Welcome

On behalf of The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts, I’d like to thank those who made possible the inaugural Pearson Global Forum. The objective of this paramount gathering was to bring together scholars, leaders, and practitioners to discuss and debate pressing issues of global conflict, social order, and how to build and sustain peace.

The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts was established through a grant from the Thomas L. Pearson and Pearson Family Members Foundation and is dedicated to contributing to a world more at peace through research, education, and engagement. The third part of our mission—engagement with the policy community—is critical. Bringing together scholars and those who work to address conflicts allows us to share research insights with those who are making decisions on the front lines, and to hear from the policy and practitioner community what works and what doesn’t. This dialogue allows us all to sharpen and improve our work, and approach it in new ways that hopefully will lead to new insights and effective interventions. Each speaker’s participation in the inaugural Pearson Global Forum was a vital part of this conversation and I thank each one for their contribution.

Sincerely,

James Robinson
Institute Director, The Pearson Institute
The Reverend Dr. Richard L. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies and University Professor, The University of Chicago

The Pearson Global Forum

The most devastating conflicts raging across the globe are not wars between nations, but violent breakdowns of social order. When the institutions that bind people together and govern how they interact with one another are illegitimate, conflict emerges creating significant instability. This instability is a by-product of the autocratic regimes that plague such societies and which fail to invest in education, infrastructure and the health and welfare of their citizens. Resources are withheld or wasted. Poverty takes root. Grievances mount.

Such a situation can lead to social break downs, conflict and violence, the creation of economic crises and drive unprecedented global displacement. From Colombia to Nigeria to Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, it is the illegitimacy of the social order—the norms by which we define ourselves and our roles in society—that drive global violence and produce staggering human costs.

At The Pearson Institute, we are mobilizing our mission to convene international leaders and world-renowned academics at the Pearson Global Forum to explore rigorous research and analysis to influence solutions, strategies and policy for reducing and mitigating conflict to achieve a more peaceful world.

The Pearson Institute for the Study of Global Conflicts

The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago promotes the ongoing discussion, understanding and resolution of global conflicts, and contributes to the advancement of a global society more at peace. Established through a grant from The Thomas L. Pearson and The Pearson Family Members Foundation, and led by Institute Director James Robinson, co-author of Why Nations Fail, the Institute achieves this by employing an analytically rigorous, data-driven approach and global perspective to understanding violent conflict. It is global in its scope, activities and footprint. Attracting students and scholars from around the world, its faculty is in the field studying conflicts—and approaches to conflict resolution—in Nigeria, Colombia and Afghanistan, to name just a few.
The University of Chicago

The University of Chicago is a leading academic and research institution that has driven new ways of thinking since its founding in 1890. As an intellectual destination, the University draws scholars and students from around the world to its home in Hyde Park and campuses around the globe. The University provides a distinctive educational experience, empowering individuals to challenge conventional thinking and pursue research that produces new understanding and breakthroughs with global impact. Home to more than 90 Nobel laureates, the University of Chicago is dedicated to an environment of fearless inquiry and academic rigor.
The Pearson Global Forum

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The Pearson Global Forum 2018: An Overview

The Pearson Global Forum convened the world’s foremost thinkers and influencers for the purpose of informing and developing new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict. Attendees included keynote speakers Nancy Lindborg, president of the U.S. Institute of Peace, Vuk Jeremić, president of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development and former president of the UN General Assembly, former United States Senator George J. Mitchell, Dan Shapiro, representing the Thomas L. Pearson and Pearson Family Members Foundation, University of Chicago president Robert J. Zimmer and provost Daniel Diermeier, leading experts, university trustees and representatives, faculty, and students.

The Forum invited attendees to reflect on state fragility, the breakdown of social order, and the role instability plays in some of the most destructive conflicts taking place around the world today. In exploring the breakdown in social order, panelists discussed causes of conflict and agreed that addressing the causes of and solutions to global conflict requires consideration of local voices, social and economic investment, and cross-sector stakeholders.

Discussion also emphasized how to better understand conflict and social order through data. Panelists concluded that in using data to address conflict, the task is to avoid potential pitfalls of data and improve communication between researchers and practitioners in order to translate data into improved policies.

Sessions addressing the consequences of a breakdown in social order noted the humanitarian impact of conflict. Panelists agreed that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), policy makers, journalists, armed forces and multilateral organizations must grapple with their evolving responsibilities in response to humanitarian crises rooted in conflict, including designing truth and reconciliation processes so as to retain their societal benefits without imposing psychological costs.

Using Syria and Afghanistan as case studies, keynote speakers noted obstacles to local statebuilding, and concluded that restoring social order requires, as discussant Roger Myerson suggested, “a balanced relationship between national political leaders and local leaders who are accountable within their communities.”

In promoting dialogue between academics and policymakers regarding the breakdown in social order, the consequences of such a breakdown, and the path to restoring social order, The Pearson Global Forum helped bridge the gap between research and policy to directly impact people and societies around the world.
Welcome Remarks and Panel: State Fragility

Tim Besley
W. Arthur Lewis Professor of Development Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science

Adnan Khan
Research and Policy Director, International Growth Center and Lecturer, London School of Economics and Political Science; Visiting Lecturer, Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School

Nancy Lindborg
President, U.S. Institute of Peace

Moderator: Daniel Diermeier
Provost, University of Chicago

“Nothing has lifted itself out of fragility based on the visions of outsiders.”

