It is our goal to convene leading scholars and high-level policy makers from around the globe to exchange ideas and maximize the potential for impact in preventing and resolving violent conflicts and informing policy. We hope this Forum is an opportunity for you to engage with other similarly interested parties and begin important conversations that may impact positive change. I’d like to extend my personal thanks to you for joining us, and I welcome you to The Pearson Global Forum.

Sincerely,

James Robinson
Institute Director, The Pearson Institute
The Reverend Dr. Richard L. Pearson Professor
of Global Conflict Studies and University Professor,
The University of Chicago
The Pearson Global Forum

The University of Chicago’s Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts presents the second annual Pearson Global Forum, Beyond Walls | Deconstructing Conflict. This Forum is a significant public event with the goal of convening leading scholars and high-level policy makers from around the globe to exchange ideas and maximize the potential for impact in preventing and resolving violent conflicts and informing policy. This conference focuses on the causes and consequences of conflict, and strategies to intervene and mitigate conflict and to consolidate peace.

Just weeks before the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, the second annual Pearson Global Forum is both a reflection on the prospects for change once envisioned, as well as a discussion of our current global reality. As the international community continues to deal with dozens of active conflicts and the quickly shifting relationships between and among nations, it is essential to look beyond existing walls – both symbolic and literal – and deconstruct conflict in order to find paths towards resolution, peace, and stability. At The Pearson Institute, we are mobilizing our mission to convene international leaders and world-renowned academics at The Pearson Global Forum to explore rigorous research and analysis to influence solutions, strategies, and policy for reducing and mitigating conflict to achieve a more peaceful world.

The Pearson Institute for the Study of Global Conflicts

The Pearson Institute for the Study of Global Conflicts at the University of Chicago promotes the ongoing discussion, understanding and resolution of global conflicts, and contributes to the advancement of a global society more at peace. Established through a gift from The Thomas L. Pearson and The Pearson Family Members Foundation, and led by Institute Director James Robinson, co-author of Why Nations Fail and The Narrow Corridor, the Institute achieves this by employing an analytically rigorous, data-driven approach and global perspective to understanding violent conflict. It is global in its scope, activities and footprint. Attracting students and scholars from around the world, its faculty is in the field studying conflicts – and approaches to conflict resolution – in Nigeria, Colombia and Afghanistan, to name just a few.

The University of Chicago

The University of Chicago is a leading academic and research institution that has driven new ways of thinking since its founding in 1890. As an intellectual destination, the University draws scholars and students from around the world to its home in Hyde Park and campuses around the globe. The University provides a distinctive educational experience, empowering individuals to challenge conventional thinking and pursue research that produces new understanding and breakthroughs with global impact. Home to more than 90 Nobel laureates, the University of Chicago is dedicated to an environment of fearless inquiry and academic rigor.
Keynote Address:
Looking Back at 1989

Markus Meckel
Cofounder of the Social Democratic Party in the GDR; First Foreign Minister after the first free democratic elections in the GDR in 1990

At the 2019 Pearson Global Forum in Berlin, Markus Meckel, cofounder of the Social Democratic Party in East Germany, gave a keynote address titled “Looking Back at 1989.” His remarks focused on how the fall of the Berlin Wall became a pivotal moment in history because of the international factors that helped catalyze the movement and because of East Germans—who Meckel says do not get enough credit in the retellings of history—who fought to achieve the freedom and values that were available in West Germany. Meckel noted that the cultural and social divide between East Germany and West Germany still feels tangible, which means there is no singular way of looking back at the past.

Leading up to the events of 1989, no one in Europe could have foreseen the fall of the Berlin Wall and the massive global impact it would have. However, changes began to unfold in other parts of Europe that helped inspire the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall and end to the Cold War. Former President of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev addressed the United Nations in 1988 in a speech that called for the world
community to take global challenges seriously and to respect international law. From a communist leader, this sort of message was unprecedented, and was one that Meckel believes to be a turning point in Cold War history, and one that helped shift the perspective on the state of European politics and government.

Meckel also pointed to specific political shifts in Poland and Hungary as precursors to the end of the Cold War, particularly the Polish Round Table Agreement and the Solidarnosc Movement in Poland, and social change led by reform communists in Hungary. This helped the political dynamic shift away from the authoritarian tendencies in East Germany; however, Meckel noted that each country has its own history and causes that precipitate change, and Germany was no exception. It was because of the determination of East Germans to build freedom for themselves as well as through internal negotiations between East Germany and West Germany that German unification became possible. The declaration that the West won the Cold War is an oversimplification of a complex struggle, but one that has been proclaimed within Germany and internationally—notably, by former US president George H. W. Bush.

