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The Geopolitical Strategy of Refugee Camps

Abstract: When developing countries are faced with a refugee crisis, their policy selection simultaneously invites humanitarian aid into the country, addresses domestic political interests associated with inviting outsiders in, and creates potential space for a neighboring country’s rebel group to exploit refugees fleeing a civil war. Inviting humanitarian aid into a developing county might at first glance seem like a welfare-improving decision. However, this choice involves delegation with foreseeable consequences. International humanitarian groups will organize refugees and the provision of aid efficiently, which armed actors can exploit. Delegating international protection in a way that appeases domestic constituents and does not alter interstate relationships, may prove impossible. This article shows that strategic refugee policy involves asylum countries carefully balancing demands of domestic constituents against efficient provision of aid and the provocation of armed actors across an international border. The research offers an alternative explanation for refugee policy that relies on neither illiberal intentions toward refugees nor the incapacity of countries to control their territory. Refugee policy outcomes are the product of strategic balancing between domestic demands and foreign policy interests. In the Analytic Narrative tradition, the claims of this article are based on a series of case studies. The theory and its implications, though, provide insight into refugee policy selection across the developing world.

Working Paper

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