Nancy Lindborg, President of the U.S. Institute of Peace, opened the evening by expressing confidence in the international relief and development community’s growing consensus on how better to understand and address state fragility—a “common denominator” in global challenges. While fragility is determined by a variety of specific social, economic, and political factors, it is broadly understood in terms of broken social contracts, fragmented societies, and dysfunctional government institutions. And the effects of increasing fragility are readily observed: within the past twenty-five years, Lindborg noted, eighty percent of U.S. humanitarian aid has shifted from providing natural disaster relief to aiding victims of global conflict.

Fragility is not, however, a purely humanitarian and development issue. Lindborg argued that fragility must also be viewed as a security issue, one which the security and diplomatic worlds need to embrace. Despite the issue’s importance, failure to secure a coalition of support across the humanitarian, development, security, and diplomatic worlds is a major obstacle in forming effective policy to address state fragility. Especially in a time of resurgent great power politics, Lindborg cautions against forgetting that the majority of conflicts and conflict-related deaths occur within fragile states.

What, then, is the pathway out of state fragility? To address this question, Tim Besley, W. Arthur Lewis Professor of Development Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, and Adnan Khan, Research and Policy Director, International Growth Center and Lecturer, London School of Economics and Political Science; Visiting Lecturer, Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School, joined Lindborg for a panel discussion. Both Besley and Khan were members of the London School of Economics (LSE)-Oxford Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development, chaired by former U.K. Prime Minister, David Cameron. The Commission drew on wide-ranging academic research and evidence to provide recommendations for addressing state fragility and conflict situations.

Besley and Khan both acknowledged the need to start from a position of failure—the current approach to resolving issues related to and stemming from state fragility is not working, they argued. Referencing the LSE-Oxford Commission report, Besley recommended two changes to the conventional approach. First, rather than rush into elections, the international community must recognize the end of conflict or emergence of a new leader as moments of potential change. Because immediate elections tend to be problematic in divided societies, international stakeholders should focus on reconciliation, consensus building, and power sharing. Khan agreed, stating that elections require mending and fundamental building blocks to first be in place. This is important, he notes, because the aim is to “change the nature of power, not just who is in power.”

Besley’s second recommendation is to allow fragile states to establish their own priorities, rather than having foreign mandates imposed upon them. The aim of international assistance should be to help fragile states build legitimate and capable institutions, rather than undermine them. Too often, Khan noted, foreign donors impose strict conditions with unachievable objectives, unrealistic expectations, and unreasonable timeframes.
When Economics and Politics Meet

James Robinson, The Reverend Dr. Richard L. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies and Institute Director of The Pearson Institute, opened day two of The Pearson Global Forum by emphasizing the opportunity for policy makers, activists, politicians, members of the military, researchers and beyond to learn from one another and develop a more sustained dialogue regarding peace and conflict resolution throughout the forum. “We want to...start a more sustained dialog [regarding] peace and conflict resolution, pooling what we know together in a synergetic way.”

To illustrate the importance of these cross-sector conversations, Robinson emphasized lessons he learned from two practitioners. The first, Sergio Jaramillo, former Colombian High Commissioner for Peace, taught him the value of time in the peacebuilding process, where ensuring all parties have committed to a solution is far more valuable than meeting rigorous deadlines. Second, Robinson reflected on a lecture by Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff and a negotiator of the Good Friday agreement, which addressed non-material causes of conflict and peace as the crux of solution seeking.

Robinson then explored the intersection of conflict and economics with a look at the correlation of economic development and politics in Bolivia. He noted that nighttime satellite imagery of Cochabamba Department showed luminosity falling over time in the period after 1997. An economic contraction like this is often regarded as a key potential initiator of conflict. The research, however, concluded that another trend emerged. Rather than economic decline leading to violence and conflict, the vote share of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) political party expanded rapidly in Bolivia in exactly the places where the economic contraction was worse. By 2005, the party’s head was elected president, effectively eradicating previous policies that impoverished the same population affected by economic downturn.

Economics causes politics, Robinson concluded, and politics cause policy. But why is economic contraction associated with politics in this case? The contraction was caused by a coca eradication policy. Robinson compared areas that can and cannot grow coca, a staple crop of Bolivian farmers whose eradication was impacting the economic climate. He also examined areas with or without an ayllus, a traditional council with rich historical and political roots in Bolivian indigenous societies. Compared to the average, there was a twelve percent increase in the vote for MAS in this period in places that experienced the economic shock of coca eradication and also had the ayllus.

These traditional institutions allowed Bolivian society to respond to the crisis, channeling it into a positive political response rather than spiraling into violence.
Panel: Causes of Conflict

Rick Barton
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Lecturer and Co-Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Grant T. Harris
CEO, Harris Africa Partners LLC

John W. McArthur
Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution; Senior Advisor on Sustainable Development, United Nations Foundation

Paul B. Stares
General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Moderator: Liz Schrayer
President and CEO, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

A multifaceted approach is required in order for researchers, policymakers, and practitioners alike to effectively combat the conditions that enable violence and instability to take root and thrive. Panelists agreed that addressing the causes of and solutions to global conflict requires consideration of local voices, social and economic investment, and cross-sector stakeholders on conflict’s rapid internationalization.

First, community-driven interventions, where data is rigorously gathered from local populations, were suggested to lead to less violence and far more effective solutions. Panelist Rick Barton concluded that foreign bodies often assume they know a place better than the population. This dangerous assumption can be countered by ensuring local voices are included in both peacemaking and violence prevention. “Silent majorities,” such as women, youth and even the business community, rarely occupy the same seat at the table as leaders, but their perspectives often lend a more constructive approach to conflict prevention and resolution.