Meckel concluded by emphasizing three points. First, the unification process between East and West Germany is not one of equitable integration; it became a process of East Germans trying to find a space in West Germany. The common narrative on the fall of the Berlin Wall typically does not consider the realities of the unification process for East Germany. It is for this reason that the notion of perspective in retelling history is of utmost importance, as it can be a lesson as to how—if a similar unification process takes place again in the future—the weaker state in the process can be empowered and dignified to achieve true unification. Second, a key lesson learned from the events of 1989 is that democracy can only be built if democratic advocates within the country are supported, and that democracy cannot be imported from other countries. Third, in order to move forward in building a peaceful society, we must face the past through a critical lens.
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall thirty years ago, Germany has faced the consistently evolving challenge of establishing its identity, both within its borders and beyond. Persisting social and economic divides between East and West Germany, changing demographics, and a dynamic global order have caused Germany to constantly reevaluate the notion of identity. Panelists discussed the complex nature of German identity on social, national, and international levels.

Though the Berlin Wall came down three decades ago, panelists discussed the lasting socioeconomic and cultural divides between East and West Germany. Panelist Naika Foroutan shared the results of a recent study conducted by the Berlin Institute for Empirical Integration and Migration Research, which focused on East German identity. The report showed that the stereotypes held toward East Germans are similar to those held toward immigrants, and largely fall into three main areas: that East Germans victimize themselves even thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that they do not distance themselves enough from extremist movements in Germany, and that East Germans have not yet “arrived” in today’s Germany. This rhetoric has had negative effects on East German self-identity, as the report shows that the majority of East Germans consider themselves to be treated as second-class citizens in their own country, and feel they need to work twice as hard to achieve the same as West Germans.

In addition to sentiment and stereotypes about East Germans, the history of internal migration between the two areas is also a factor in the discussion around identity. Philip Faigle cited a report published by Zeit Online titled “The Millions Who Left,” which uses data visualization to show migration patterns between East and West Germany since the 1950s. In 1989 and 1990, 800,000 East Germans moved to West Germany in search of jobs, education, and an overall higher standard of living. A similar migration wave occurred in 2000, when a higher number of young people and women moved from East to West. However, 2017 marked the first year in post–World War II Germany that there was a higher number of people from West Germany moving to East Germany than the other way around. This, according to Faigle, exemplifies that the demographic differences between East and West Germany are narrowing as a result of internal population movement.

On a national level, there have been political challenges to creating a unifying voice and identity for Germany. Thorsten Benner expressed that there are no prominent political or social leaders who are pushing what he referred to as the “pluralism of identity” that Germans need. Rather than leveraging the diversity of Germany into a source of pride and as a unifying force, identities are becoming more siloed. Benner made the argument that elected officials from across the political spectrum tend to reject ideas of what kind of country Germany is if those ideas do not align with their own views, which results in the lack of an inclusive sense of patriotism among citizens. To prevent Germany from becoming more polarized, panelists expressed the importance of creating platforms to facilitate dialogue between Germans of different backgrounds.

In addition to the country’s internal divides, establishing Germany’s identity on an international level and its role in the modern world have also proven to be challenges for the nation. Thomas Bagger recalled his initial shock in 1989 when he received the news that the Berlin Wall was coming down, and how the event created a sense of linearity among the German people in terms of the country’s future. There was a sense that Germany had reached its intended “destination,” creating unity and stability for future generations and serving as an inspiration to other nations. Bagger said that it has been difficult for Germans to reconcile with the fact that this reading of 1989 proved to be too optimistic and that the country’s future is more open than expected. In the era of Brexit and the Trump presidency, the role and identity of Germany as a leader in the Western world has been called into question. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany has grappled with creating its internal and external identities, which will likely continue to evolve in the decades to come.
By promoting dialogue between diverse academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders, The Pearson Global Forum is designed to inform new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict.
The data showed that female leaders were 39 percent more likely to participate in war than male leaders were. Dube noted, however, that it is important to consider other factors that may contribute to this higher probability. Were female leaders perceived as weak, thus leaving their polities to become more vulnerable to being attacked, eventually leading to a greater chance of war participation? Dube’s research showed that this is likely not the case, since more female leaders in the sample engaged in war as attackers rather than as the targets of others’ attacks. Did the nature of war participation of female leaders change depending on whether those leaders were married or single? Yes: single female rulers were more likely to be attacked than single male rulers, while married female rulers were more likely to participate as attackers than male rulers, single or married. This is perhaps because female rulers were more likely to appoint their husbands to powerful positions in government, such as military leadership or enacting financial reform, which strengthened their ruling capacity and positioned them to be able to engage in war.

