.279)	(0.286)			
Post	-0.487*	-0.444	-0.457**	-0.373	-0.547
	(0.278)	(0.289)	(0.219)	(1.079)	(1.146)
Post*Repressed Parent	0.983***	0.980***	0.987***	0.828**	0.759**
	(0.354)	(0.354)	(0.314)	(0.329)	(0.330)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	591	591	591	591	591
R-squared	0.090	0.108	0.766	0.780	0.787

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) is the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Ideological position, takes values from 1 to 10 where 1 a "left-wing" position and 10 is a "right-wing" position. The socio economic covariates included are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 5: Talked About Politics with Friends

DV: Talked About Politics with Friends (1=Never, 2=Sometimes, 3=Always)

	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	0.598***	0.515***			
	(0.093)	(0.089)			
Post	-0.025	-0.056	-0.049	0.137	-0.024
	(0.088)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.391)	(0.417)
Post*Repressed Parent	-0.304**	-0.289**	-0.279**	-0.248**	-0.259**
	(0.125)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.119)	(0.121)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	634	634	634	634	634
R-squared	0.085	0.187	0.718	0.731	0.718

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) is the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Talked About Politics with Friends, takes values from 1 to 3 where 1 represents Never, 2 Sometimes, and 3 Always. The socio economic covariates included are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 6: Participated in Political Demonstrations

	DV: Participated in Political Demonstrations (1/0)				
	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	0.542***	0.502***			
	(0.049)	(0.050)			
Post	0.078	0.076	0.068	-0.092	-0.246
	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.217)	(0.219)
Post*Repressed Parent	-0.225***	-0.220***	-0.205***	-0.214***	-0.212***
	(0.071)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	630	630	630	630	630
R-squared	0.186	0.240	0.240	0.717	0.733

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) displays the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Belonged to a Human Rights Organization, takes values of 1 when the subject reports to having belonged to a human rights organization and 0 otherwise. The socio economic covariates included are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p< 0.05, *p < 0.1

Table 7: Political Party

	DV: Belonged to a Political Party (1/0)				
	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	0.428***	0.412***			
	(0.047)	(0.046)			
Post	-0.083***	-0.090***	-0.083***	0.253*	0.272**
	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.130)	(0.137)
Post*Repressed Parent	-0.259***	-0.259***	-0.259***	-0.232***	-0.241***
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	690	690	690	690	690
R-squared	0.213	0.259	0.669	0.700	0.687

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) displays the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Belonged to a Political Party, takes values of 1 when the subject reports to having belonged to a political party or movement and 0 otherwise. The socio economic covariates included are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Table 8: Human Rights Organizations

	DV: Belonged to Human Rights Organization (1/0)				
	Difference in Differences				PSM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Repressed Parent Dummy	0.036*	0.034*			
	(0.019)	(0.018)			
Post	-0.000	-0.009	0.000	-0.056	-0.044
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.071)	(0.075)
Post*Repressed Parent	0.059*	0.059*	0.059*	0.061**	0.058*
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Socio-economic variables	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO
Fixed Effects	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO
Fixed Effects and X*Post	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES
Observations	690	690	690	690	
R-squared	0.038	0.063	0.567	0.567	

Note: Columns (1) to (4) report the results of the difference in differences models and Column (5) displays the estimation using the propensity score matching. The dependent variable, Belonged to a Human Rights Organization, takes values of 1 when the subject reports to having belonged to a human rights organization and 0 otherwise. The socio economic covariates included are: age, a female dummy, household income scale (1 poor - 10 rich), years of education, working dummy, levels of skill and sector of the economy in which the individual worked in 1973. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$