Section I: The Breakdown of Social Order
A second component emphasized by panelist Grant Harris is the need to invest in social and economic solutions. One illustration came from the African continent, which will constitute a quarter of the world’s population by 2050. One must consider the steps necessary to create jobs that provide opportunity for this burgeoning population and, in turn, lead away from potential extremism. Harris noted that, though the causes of radicalization are complex, economic hopelessness and a sense of grievance against the state are often as or more important than religious ideology in motivating youth to join extremist groups. With that in mind, investing in interventions tied to economic, social, and environmental objectives can help reduce poverty and instability and promote a more inclusive society. For example, as panelist John W. MacArthur suggested, in places with high rates of extreme poverty, child mortality and climate variability that makes it difficult to grow food, any answer to security issues must consider these interconnected challenges. This is especially salient with fragile states.

And third, the conversation suggested outside powers and players intervene directly or indirectly in conflict-affected places at far greater rates now than ever before. As noted by panelist Paul Stares, in the mid 1990’s, around five percent of all civil wars were internationalized. Today, that estimate is up to thirty percent. This is cause for concern, as internationalized civil conflicts tend to result in higher death counts, last far longer, and prove more difficult to resolve.

But just as the internationalization of conflict has led to challenges, global players and partnerships have the potential to play a role in forming solutions. Key players include multilateral bodies such as the United Nations, where recent reforms focus on conflict prevention and strategies for more effective management. However, some donor countries face dramatic proposals to reduce funding for development and diplomacy. The panelists agreed that these countries’ investments remain critical to ensure stability and are in both humanitarian and national interests. The United States, for example, must consider its role—and self interest—in global wellbeing, and work to support transparency and economic growth abroad. This is important to promoting regional stability and reducing conflict, but also to yielding a more attractive climate for the private sector.

Panelists demonstrated a range of suggested solutions that would lead to greater global stability, such as providing an agricultural credit for irrigation, investing in girls’ secondary education, working towards a $5,000 per capita GDP (after which the threat of civil war diminishes dramatically) and promoting private sector investment in infrastructure. Their varied suggestions emphasize that the path to ending global conflict involves a range of sustained interventions in regions at risk of or currently recovering from conflict.

**Stopping Street Violence**

Chris Blattman
The Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

“Behaviors change thoughts. Practice a different way of living, and you eventually change your thoughts.”

Not long after the country emerged from war in 2003, Liberia’s government and UN peacekeepers alike considered men like Monrovia’s “wheelbarrow boys” (young men who ferry customers’ goods around the market) among the city, country and even region’s greatest threat. They were the primary drivers of petty crime in Monrovia, and when a war broke out in neighboring Cote d’Ivoire in 2011, both sides offered these young men money to fight. Subsequently, researchers began reflecting on what drives such behaviors in young men and solutions that could provide them with an alternative lifestyle.

Chris Blattman, The Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago reflected on community-centered youth development initiatives in Monrovia run by Johnson Bohr, CEO/President, Network for Empowerment & Progressive Initiative - NEPI International USA, who was in attendance as a Forum Delegate. These initiatives, informally rooted in cognitive behavior therapy (CBT), created opportunities for these young men to recognize
problematic thoughts and change their behaviors—to practice new responses to tense social interactions or violent situations. Essentially, “behaviors change thoughts. Practice a different way of living, and you eventually change your thoughts.”

An analysis of the intervention compared one thousand young men from across Monrovia—specifically selected for their violent tendencies. One quarter served as the study’s control, another participated in the community engagement initiative; a third quarter received a startup grant to use for an alternative personal business venture and a final quarter received both the startup grant and community programming.

Over the course of the intervention, the young men participating in the program, business ventures, or both marked a significant reduction in violence. After a year, however, only the group that received both the CBT training and startup grant had succeeded in changing their lifestyles. Even if their businesses no longer thrived, they demonstrated a huge reduction in criminal and violent behaviors.

The solution, Blattman concluded, was ongoing practice of an alternative to their criminal lifestyle—allowing the young men to cement better behaviors and self-image. This same pattern of intervention continues to provide hope as practitioners replicate it across the world, from El Salvador to Nairobi, Kenya, and even Chicago. In Chicago, researchers are working with non-governmental organizations to target a group of approximately 1,000 young men considered likely to be responsible for the majority of the homicides that happen across the city in the next twelve months. Researchers and their partners are providing this population with an eighteen-month transitional job, cognitive behavior therapy, and other social services in hopes that the model that proved successful in Liberia may also play a role in reducing the homicide rate in Chicago.

Blattman remarked, “Usually we think about innovations coming from America and going to a place like Liberia. This is a case of innovations from Liberia coming to a place like America.” He reminded participants that violence is not only a problem in faraway places, but that these innovations from around the globe can help us solve problems happening in America as well.
The Balkans Today

Vuk Jeremić
President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development; President, 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

"The Balkans remain tangled in frictions between great powers and sometimes find themselves pulled into their wars as a result of cultural, ideological, or religious ties."

The state of the Balkans today is the result of a three-way struggle between Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam dating back to the 15th century. This struggle has extended beyond religion to include great power rivalry. Given its strategic location, the Balkans have always functioned as a highway to empires, as well as a buffer against these empires.

Vuk Jeremić, president of the Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development and former president of the UN General Assembly, shared how although alliances have shifted throughout history and former enemies have become allies, the Balkans remain tangled in wars and games between the great powers, and sometimes find themselves pulled into those wars as a result of cultural, ideological or religious ties. These same ties have also historically expanded conflict between the small countries of the Balkans to a great power conflict, the most notorious example of this being the escalation of hostilities after the assassination of archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo when a German-backed Austria invaded a Russian-backed Serbia, prompting involvement from allies like England and France. Soon, the entire world was at war.