While considering the causes of why female leaders were more likely than their male counterparts to engage in war in a pre-1913 era, the outcomes of war participation are also an integral part of the study. The data show that overall, queens not only engaged in war more aggressively but were also more likely to oversee territorial gain relative to kings.

Dube then posed the question of whether these conclusions hold up in the modern era. There is some evidence to suggest that in modern developed democracies, women leaders have also invested more in military development and spent more time engaged in conflict than male leaders. However, this is a difficult conclusion to reach definitively, as there have been very few female heads of states, even in the modern era. Perhaps one of the reasons for this outcome is the widespread notion that women are more pacifist, conciliatory leaders. However, the data, as Dube points out, certainly show otherwise.

From the beginning of the modern era into contemporary politics, female heads of state were often seen as setting more conciliatory war policies or being less likely to engage in war. This notion has persisted throughout the centuries in part due to prevailing gender norms. When studying female political leadership throughout history and its intersection of war and conflict, a main question becomes: Do states led by women engage in war more or less than states led by men?

Oeindrila Dube, the Philip K. Pearson Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, shared her research that aims to answer this question. Focusing on European polities and their leaders, Dube and her team gathered data on the genealogies of the gender makeup of European monarchies leading up to World War I, and coded that data against Quincy Wright’s “A Study of War,” an anthology of the nature and causes of modern war. The sample included 193 distinct reigns of monarchs, 34 of which were ruled by women.
Why are different parts of the world organized so differently and what are the consequences of this contrast? Professor James Robinson began his presentation by outlining the model that is central to the book *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty*, Robinson’s most recent collaboration with coauthor Daron Acemoglu. According to this model, countries lie somewhere between two extremes: a society dominated by the state and a state dominated by society.

For examples of the first extreme, a society dominated by the state, Robinson turned to Russia and China. Robinson pointed out that this characterization applies not just to the modern Chinese state but, in fact, to China throughout its history. For instance, one 2,500-year-old Confucian quote reads, “Commoners do not debate matters of government,” a sentiment echoed later by Shang Yang, the intellectual mastermind of the Ch’in Dynasty, when he said, “When the people are weak, the state is strong, hence the state strives to weaken the people.” These views have persisted over the years and are reflected more recently both in the
crushing of the democratic movement in Tiananmen square thirty years ago and in the installation of more than 200 million AI-powered cameras to monitor citizens on China’s present-day streets.

To illustrate the other extreme, a state dominated by society, Robinson cited Yemen and Lebanon. Society in both countries is so strong and well organized that a robust state has yet to emerge. Like China, Yemen has existed in this same state as far as its history is documented. In Yemen, every boy gets his first dagger when he is just six years old and every man must have a dagger—a custom that shows the cultural belief that one can’t have honor without being able to defend it, and to defend this honor one should be weaponized. This is the exact opposite of Max Weber’s definition of the state as the entity that monopolizes violence; in Yemen, everyone has a legitimate claim to the use of violence.

According to Robinson, these extremes have implications. In China’s case, growth has always been very transitory and subject to crisis. In Yemen, restrictions and social norms replace the state, leading to a country with, for example, the lowest rate of female labor participation worldwide and high poverty.

Lying between those two extremes, balanced liberal democracies in Western Europe and North America exist. Throughout their histories and present, they have been attaining a balance between state and society. To illustrate this evolution, Robinson looked back 1,500 years to the fall of the Roman Empire, when Clovis I established the Frank Kingdom. He brought together state institutions and established the Salic laws—laws that were written not by him, but by different elected representatives. This way of organizing society has persisted and represents the narrow corridor that lies between the two extremes. Where this balance emerges, one sees prosperity and liberty.

Still, European history has not trended inevitably toward the narrow corridor but rather shown a constant struggle between state and society. Historically, countries have moved in and out of the corridor; however, once inside, history shows that, despite suffering in welfare that may result from short periods outside the corridor, countries trend back toward liberty.
According to al-Istrabadi, the second lesson is that a state in transition may not be immediately ready to draft a constitution. In Iraq’s case, al-Istrabadi noted that conditions were not ideal for constitution drafting after the invasion; foreign troops were still on Iraqi soil. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for January 30, 2005, and the body was given a mandate to draft a new constitution. Leaders of the second largest ethno-confessional group, the Arab Sunnis, felt that fair elections would be impossible considering the violent insurgency in their provinces. When parliamentary elections were held, they were boycotted by the Arab Sunnis. In October 2005, as an extension to the parliamentary elections, the constitutional referendum was also rejected by Arab Sunnis. Although the boycott should have been concerning, US officials stated that Kurds and Shiites would build a new state regardless of opposition from the 20 percent of the population that was Sunni. Al-Istrabadi concluded that the “eighty-percent solution” did not work and the failure to enfranchise all groups has led to ongoing violence.