Today, the Balkans are once again a buffer zone between three major centers of power: the West, embodied by the EU, the East, embodied by Russia and the South, embodied by Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Interestingly, powers absent from the region before the twentieth century have increased their influence there—specifically the United States and China. These new players invest in Balkan infrastructure and development, with antagonized visions for the region—to strengthen the buffer between Europe and the Middle East as large numbers of refugees threaten political stability, as opposed to creating a major springboard for further economic expansion into the continent.

Jeremić observed that such friction is beginning to weigh on the Balkans, and an unfortunate trend has developed—the decline of democracy. In recent years, large reversals have eroded the democratic gains made since the beginning of the century when Serbia overthrew dictator Slobodan Milosevic and introduced democracy into the country. Jeremić found this decline of democracy alarming, but perhaps more so the fact that the West does not share his alarm at such developments. The effects of external conflicts threatening the region, such as the influx of refugees, are compounded by the contentious internal dynamics of the region. Currently, Balkan leaders have engaged in peace dealings that would amount to the de facto redrawing of the boundaries in the Balkans. Specifically, leaders in Kosovo and Serbia are encouraged to finalize a deal that would redraw boundaries based on ethnic principle. This decision and precedent could have implications for multiple other boundaries in the Balkans, and in the midst of the current political climate, could be the spark that starts another conflict.
Section II: Understanding Conflict and Social Order Through Data
Deterrence in Cyber Space

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
Sydney Stein Professor and Deputy Dean for Promotions & Recruitments, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago; Faculty Affiliate, The Pearson Institute

“In forming a cyber strategy, we must think and act globally.”

Attributing responsibility for an attack depends on both specific evidence and features of the general strategic environment. For instance, North Korea was suspect following the 2014 attack on Sony Pictures both because of direct evidence and because of its reputation for an aggressive cyber posture. More capable and aggressive adversaries are more suspect following hard to attribute cyber attacks. And this makes other adversaries less suspect and less likely to face retaliation. This reduced chance for retaliation increases the incentive to engage in an attack. In effect, the attribution problem allows adversaries to hide their activities behind those of already suspected adversaries, as the Russians did by trying to make their attack on the Pyongchang Olympics look like the work of the North Koreans. Consequently, if we become worse at deterring any one of our enemies, we become worse at deterring them all. Therefore, according to Bueno de Mesquita, when formulating a cyber strategy, “we must think and act globally.” If we fail to deter one adversary, we can unintentionally create a strategic environment that incentivizes greater aggression.

What does this mean for how we think about a new doctrine for the cyber age? Bueno de Mesquita asked. Traditional deterrence theory states we should commit ourselves to greater retaliatory aggressiveness. In terms of cyber deterrence, such a strategy increases the chance of retaliating against the wrong adversary, which has the potential for unintended escalatory spirals. Retaliatory aggressiveness also creates incentives for deliberate provocation by adversaries and rogue actors seeking to leverage the attribution problem to foment conflict. Therefore, a commitment to greater retaliatory aggressiveness is only beneficial following attacks that are relatively straightforward to attribute. Bueno de Mesquita suggested that when an attack is particularly difficult to attribute, we should commit to retaliating less aggressively than we would otherwise be inclined to do. Such forbearance would reduce the risk of erroneous retaliation and reduce incentives for deliberate provocation at little cost in terms of deterrence and security.
Panel: Using Data to Address Conflict

Jeannie Annan  
Senior Research Associate, The Pearson Institute; Senior Director of Research & Evaluation, International Rescue Committee

Liam Collins  
Colonel, U.S. Special Forces; Director, Modern War Institute, U.S. Military Academy West Point

Rebecca J. Wolfe  
Director of Evidence and Influence, Mercy Corps

Austin L. Wright  
Assistant Professor, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago; Faculty Affiliate, The Pearson Institute

Moderator: Hal Weitzman  
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Behavior Science and Executive Director for Intellectual Capital, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Introduction by Mariana Laverde  
Pearson Scholar and Harris Public Policy PhD Student

Moderator Hal Weitzman stated that data analysis is transforming how we think about conflict, conflict prevention, and helping populations affected by conflict. With more data available, the task becomes avoiding potential pitfalls of data and improving communication between researchers and practitioners in order to translate data into improved policies.

Over the past ten to fifteen years, the use of experimental research and randomized control trials to test the effectiveness of various types of programming in conflict zones has seen a significant change. Panelist Jeannie Annan pointed out that a decade ago, the use of this type of research was considered not only infeasible but also unethical. As humanitarian response programming has shifted towards finding the best evidence that informs the effectiveness of programming, previous stigmas have faded. Annan noted that data inclusion in humanitarian response programming has been encouraged over the last 10 years, and proven beneficial at managing expectations about feasible results in conflict-affected countries.

Data has also helped further understanding of the motivations and incentives behind conflict and violence.

Panelist Liam Collins explained how, as with humanitarian response programming, the use of data in military settings has changed in recent years and continues to develop. In Vietnam, for example, body count was used erroneously as a measure of success. Collins noted that in Afghanistan, senior officials initially struggled to know where to focus in the presence of so many metrics. The most commonly used data throughout the war was termed “significant activity,” but in reality, only showed areas of attacks. Other activities could also have informed strategy on the battlefield, but may have been missed because they were deemed less significant, proving the importance of naming data accurately. However, Collins remarked that as the war in Afghanistan continued, intelligence collection and analysis improved.

As our ability to collect more precise data improves, it is important to remain cognizant of potential issues with data, and with the application of data to policymaking. Panelist Rebecca Wolfe warned that one of the issues with data is sourcing, i.e. “Who are we asking?” Further, spurious data can distract from relevant metrics. Finally, though a critical component needed to inform policymaking, data doesn’t always spell out a response, partly due to the difficulty of applicability across circumstances.

As stakeholders increasingly value data-driven initiatives, more and more positions that blend fieldwork and research will open up, allowing us to bridge the critical gap between data analysis and policy making. Panelist Austin Wright said, “The Pearson Institute exists to enable us...to translate information collected among academics and in our own work to help shape policy.”

While data availability can be an excellent resource for policy makers, researchers do need to be wary about malignant actors manipulating that data to serve nefarious purposes. For example, in the gang violence prevention space, there are some relatively good models of predicting who will engage in violence and join gangs, but this is not the case for violent extremism and terrorism. In certain contexts, a model predicting engagement in violent extremism, accessed by certain actors, could lead to excessive preventative action that could lead to human rights abuses. On a more micro level, data protection can be an important aspect in protecting respondents, particularly in domestic violence research. In conflict scenarios, data protection may ensure that data is not used maliciously, or in contrast, it may ensure that data is considered when creating policy. There is also the potential for data dismissal in circumstances where the status quo positively affects policy makers.

As we adapt to this data-abundant environment it is important to consider not only how data is collected, but also how it is stored, interpreted and shared.
Section III: Consequences of a Breakdown in Social Order

Can the Wounds of War be Healed? Reconciling after Civil Conflict

Oeindrila Dube
The Philip K. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

“These processes should be designed and redesigned so as to retain their societal benefits without imposing psychological costs.”

After a conflict, residual grudges and animus contribute to the risk that over time hostilities will flare back up. Truth and reconciliation processes have the potential to help mitigate these cycles of conflict, but they can also incur a psychological toll on participants.

Citing results from a study she and other researchers conducted in Sierra Leone about ten years after the conclusion of its civil war, Oeindrila Dube, The Philip K. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago explained how those who had participated in reconciliation processes were “substantially more likely to have forgiven their war perpetrators.” These processes were also found to have improved social capital in communities, strengthening social networks, increasing participation in community organizations and boosting contributions to public goods—for example, in repairing roads, clinics and schools in the community.

However, Dube warned that these reconciliation processes also contribute to deterioration in
psychological wellbeing. In the Sierra Leone study—which surveyed nearly 2,400 people in two hundred villages among fifty treatment sections and fifty control sections—the reconciliation processes involved victims who described the atrocities they experienced and perpetrators who admitted to crimes and sought forgiveness. People in the treatment sections shared and listened to very personal, painful experiences. They were also found to have had higher levels of PTSD, anxiety and depression.

To mitigate such psychological issues, reconciliation processes may require ongoing engagement with participants to help prepare their minds for what they will encounter and to help them better cope with negative war memories. Dube said, “these processes should be designed and redesigned so as to retain their societal benefits without imposing psychological costs.”

She concluded that these effects, positive and negative, suggest animus doesn’t disappear by itself in communities scarred by conflict. Reconciliation could not have exerted effects on outcomes like forgiveness if people had simply self-healed with the passage of time. Truth and reconciliation can have a demonstrable impact on understanding and addressing residual hostility, but the processes should be designed to assuage the psychological toll on participants.

Making Peace: Restoring and Strengthening the Social Order

George J. Mitchell

“We must raise our actions to the level of our aspirations.”

When facing challenges at home or abroad—including the complexities of Brexit in Ireland, the U.S.’s position in international alliances, and the Israel-Palestine conflict—if the U.S. is to live up to its stated principles, then, according to former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, “we must raise our actions to the level of our aspirations.”

Twenty years ago, Mitchell played a key role in the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement, which helped bring an end to a decades-long violent conflict in Ireland known as “The Troubles.” The agreement itself is not a guarantee of peace or stability, Mitchell warns—those are the product of visionary and courageous leadership. Such leadership is particularly crucial now, as the UK and the European Union debate over the logistics of Britain’s decision to leave the EU. One of the sticking points in negotiations is what to do about the border between Northern Ireland—which is part of the UK—and the independent Republic of Ireland.

According to Mitchell, who was the U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland, reestablishing a hard border in
Ireland “would be an economic and political disaster.” The removal of the hard border was a major step for dissolving divisive stereotypes and hostile, us-versus-them mentalities. It also provided a major economic benefit on both sides.

Economics are a common factor across the conflicts with which Mitchell has been engaged, including in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and the Middle East. Low prospects for jobs, education, and opportunity deflate the self-esteem of individuals who then become more susceptible to engaging in violent conflicts. “You cannot overestimate the importance of ... the chance to succeed in life” for ending and preventing violent conflicts, Mitchell said.

Amid questions regarding the future of international institutions that have helped increase global trade and collective security, Mitchell said their success might now be threatened. Fissions in the EU would have a negative impact on U.S. global leverage and could create domino effects in Africa and much of Asia. The Trump Administration’s actions to withdraw from and stall international agreements cause concern for Mitchell. When asked if the administration’s divergence from conventional policy approaches might open new opportunities to resolve conflicts, Mitchell responded that he welcomes successful resolutions but doesn’t expect them.

In regard to the Israel-Palestine conflict, Mitchell shared that from conversations he’s had with leaders on both sides, neither side believes they’ll be able to reach an agreement with their counterpart. Mitchell remains optimistic that future leaders may be able to reach a deal on a two-state solution, which he sees as the best option, but in the meantime, mounting public pessimism on both sides regarding such a solution could cause greater political difficulties.
may find themselves playing to their strengths in the pursuit of public support or of adding members to their ranks. An invigorated extremist group may pose a greater threat through networks that could strike the homeland of the occupying force. Intervention to suppress such threats affects the local people. At the end of the day, intervention can boil down to a terrible tradeoff between the well-being of American (or European or Chinese or Russian) citizens and the well-being of the people of the host nation.