A final point that al-Istrabadi raised is that legitimacy should have been sought through the restoration of order and the provision of services. This would have allowed the Iraqi people to feel positive change. Instead, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) wasted the opportunity by pursuing “strange laws”—namely, the corporate law and the motor vehicles code. Nussaibah Younis asked al-Istrabadi further about the assertion that dissolving the state and army were detrimental to Iraq’s state-building project. She asked him to comment on the argument that if one considers that the same tactic was used in other historical cases, such as Germany after the World War II, and the Iraqi armed forces were complicit in war crimes and the state was ruled by a totalitarian party intimidating the Iraqi people, then the process of dissolving the state and army was necessary to prevent vigilante justice. Al-Istrabadi rejected this view, arguing that unlike in Germany where the United States and the Allies maintained an intensive presence and administration in every German city, the United States had a much weaker presence in Iraq. As for the army, al-Istrabadi argued it would have been enough to dissolve just the elite forces, such as the Republican Guard, and that the United States should have empowered the general Iraqi forces. As a result, the country was left without local security forces and relied on American forces to maintain public order. The physical presence of American forces in the cities became intimidating to Iraqis.

In response to the argument that Iraq was not ready to draft a constitution, Younis asked who has the right to decide when a country is ready for a constitution and elections, especially considering that elections and constitution drafting were an effort by the allies to restore legitimacy in Iraq. Al-Istrabadi responded that elections and a constitution early in a transition could destroy the democratization process. Moreover, negotiations were moving at a much slower pace and were not inclusive, as the Arab Sunnis rejected the legitimacy of any transitional elections with foreign troops present on Iraqi soil.

Younis asked Emma Sky to reflect on lessons from after the 2007 US troop surge. First, Sky described the
context of the surge under which US President George W. Bush ordered 20,000 additional US troops to Iraq, which took place in 2006 at a violent time in the civil war when dead bodies were seen daily on Iraqi streets. At that time, the coalition possessed a leadership that tried to ask questions about the roots of ongoing conflict—namely, why there was so much violence in Iraq. Initially, violence was directed against coalition forces and Iraqi groups allied with them. However, as the state collapsed, more armed groups became violent and the civil war erupted. In 2007, the first attempt to reach out to the armed groups took place with the goal of understanding the reasons behind the violence. Findings suggested that most groups were competing for power in the political vacuum that was created after the dissolution of the Iraqi state. The surge filled the power vacuum and provided an opportunity for different groups to change their strategic calculus. Sunni insurgent groups realized that al-Qaeda was leading them to absolute disaster and turned against al-Qaeda, which led to the end of Iraq’s civil war.

Sky noted that the second reason that Iraq had spiraled into a civil war was because of the terms of the peace agreement in 2003. These terms were exclusionary and gave priority to the groups that had been exiled under former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, many of which were Islamists and had been in Iran, while excluding those who stayed in Iraq. The 2007 surge was intended to reduce violence and pave the way for national reconciliation and improved service delivery. In the 2010 elections, the turnout was high with all groups participating, including those that had previously boycotted elections. For the first time, a nonsectarian coalition came together and won the elections by a narrow margin. However, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refused to accept the election results. The United States decided the easiest course of action was to allow him to stay in office. During his second term in office, al-Maliki stoked sectarian tensions by accusing Sunni politicians of being terrorists, and reneging on promises to Sunni Awakening leaders who fought against al-Qaeda, which led to them being exiled, killed, or arrested. Sky argued these policies created the conditions for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to rise up out of the ashes of al-Qaeda in Iraq and proclaim itself as the defender of the Arab Sunnis against the Iranian-backed sectarian regime of al-Maliki.

Younis asked the panel if the state’s tendency to respond to protests with repression instead of reform will create the same conditions that Iraq experienced under the Saddam Hussein regime. Al-Istrabadi responded that he is concerned about Iraq’s future. Despite claims from the government that it intends to reform, there is no actual will to move forward with the constitutional reform process. Sky does not believe Iraq will return to a centralized repressive state, because the government does not have a monopoly on the use of force and power is so diffused.