While terrorist groups do tend to share similarities, there are also crucial strategic distinctions. ISIS is a prime example of this. It has a distinct ability to recruit followers by the tens of thousands. As panelist Graeme Wood noted, other extremist groups have appealed to sympathizers with litanies of grievances and appeals to protect their homes, families, or values—but ISIS has found its success in enticing people with the portrait of a utopian vision. By appealing to supporters’ desires to be part of a “greater cause,” ISIS and other extremist groups can gain devoted followers ready to accelerate the use of violence.

English reminded attendees that extremist groups can sustain themselves over long time frames, and rushed efforts to eradicate these groups can backfire. This is one of the dangers of politicians pledging to wipe out extremist groups: it puts the extremists at an advantage, as they can gain a victory just for surviving a politician’s term. To end an extremist campaign, their leadership must conclude that the violence they thought would bring victory has failed and they must of necessity seek an alternative.
Panel: Consequences of Conflict

In modern conflicts, including those in Syria and Yemen, civilians have borne the vicious brunt of war in the form of lives that are lost, broken and displaced. Panelist Federico Borello highlighted the importance of mitigating civilian harm and the legal and ethical obligations to civilian victims and their families when harm does occur. Panelist Michelle Rempel added that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), policy makers, journalists, armed forces, multilateral organizations and U.S. citizens must grapple with their evolving responsibilities in response to these humanitarian crises rooted in conflict. Richard warned that at home, lawmakers and citizens must confront “compassion fatigue” and find ways to keep attention and resources focused on crises. Prolonged global conflicts are tempting to deprioritize, but it’s important for lawmakers to communicate to constituents that the U.S. can play a significant role in resolving conflicts and stabilizing these countries. Bipartisan support for foreign assistance ought to continue as one tool of U.S. engagement overseas.

Panelist Ciarán Donnelly noted that humanitarian NGOs have made real progress in ensuring that the assistance they provide is better targeted and proactive in protecting vulnerable groups during conflicts. He said, “When we design programs, we design them with those most affected by crisis—by definition civilians—in mind.” But often these same NGOs are placed in difficult positions, grappling with how and whether to share information on perpetrators of violence without endangering their staff and services. NGOs are also confronted by the challenge of delivering services without unintentionally lending legitimacy or political leverage to one side in an area at risk of conflict. This is an area of increasing scrutiny by international donors—which in turn threatens the ability of NGOs to deliver in active conflict zones.

Further progress has come from U.S. and NATO military forces, which are taking greater strides to protect civilians from harm during military operations. Borello pointed out that such efforts are, in part, a response to the reality that civilian deaths fuel a cycle of violence as people who have lost a family or community member are more likely to join hostile forces.

Richard warned that at home, lawmakers and citizens must confront “compassion fatigue.” Prolonged global conflicts are tempting to deprioritize, but it’s important for lawmakers to communicate to constituents the impact that the United States is having in these countries and to avoid unscrupulously using foreign assistance funds as a political bargaining chip.
Yazidi genocide, Avdal moved back to Iraq and began volunteering as an IT specialist.

At Yazda, Avdal worked with Nadia Murad, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts “to end the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and armed conflict.” While volunteering at Yazda, Avdal also met a University of Chicago graduate student. In January 2017, Avdal came to the United States as a refugee and was accepted into the University of Chicago, where he’s now studying computer science.

“I think everyone can make a difference,” Avdal said at the Forum. “And we all have a moral responsibility to stop these crimes, not just against Yazidis, but against anyone, anywhere in the world.”
Section IV: Restoring Social Order

Hazim Avdal, University of Chicago Student and Iraqi Refugee

Roger Myerson (see page 46 for title & affiliation)
Discussant Peter Luskin noted that ironically, from the donor perspective, humanitarian needs and service provisions are “easiest” to fund because they are seemingly neutral and non-controversial. In the context of a fragile state and complex crisis, assisting with service provision can appear to be a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the existing regime. In effect, the Syrian Civil War can be seen as a war on service provision.

Given this dynamic, Myerson suggested that assistance ought to be provided with the understanding that the Bashar al-Assad regime will seek to profit from it. The regime will likely prefer that all the assistance should be directed towards communities affiliated with the incumbent Ba’ath Party and that the communities which rebelled the longest should receive little to no aid. To buffer against this, the condition for reconstruction aid should include provisions for intense international monitoring by establishing a local reconstruction office in every district of Syria to direct and oversee the local delivery of international assistance. These donor-appointed local reconstruction officers should ensure that all communities receive reconstruction assistance, regardless of past positions in the Civil War, and they should try to help all communities develop forms of trusted local leadership in the delivery of public relief services. When local reconstruction officers report that the regime is unduly resisting against the aid conditions, the donor community needs to be ready to withdraw assistance until abuse and resistance stop. Until the Assad regime is willing to allow for local leadership and public services provision, Syria is and will continue to be, for many years to come, a place that its own people will not want to return to.

Restoration of social order depends on institutions and infrastructure, and impacts individual lives, communities and cultures that have been transformed in the Civil War. A prosperous democratic society depends on having an ample supply of respected individuals capable of stewarding public funds responsibly to serve their communities.
Local State-Building in Afghanistan

Professor Jennifer Murtazashvili, Director of the International Development Program at the University of Pittsburgh, told the story of a traditional village leader in Northern Afghanistan she called “Fatima.” Fatima believed that if she could change her community, she could change her country. She had been appointed after a long deliberate process in her community, and her customary authority was derived from trust and respect—her community believed that she could solve problems when they arose. Murtazashvili wondered how customary authority remained so legitimate in rural Afghanistan and what obstacles prevented government structures from gaining the same kind of legitimacy even with assistance from international donors.

Through interviews and focus groups conducted over the course of two years, Murtazashvili observed that customary authority is effective in delivering public goods and services because power is not concentrated in the hands of any single individual. Rather, power is diffused amongst three bodies: religious leaders derive their authority from Islam, village councils represent each household in the community, and village leaders, like Fatima, are appointed as the result of deliberate processes. Checks and balances among the three distinct sources of power serve to constrain the power of individual leaders. Murtazashvili noted, “Constraints on power give local leaders legitimacy and instill in communities a sense of trust.”

Insights into why customary authority is effective also help us understand why efforts to build the Afghan state have not succeeded. Scholars of Afghanistan disagree on many things, but agree that corruption on the part of the government is driving the Taliban insurgency. Unlike customary authorities, government leaders are not subject to many constraints on their authority. They are not elected, but appointed by central government officials in Kabul. The lack of constraints on their authority creates opportunities for corruption. This corruption and lack of respect have eroded trust.

Rather than work to strengthen such local sources of legitimacy, international donor efforts often sought to undermine them. In 2003, the World Bank partnered with the Afghanistan government to create an ambitious National Solidarity Program (NSP) in an effort to fill what was perceived as a vacuum of authority. NSP sought to improve access to basic services and to win the hearts and minds of the people through service delivery and infrastructure development. As part of NSP, 32,000 community development councils were established. Afghan government officials argued that these new councils would replace customary authority.

Yet, in villages with community development councils, more disputes remained unresolved than had with the traditional authorities they replaced. In its own evaluations, the World Bank also found governance outcomes were actually often better in communities that relied solely on customary structures and worse in the presence of new community development councils.

As the international community thinks about ways to build states in the future, Murtazashvili urged less consideration of building state capacity, and more careful consideration of how to build constraints on government authority, as these constraints encourage respect and prevent corruption. Additionally, following conflict, there ought to be an expectation that people are resilient and capable of solving their own problems, rather than an anticipation that a vacuum needs to be filled.

“Constraints on power give local leaders legitimacy and instill in communities a sense of trust.”

Jennifer Murtazashvili
Associate Professor and Director of the International Development Program, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh

“Local State-Building in Afghanistan”
The design of peace agreements can help overcome these commitment problems; in particular, in cases [with] post-conflict elections, in which both the government and rebel group parties agree to participate.

As combatants come together to sign a peace agreement, there remains one major barrier to peace: trust. Aila Matanock, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, described how, in 1992, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN for its Spanish title) rebels and the government in El Salvador came together to sign a peace agreement to end over twelve years of violence and war. Both sides were concerned about whether they could trust the other. Certainly, there were trust issues due to the conflict at hand, but the distrust also stemmed from incentives and the threat that one side could take advantage of the other. Specifically, the FMLN worried that as they started the disarmament process, the government could take advantage of their vulnerability and renge on the agreement. How, then, did the government and the FMLN overcome this trust deficiency?

In this case, the peace agreement outlined participatory elections along with an international peacekeeping mission. The government and the FMLN agreed to participate in the elections as political parties. In doing so, they allowed for a process of power distribution that the United Nations could monitor. The international donor community also provided reconstruction aid, as well as party funds, which were contingent on continued compliance with the peace agreement. These elections set to distribute power between ex-combatants, the presence of international monitoring, and conditional aid provided incentive for stakeholders to adhere to the peace agreement.

Matanock explained, “the design of peace agreements can help overcome these commitment problems, these trust issues; in particular, in cases where you are set to hold post-conflict elections, in which both the government and rebel group parties agree to participate.” Establishing electoral processes is helpful because elections serve as benchmarks and milestones that allow observers to detect whether both sides are complying. Each side becomes vulnerable due to the uncertainty of power distribution in the period leading up to elections. These electoral processes, then, also typically involve international actors, which are essential for monitoring, and equally importantly, providing incentives conditional on compliance with the peace agreement.

Examining cross-national data between 1975 and 2005 reveals that of the one hundred twenty-two peace agreements signed in this period, nearly forty percent returned to conflict within five years. This analysis demonstrates that agreements with electoral participation provisions are much less likely to be violated than those that do not have provisions that incorporate ex-combatants as political parties. The pacifying effect especially holds with expectations of international actors’ involvement. Matanock noted that beneficial elections involve ex-combatant political parties, international observation, and conditional incentives. Incorporating these elements into the design and implementation of agreements helps ensure enduring peace.
Agenda

October 4, 2018

Thursday

6:45 – 6:50 P.M.
WELCOME REMARKS
Robert J. Zimmer
President, University of Chicago

6:50 – 7:00 P.M.
PEARSON GLOBAL FORUM OVERVIEW
James Robinson
Institute Director, The Pearson Institute; The Reverend Dr. Richard L. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies and University Professor, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

7:50 – 8:00 P.M.
FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND EXTREMISM
Nancy Lindborg
President, U.S. Institute of Peace

October 5, 2018

Friday

9:00 – 9:05 A.M.
WELCOME REMARKS
Robert J. Zimmer
President, University of Chicago

9:05 – 9:15 A.M.
WHEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS MEET
James Robinson
Institute Director, The Pearson Institute; The Reverend Dr. Richard L. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies and University Professor, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

I. THE BREAKDOWN OF SOCIAL ORDER

9:15 - 10:00 A.M.
CAUSES OF CONFLICT
Rick Barton
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Lecturer and Co-Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Grant T. Harris
CEO, Harris Africa Partners LLC

John W. McArthur
Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution; Senior Advisor on Sustainable Development, United Nations Foundation

Paul B. Stares
General John W. Vessey Senior Fellow for Conflict Prevention and Director, Center for Preventive Action, Council on Foreign Relations