During the question-and-answer portion of the panel, audience members inquired about corruption in Iraq. US commitment to interventions, and the structure of the Iraqi government. Sky urged the United States to be “more realistic” about what can be achieved during an international intervention. In the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States invested “masses in terms of blood and treasure,” but she believes the goals were not realistic. Al-Istrabadi answered a comparison of the Iraqi government’s structure to Lebanon’s consociational political model, emphasizing that “there is nothing in the Iraqi constitution that mandates ethno-confessional divisions” and that there was not a conscious effort to emulate the Lebanese model. According to al-Istrabadi, the ethno-political model emerged because the United States failed to recognize that an overarching national identity existed in Iraq.
Collaborating Across Disciplines

By promoting dialogue between diverse academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders, The Pearson Global Forum is designed to inform new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict.
Humanizing Conflict: Palestinian Reality

Yousef Bashir  
Peace Activist; Author  
(Pictured, opposite page)

Yousef Bashir was shot in Gaza by an Israeli soldier when he was only fifteen years old. Beginning by reading from a letter that he wrote to this soldier, Bashir asked, “Why did you shoot me?” Bashir focused his presentation on his personal motives for forgiveness, tracing his story from violence, to injury, to compassion from doctors in Tel Aviv, a story that led to his dedication to peace that allowed him to forgive this soldier despite still feeling the pain from his bullets.

When he was eleven years old, Yousef Bashir’s family was ordered to leave their home during the first intifada in 2000. However, his family refused this displacement, which resulted in extreme conditions ordered by Israeli soldiers as a proviso of their remaining in place. Bashir’s family was not allowed to move from one floor to the next—or even lock the bathroom door—without permission from a member of the Israeli military. Bashir recalled asking his father, given circumstances such as these, how would it be possible for Muslims and Jews to one day live in peace?
In 2002, Bashir’s struggle for the belief in peace was challenged again after crossfire between Israeli forces and Palestinian protestors. Bashir recalled, in the midst of this ever-present threat of violence, his father being interviewed by CNN. When the reporter asked Bashir’s father if he still believed in peace, Bashir was incredulous to hear his father’s response: in fact, it made him believe even more in peace.

In 2004 Bashir was shot in the back by an Israeli soldier and moved to Tel Aviv for medical treatment. The year in hospital where Bashir was treated exclusively by Jewish staff was his first interaction with Israeli Jews who were neither soldiers nor settlers. Their compassion allowed him to finally realize his father’s commitment to peace, understanding that the biggest defeat comes when others’ violent actions make us lose our humanity.

In 2005, Bashir attended Seeds of Peace summer camp in the United States, interacting with youth from Egypt, Israel, and other countries, beginning his career advocating for peaceful resolution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. His return coincided with Israel’s decision to evacuate the Gaza Strip, and Bashir’s family was able to resume ownership of their house: they celebrated by running to the upper stories they had been prevented from visiting since 2000. Bashir views his father as a hero who never succumbed to the cycle of fear and violence. With this inspiration, he has learned to dedicate his life to peace for himself, his family, his nation, and even his enemies.
Thirty years ago, the same global forces that allowed for the dismantling of the Berlin Wall were equally instrumental in bringing about efforts at peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, it appeared that both parties were on a path to peace built on a model of two states. Instead, the reality in 2019 is a one-state model controlled by Israel wherein the Palestinian Authority—itself on the brink of financial collapse—and the de facto government in Gaza are limited to self-administration. Israel’s annexation of Palestinian territory and the ongoing blockade of Gaza present further challenges, all of which combine to make this one of the most intractable conflicts in the Middle East. Moderator Muriel Asseburg questioned, “What went so terribly wrong over the last thirty years?”

Ambassador Husam Zomlot highlighted three failures that have made peace so elusive. First, Palestinians made the mistake of entering into a peace process that was not reciprocal. Palestinians agreed to negotiate, renounced violence, and officially recognized Israel as a state, but they never received recognition from Israel in return. Following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, Israel has publicly asserted its desire to undermine the peace process. According to Zomlot, the second failure was having the United States act as the sole mediator of the conflict over the past thirty years. Seeking instead to advance its own political interests, the United States has failed to deliver the two-state solution. The final and most significant failure lies with the international community. Despite asserting the premise of the “inadmissibility of acquiring land by force” as a fundamental component of the international order, the international community has not punished Israel for the construction of illegal settlements in Palestinian territory.

Ambassador Zomlot noted that contact between the Palestinian Authority and the Trump Administration was sustained and positive in the first half of 2017. Seeking to dismantle this productive process, Prime Minister Netanyahu ensured that powerful individuals in the United States intervened. The result has been the closure of the US Consulate in Jerusalem, the cessation of US aid and funding to Palestine and the cessation of US funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). This change in strategy—taken by the sole mediator of the conflict—has the effect of dismantling the entire basis of the peace process and the vision of the two-state solution.

Finally, Ambassador Zomlot addressed the charge of anti-Semitism leveled against critics of Israeli policy. While acknowledging that anti-Semitism is real and that it must be eradicated, he finds no contradiction between those who fight anti-Semitism and those who fight Israeli expansionism. Rather, a small minority seeks to conflate these mutual goals in an effort to delegitimize the negotiations, which makes peace elusive.
Creating a World More at Peace

By promoting dialogue between diverse academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders, The Pearson Global Forum is designed to inform new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict.
Foreign intervention should be a last resort, but when the violence and suffering in a failed state warrants it, the intervening country should ensure it effectively supports political development. According to Roger Myerson, lessons for how to accomplish this can be gleaned from the success of nineteenth-century colonial agents. The goal is not to recreate the racist colonial past but rather to learn from how British colonizers established stable political order in distant lands at a low cost to taxpayers.

Myerson outlined the three fundamental pillars of the British mechanism for accomplishing this: decentralization, continuity, and cooperation. Decentralization involved the devolution of local authority to a team of district officers who oversaw the political and economic development of a small territory. This decentralized power from Britain, while concentrating it locally in the hands of an officer whose primary concern was political development.

Continuity referred to the practice of installing provincial commissioners who would oversee the work of the district officers. They often held these positions for the entirety of their careers, allowing them to maintain long-term relationships within their province. Finally, cooperation described the mandate of the district officers to build a broad and inclusive local government that incorporated indigenous leaders of all major groups, ensuring that each of them benefitted from a share of tax revenues. Thus, the British district officers formed a decentralized network that was by design sensitive and responsive to local concerns.

Myerson proposed that when the goal of foreign assistance is political development, initiatives should be overseen by such broadly responsible district officers. To take the context of Syria as an example, a broad international coalition of democratic nations could jointly finance reconstruction efforts, under the condition that district officers in each region supervise the disbursement of aid. These local observers would monitor the local situation, assess what was politically feasible, and encourage cooperation among leaders to achieve the maximum possible good.
Left: Roger Myerson, David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies at the Harris School of Public Policy, the Griffin Department of Economics, and The College, University of Chicago; Nobel Laureate (2007). Right: Kristin Fabbe, Assistant Professor of Business Administration and Hellman Faculty Fellow, Harvard Business School.
secular nor revolutionary. Instead, many religious elites already were or soon became civil servants. A number of these religious elites joined the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), a bureaucratic entity wherein the state conferred legitimacy on certain individuals to practice Islam. This was emblematic of how the state took control both of religious elites and religious doctrine. What emerged was a state that claimed to be secular while also maintaining its deep religious heritage. In the face of conflict throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Turkey has leaned on this religious bureaucracy to weather periods of unrest.

Today, critics charge Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with attempting to reverse the secularization of Turkey by building mosques and seeking to create a pious Turkish state that is at odds with its secular culture. Fabbe showed that, in fact, many of his actions mirror those of his predecessors. When faced with a military coup in July of 2016, Erdogan called on the mosques to send people to the streets to resist the attempt. While the coup failed, the repercussions have been drastic, including large purges of individuals from state institutions and pronounced democratic backsliding. Amid this crisis, the state continues to rely on religious legitimacy to bolster its authority.

In the former Ottoman Empire and particularly in Turkey, secularism was rarely about ideals of neutrality or separation of religion from the state. Instead, it was about state-centric religious actors and religious majoritarianism, with minorities, liberal values, and democratic development suffering over the long term as a consequence. If one wants to question whether Islam is incompatible with democracy, Fabbe argued, one must also question whether certain varieties of “secularism” are incompatible with democracy. Islamists should not be seen as uniquely antidemocratic when authoritarian “secularists” both instrumentalized religion and created the broader framework in which political actors operate.
A Data-Driven Approach

By promoting dialogue between diverse academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders, The Pearson Global Forum is designed to inform new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict.
Roland Jahn opened his keynote address by drawing the audience’s attention to the fact that they presently sat in an area that had once been a “death zone”—an area where people had been shot simply because they attempted to cross from East to West Berlin. Jahn juxtaposed this image of suppression with the mission of The Pearson Global Forum to bring together thinkers and influencers from around the world to understand and resolve global conflict, emphasizing the optimistic message of this vast transformation, claiming that the impossible becomes possible when people choose to act.

In this vein, Jahn paid homage to the brave citizens of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and their perseverance through countless struggles to bring down the Berlin Wall through peaceful revolution, a feat that had at many times felt hopeless. He reflected on his own time in prison and the challenges of remaining vitalized when feeling so weak and isolated, crediting his own strength to his daughter and his desire for her to grow up in a free world. However, he suggested the choice to resist is
not always an easy one; it ultimately depends on individual choices and values.

For Jahn and many others involved in the peaceful revolution, it became crucial to not only tear down the wall separating the East from the West but to also make accessible to Germans and broader society the various classified documents citing the injustice and violations at the hands of the GDR. Jahn credits these documents in understanding the tactics by which the government remained in place for so many years; among these tactics was the use of fear.