Moderator: Liz Schrayer
President and C0-CEO, U.S. Global Leadership Coalition

II. UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT & SOCIAL ORDER THROUGH DATA

11:00 – 11:30 A.M.
DETERRENCE IN CYBERSPACE
Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
Sydney Stein Professor and Deputy Dean for Promotions & Recruitment, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago; Faculty Affiliate, The Pearson Institute

11:10 – 11:55 A.M.
USING DATA TO ADDRESS CONFLICT
Jeffre Annan
Senior Research Associate, The Pearson Institute; Senior Advisor, The Pearson Institute

Liam Collins
Colonel, U.S. Special Forces; Director, Modern War Institute, U.S. Military Academy West Point

Rebecca J. Wolfe
Director of Evidence and Influence, Mercy Corps

Austin L. Wright
Assistant Professor, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago; Faculty Affiliate, The Pearson Institute

Moderator: Hal Weitzman
Adjunct Assistant Professor of Behavior Science and Executive Director for Intellectual Capital, University of Chicago Booth School of Business

Introduction by Mariana Laverde
Pearson Scholar and Harris Public Policy PhD Student
III. CONSEQUENCES OF A BREAKDOWN IN SOCIAL ORDER

1:10 – 1:20 P.M.
CAN THE WOUNDS OF WAR BE HEALED? RECONCILING AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT
Oeindrila Dube
The Philip K. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

1:20 – 2:10 P.M.
MAKING PEACE: RESTORING AND STRENGTHENING THE SOCIAL ORDER
George J. Mitchell

2:10 – 2:55 P.M.
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Richard English
Distinguished Professorial Fellow, Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast
Carter Malkasian
Special Assistant for Strategy to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense

2:55 - 3:15 P.M.
CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT
Federico Borello
Executive Director, Center for Civilians in Conflict
Clárs Donnelly
Senior Vice President, International Programs, International Rescue Committee
Anne C. Richard
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration
Michelle Rempel
Canadian Member of Parliament
Moderator: Kimberly Dozier
Global Affairs Analyst, CNN

3:15 - 3:30 P.M.
FROM STUDENT TO REFUGEE AND BACK AGAIN
Hazim Avdal
University of Chicago Student and Iraqi Refugee

4:10 – 4:55 P.M.
LOCAL POLITICS AND RECONCILIATION IN SYRIA: A CASE STUDY IN POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION
Peter Luzkin
Managing Director and Co-Founder, Center for Operational Analysis and Research
Roger Myerson
David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris Public Policy, the Griffin Department of Economics, and the College at the University of Chicago

4:55 – 5:05 P.M.
LOCAL STATEBUILDING IN AFGHANISTAN
Jennifer Murtazashvili
Associate Professor and Director of the International Development Program, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh

5:05 – 5:15 P.M.
ELECTING PEACE
Aila Matanock
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California – Berkeley

5:15 - 5:20 P.M.
CLOSING REMARKS
Daniel Diermeier
Provost, University of Chicago
List of Participants

Marianne Akumu
Obama Foundation Scholar and Harris Public Policy Student

Jeannie Annan
Senior Director of Research & Evaluation, International Rescue Committee; Senior Research Associate, The Pearson Institute

Hazim Avdal
University of Chicago College Student and Iraqi Refugee

David Axelrod
Institute Director, Institute of Politics at the University of Chicago; Former Chief Strategist and Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama

Katherine Baicker
Dean and Emmett Dedmon Professor, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

Rick Barton
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations; Lecturer and Co-Director, Scholars in the Nation’s Service Initiative, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Tim Besley
W. Arthur Lewis Professor of Development Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science

Chris Blattman
The Ramalee E. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

Federico Borello
Executive Director, Center for Civilians in Conflict

Ethan Bueno de Mesquita
Sydney Stein Professor and Deputy Dean for Promotions & Recruitment, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago; Faculty Affiliate, The Pearson Institute

Steve Clemons
Washington Editor-at-Large, The Atlantic

Liam Collins
Colonel, U.S. Special Forces; Director, Modern War Institute, U.S. Military Academy West Point

Daniel Diermeier
Provost, University of Chicago

Clara Donnelly
Senior Vice President, International Programs, International Rescue Committee

Kimberly Dozler
Global Affairs Analyst, CNN

Oeindrila Dube
The Philip K. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies, Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago

Steve Edwards
Vice President, Chief Content Officer, WBEZ

Richard English
Distinguished Professorial Fellow, Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice, Queen’s University Belfast

Rahmatullah Hamraz
Obama Foundation Scholar and Harris Public Policy Student

Grant T. Harris
CEO, Harris Africa Partners LLC

John Hewko
General Secretary, Rotary International

Vuk Jeremic
President, 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly; President, Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development

Adnan Khan
Research and Policy Director, International Growth Centre and Lecturer, London School of Economics and Political Science; Visiting Lecturer, Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School

Mariana Laverde
Pearson Scholar and Harris Public Policy PhD Student

Elaine Li
Pearson Fellow and Harris Public Policy Student

Nancy Lindborg
President, U.S. Institute of Peace

Peter Luskin
Managing Director and Co-Founder, Center for Operational Analysis and Research

Carter Malkasian
Special Assistant for Strategy, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense

Aila M. Matanock
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California - Berkeley

John W. McArthur
Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution; Senior Advisor on Sustainable Development, United Nations Foundation

George J. Mitchell
Inaugural U.S. Special Envoy for Northern Ireland (1995-1998); Independent Chairman, Northern Ireland Peace Talks; U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace (2009-2011); former U.S. Senator
Jennifer Murtazashvili
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Anne C. Richard
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration

Michelle Rempel
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