Jahn cited the use of fear by GDR officials in his own experience of being expelled from university after sharing a critical opinion of the state government during a seminar. Despite being given the opportunity to “democratically” vote on the issue of his expulsion, Jahn’s own friends and peers from the seminar voted against him. It wasn’t until many years later that Jahn found out that his friends had betrayed him due to fear tactics that had been used by GDR officials. These government officials had threatened their futures and their families, leaving them little choice but to vote in favor of Jahn’s expulsion. “That is exactly what the system of fear in a dictatorship is; it manipulates people into making decisions against their will,” suggested Jahn.

Finally, Jahn warned against complacency of those supporting current dictatorial regimes and called on individual responsibility to denounce fear tactics and exclude oneself from partaking in rights violations. However, he further urges democracies and even schools to consider the ways in which people exert power over one another and foster systems absent of fear in which people do not shy away from sharing information, expressing their opinions, or exerting their human rights. This has been the focus of Jahn’s work for many years since he was expelled from the German Democratic Republic to West Germany, where he worked as a journalist and leveraged media coverage to promote a unified Germany.

As Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Records, Jahn continues to use former GDR records to show the causes and results of the dictatorship in an effort to promote democracy. Jahn has even worked with the international community to protect personal data, while still providing transparency and processing the documents of various dictatorships worldwide. According to Jahn, “[t]he more we understand dictatorship, the better we can build democracy.”
In 2013, Ilham Tohti accepted a visiting professorship at Indiana University. He hoped to bring his daughter to the United States with him over one of her school breaks; however, when he was detained at the Beijing airport by Chinese officials, the situation resulted in Jewher Ilham traveling to the United States alone. The following year in China, Ilham Tohti was charged with separatism and sentenced to life in prison.

Since then, Jewher Ilham has remained in the United States, spending her time advocating on behalf of her father and the one to three million Uyghurs who remain detained in concentration camps, which have been dubbed “re-education camps” by the Chinese government. She harnesses her education and personal experiences as motivation to help her father and others in similar situations. She has testified in front of the US Congress, spoken at the UN, and met with US President Donald Trump. “One person’s power is too little...I need a much bigger team to help me to change [the] Chinese government’s behavior,” said Ilham, encouraging others to educate themselves on the abuses of the Chinese government and to join in advocacy efforts to end human rights violations against the Uyghurs.

At the 2019 Pearson Global Forum, Jewher Ilham recounted her experiences living as an Uyghur in the Xinjiang region of China. An ethnic minority primarily located in the western region of the country, the Uyghurs have long been persecuted by the Chinese government and excluded from educational and employment opportunities on the basis of their Muslim faith, culture, appearance, and language.

Jewher Ilham’s father, Ilham Tohti, is an academic and former professor at Minzu University of China. Ilham Tohti first began researching the plights of Uyghurs, especially homeless Uyghur children, between 2006 and 2007. Recognizing the gravity of the abuses against the Uyghurs, Ilham Tohti became an advocate for peace and cross-cultural understanding, and he created an online platform to educate and share with others the narratives of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in the country. This platform received mass attention, both within China and in other countries, ultimately leading to Ilham Tohti’s various arrest and questioning by the Chinese government, which perceived the growing platform as a threat.
Globally Engaged

By promoting dialogue between diverse academics, policymakers, and other stakeholders, The Pearson Global Forum is designed to inform new strategies to prevent, resolve, and recover from conflict.
New Holocaust? Uyghurs

Nicole Morgret
Project Manager, Uyghur Human Rights Project

Dilnur Reyhan
Instructor, French National Institute for Oriental Studies; President, European Uyghur Institute; Director, Regarde sur les Ouïghour-e-s

Sophie Richardson
China Director, Human Rights Watch

Rian Thum
Senior Research Fellow, University of Nottingham

Moderator: Ursula Gauthier
Senior Reporter, L’Obs

Rian Thum, a researcher from the University of Nottingham, opened up the panel discussion by offering some background on the current situation in the western region of China. Thum estimates that about 1.5 million Uyghurs are being held in internment camps, where they have been subject to forced indoctrination, torture, rape, and many other abuses. The Uyghurs, an ethnic minority in China, have long been persecuted by the Chinese state; however, in recent years, this persecution has escalated as part of a broader policy directive from the state to culturally transform the Uyghur people. This has manifested in the detention of Uyghurs in internment camps, prisons, and forced labor camps, in addition to campaigns for Han Chinese to marry Uyghur women and attempts to raise Uyghur children as Han Chinese in various orphanages.

Ursula Gauthier, a senior reporter at L’Obs, strengthened Thum’s claims of the atrocities against the Uyghurs by sharing details from an interview she had conducted with an Uyghur Kazakhstan national who had been imprisoned in one of the internment camps. The interviewee recounted “hell-
like conditions,” experiencing a lack of food and water, torture, and other abuse, which Gauthier claimed would leave “[deep] scars which will last decades.”

Dilnur Reyhan spoke next, offering not only her personal experiences as an Uyghur but also insights gained from her many years of study of the Uyghur diaspora. Reyhan cited that at least one million Uyghurs are living outside of their native land, with harrowing impact. First, there is an increasing number of diaspora members who have become active in political movements against Chinese policies. However, this number remains small due to the second implication—the lingering fear of intimidation and threats against individuals’ families that remain in China; the Chinese government has been known to hold the family members of their critics hostage. Third, there has been an increase in Uyghurs seeking citizenship in the countries to which they flee. For a while this was not the case, as families hoped to one day return home; however, they are increasingly losing contact with those who remain in China. According to Reyhan, these previous three points have culminated in a collective depression, which is bound to have many psychological effects, especially on the affected children. Finally, there has been an increasing loss in research and study of the Uyghurs, as many academics—Chinese and foreigners alike—have disappeared or been silenced by Chinese government officials.

The conversation then shifted to the actions, or rather the lack of actions, taken in response to the situation in China. Nicole Morgret emphasized the role of the private sector in recognizing and acting against Chinese textile and other industries, which have profited from the forced labor of thousands of Uyghurs. She applauded the United States in placing twenty-eight entities on the “Entities List,” which would prevent American companies from selling their products to the identified Chinese entities without a specific license. However, she criticized the lack of broader global response to the situation, encouraging these actors to consider more than the short-term implications of speaking out against China.

Sophie Richardson addressed the need for accountability on a national and international scale to confront the Chinese government. While many states and individual actors have failed to act due to China’s increasing power and influence in the global market, she does not discredit growing trends of Islamophobia in shaping the conflict, as the Uyghur community is Muslim. Richardson asked the audience to consider the broader implications if China remains unchecked in its blatant violations of human rights.

To conclude, the panelists alluded to the rise of ethnocentric sentiment throughout the world and its role in the larger prerogative of the Chinese government. They urged global actors and civilians alike to unite and be courageous in standing up to the Chinese. “There’s no reason that an Uyghur person or child should have any fewer rights than I do,” suggested Richardson.
Chris Blattman explored the notion that “war is the exception, not the rule,” by attempting to explain the motivations and incentives for why adversaries ultimately choose to fight. To illustrate this claim, Blattman drew on a case study of Medellín, Colombia’s second-largest city and industrial and commercial heartland. Medellín, located in a valley, is overlooked by hillside barrios, which have been largely ignored and underdeveloped by local government. As a result, gangs, locally known as combos, have maintained order in this area with a presence in each low- and middle-income neighborhood.

Blattman drew on the example of the 2012 “Billiards War” at Medellín’s Bella Vista Prison to explain how this vast network of gangs interacts with one another throughout the city. During this incident, two members from rival gangs initiated a fight over a botched billiards game, resulting in twenty-three injuries and hostile sentiments between the rival gangs. One would expect this incident to initiate a march to war—a mobilization of gang members outside the jail, an activation of alliances with other gangs, and an endless spiral of killings. Surprisingly, however, the leaders of these rival gangs chose to find a path to peace.

How can one explain why some rival parties choose to march toward war, while others walk down a path of peace? Blattman ultimately identified five incentives that incite conflict: 1) unchecked leaders who rarely bear the costs of war; 2) violent tastes and struggles for vengeance or glory; 3) irrational behavior and the overconfidence of leaders; 4) uncertainty and lack of accurate information about rivals; and 5) commitment problems.

Though combo leaders are often unchecked, overconfident, and exhibit many of the aforementioned incentives, more prominent crime lords are often able to negotiate peace between these combos by reminding each side of the costs of war. The loss of drug money, deaths of soldiers, unwanted media exposure, and risks of imprisonment often disincentivize adversaries from initiating war. The reality is that war is extremely ruinous, and leaders often opt to prevent these losses by engaging in negotiations for compromise.

Blattman concluded by offering the following thought: Medellín is an analogy for the world. He compared the globe to “a patchwork of rival territories,” where leaders often assume that war is an easier route to pursue than peace. However, according to Blattman, this assumption is mistaken for two reasons. First, the prominence of existing conflicts makes it very easy to forget the countless compromises negotiated each day to achieve peace. Second, peace is often assumed to be about brotherhood, harmony, and love; while this is an idealistic sentiment, Blattman offered the simpler notion: peace is merely about tipping the incentives of leaders just far enough from the march to war, in turn nudging them toward a path of peace as “bitter, grudging rivals.”
Convening Influential Thinkers

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